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PART ONE 
Alternative dispute resolution system in some European countries 
The Part One deals with the most significant alternative dispute resolution systems 
in various European countries. We intend to introduce their historical development, 
however, this chapter will introduce mainly their recent systems. 
Chapter 1 
Settlement of labour disputes in Belgium 
1. The Development of the Settlement of Labour Disputes 
The Belgian settlement of labour disputes through other means than adjudication 
began at the end of the 18th century and emanated from various institutions. 
The settlement of labour disputes arising from the individual contract of 
employment was first performed by the Vrederechter/Juge de Paix and by the 
Werkrechtersraden/Conseils de Prud'hommes. 
The settlement of collective labour disputes originated in the Nijverheids of 
Arbeidsraden. In 1926 these Nijverheids- of Arbeidsraden/Conseils de I'Industrie et du 
Travail were supplemented by the Ambtelijke Scheids- en Verzoeningsraden/Comités 
Off ciels de Conciliation et d'Arbitrage and established by the Government. At the 
same time settlement of collective labour disputes was also performed by the Paritaire 
Comités/Commissions de Paritaires. 
At present these Paritaire Comités together with the Sociaal 
Bemiddelaar/Conciliateur Social are the most important institutions involved in the 
settlement of collective labour disputes. The Paritaire Comités are composed of 
representatives of the employers' organisations and the trade unions. They are usually 
chaired by a Sociaal Bemiddelaar. The function of Sociaal Bemiddelaar emerged from 
the inspection of health and safety in enterprises. Through the institution of the 
` The research for this paper was undertaken as part of the research project for Bolyai János Grant. The 
author indebted to his colleagues at the Faculty of Law of Szeged University, Szeged, Hungary. Special 
appreciation for their support goes to Prof. Steven Adler (Supreme Court, Israel); Prof. Rolf Birk (University of 
Trier, Germany); Prof. Matthew Finkin (University of Illinois, USA); Prof. Lela P. Love (Cardozo Law School, 
New York); Prof. Masahiro Ken Kuwahara (Aichi Gakuin University, Nagoya, Japan) Prof. Laszló Nagy 
(Szeged University, Hungary) and to Associate Prof. Károly Tóth, who carefully and scrupulously edited this 
paper. I also would like to express my many thanks to my wife (Yoshie Akasaka) for her support and patience 
during my research. — The author is an associate professor (Ph.D.) at the Department of Labour Law and Social 
Security at the Faculty of Law of Szeged University, Szeged in Hungary. 
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Sociaal Bemiddelaar the role of the Government in the settlement of labour disputes 
has become increasingly interventionistic. 
2. The present system 
2.1. The Labour Relations Service: the Joint Committees and the Mediation Officers 
In Belgium the present institutionalised settlement of collective labour disputes is 
largely the result of the institutions described in the former sections of this Chapter and 
framed within -the Dienst -- van- de -Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen/Service des 
Relations Collectives de Travail (Labour Relations Service). The leading actors in the 
settlement proceedings are the Verzoeningsbureaus/ Bureaux de Conciliation 
(Conciliation Bureaus), established within the Paritaire Comités/Commissions de 
Paritaires (Joint Committees), and the Sociaal Bemiddelaars/Conciliateurs Sociaux 
(Mediation Officers). These institutions function on a voluntary basis. The 
competencies of both the Paritaire Comités and the Sociaal Bemiddelaars are statutory 
based. 
2.1.1. The establishment and the statutory basis of the labour relations service 
The Dienst van de Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen is responsible for facilitating 
the settlement of collective labour disputes. The Service has been special branch of the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour since 1 November 1969 and is established in 
Brussels. 
The assignments of the service are laid down in the Royal Decree of 23 July 1969, 
which provides for the establishment of the Dienst van de Collectieve 
Arbeidsbetrekkingen and its statute.' S. 2 of the Royal Decree states that the Office has 
the duty: 
to contribute to the development and regulation of collective labour relations 
between employers and employees; to perform all administrative functions and 
assignment laid down in the Act of 5 December 1968 concerning collective agreements 
and Joint Committee; 
to co-operate in the prevention of collective social disputes; to perform social 
mediation assignments; to report to the Minister of Employment and Labour with 
respect to social relationships within a branch of industry, within a sector of industry 
or within a particular company. 2 
The tasks of the Service are distributed over three divisions of the Dienst van de 
Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen, that is the Directorate of General Affairs which is 
responsible for the guidance and administration of the Paritaire Comités and the 
registration of the collective agreements, the Secretariat of the Sociaal Bemiddelaars 
and the Directorate Research and Documentation. 
' The following amendments were effectuated by the Royal Decree of March 1977. 
2 Royal Decree of 23 July 1969, Monit. 30 July 1969. 
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The Directorates General Affairs and Documentation and Research do mainly 
preparatory work. Apart from their performance as chairpersons of the Paritaire 
Comités, the Sociaal Bemiddelaars are chiefly involved with the mediation work of the 
Service.' 
Since the establishment of the Service its competence is extended continuously, not 
only through various Acts but also through regulations with respect to Paritaire 
Comités and through provisions in collective agreements. 
2.1.2. The organisation of the labour relations service 
The Dienst van de Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen is staffed by 149 civil servants.' 
At the top of the Service there is the Administrateur-Generaal (Administrator 
General).' He/she is the overall manager of the Service and directly responsible to the 
Minister of Employment and Labour and is recruited from among the Sociaal 
Bemiddelaars. 6 The requirements to qualify for this functions are laid down in s. 10 of 
the Royal Decree of 23 July 1969.' His/her main responsibility is to ensure that the 
Service supports and facilitates collective bargaining by providing the Paritaire 
Comités with logistic support and the settlement of collective disputes. 
2.1.3. The Labour Relations Service: conciliation or mediation? 
Preferably the Belgian Government does not intervene in the collective bargaining 
machinery, since the autonomy of the parties should be left intact as far as possible. 
Nevertheless, the Government plays an important role in the settlement of collective 
labour disputes through the intervention of the Sociaal Bemiddelaars which function 
within the Dienst van de Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen. The Service assesses the 
conciliation/mediation task as one of its primary responsibilities.' In Belgian labour 
relations not much value is attached to the distinction between conciliation and 
mediation.' This might be the reason why in the French text of the legislation the 
Sociaal Bemiddelaar is translated as Conciliateur Social. In the opinion of the 
Administrateur-Generaal the distinction is regarded highly artificial since both the 
Paritaire Comités and the Sociaal Bemiddelaars are making settlement proposals. If a 
distinction should be made, it is considered that conciliation is focused on contributing 
to the negotiations between the parties and offering goede diensten (good services). 
The focus of mediation is on making non-binding settlements agreements. The French 
' The present organization of the Labour Relations Service differs slightly from s. 3 of the Royal Decree of 
1969 which says that the Service has a Directorate for the Joint Committees and Collective Labour Agreements, a 
Directorate for the Mediation Officers, and a Secretariate. 
The Labour Relations Service kindly provided us with these data. 
' S. 4, Royal Decree of 23 July, Monit. 30 July 1969. 
6 At present Mr. J.L. Rombouts is the Administrateur-Generaal. 
' To perform this function a person must be a civil servant, 35 years of age, physically able and have at least 
ten years of experience in the relationships between employers and workers/employees. 
This was said to us during the meeting we had with the Administrateur-Generaal, Mr. J.L. Rombouts, in 
April 1992. 
9 J.L. Rombouts (1992), o.c., p.12. 
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do distinguish between conciliation and mediation, as do the British as practised in 
collective labour disputes. 
2.2. The Joint Committees 
In Belgium institutionalised collective bargaining and prevention and resolution of 
collective disputes largely take place through the Paritaire Comités/Commissions de 
Paritaires under the chairmanship of the Sociaal Bemiddelaars. On 1 January 1993 
101 Paritaire Comités and 60 Paritaire Subcomités were administrated by the 
Service. 10 In these committees 3034 persons take part of which the majority of the 
members sit in more than one Paritaire Comité. On average a Paritair Comité has 20 
members. 
The present statutory framework of the Paritaire Comités is laid down in the Wet 
betreffende de Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomsten en de Paritaire Comités (Act 
regarding the Collective Agreements and the Joint Committees) of S December 1968. 
This Act does not cover civil servants." 
The conciliation competence of the Paritaire Comités is not exclusive and that also 
applies to the Sociaal Bemiddelaars. The Act of 1968 allows every person to act as a 
third party on the condition that he is fully accepted by the parties." It happens that a 
local or national politician acts as a mediator on a purely  ad hoc basis on his own 
motion or on the request of the parties." 
The importance of the Paritaire Comités for Belgian labour relations is beyond 
doubt. Often they are regarded as the legislators of labour relations. Within these 
committees substantive labour regulations are shaped, for example through the 
conclusion of collective agreements. The regulations of the Paritaire Comités can be 
regarded therefore as a major source of social law. Also their importance is due to their 
contribution to the settlement of labour disputes. 
S. 35 of the Act of 1968 allows the King to set up Paritaire Comités either on his 
own motion or on the request of one or more professional organisations of employers 
and workers/employees. The competence of the King to establish Paritaire Comités on 
his own motion is new. The Decree-Act of 9 June 1945 allowed the parties alone to 
take such initiatives. The range of the Act of 1968 is wider. The Paritaire Comités are 
no longer permitted in particular private sectors only. The 1968 Act has a general 
scope. As a result of this extension all existing Paritaire Comités were newly 
established. 
2.2.1. Functioning 
The private regulations of the Paritaire Comités and the Paritaire Subcomités, 
which are administered by the Directorate of General Affairs, contain the proceedings 
of their operations. 
10 The Service holds a list of all the Paritaire Comités, the Paritaire Subcomités and their chair-persons. 
This list is published annually. 
" S. 2, para. 3, ss. I of Act on Collective Agreements of 5 December 1968. 
12 M. Rigaux (1986), o.c., p. 29. 
13 Ibid., p. 29. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems in the sphere of labour law... — 7 
The Paritaire Comités meet on the initiative of either the chairperson or on the 
request of one of the organisations represented. There are Paritaire Cornités which 
meet regularly, for instance, twice a month or on an ad hoc basis. The meetings are not 
public. The actions of or within the Paritaire Comités have legal effect only when at 
least half of the representatives of the employers and half of the representatives are 
present. The members have the right to vote. The chairperson, deputy chairperson and 
the secretaries do not. Decisions are taken by unanimity of the members present." 
2.3. The Mediation Officers 
The Belgian Mediation Officers (Sociaal Bemiddelaars) are high ranked civil 
servants. There are 22 Mediatión Officers of whom four are Senior Mediation Officers, 
nine Sociaal Bemiddelaars and nine Adjunct Sociaal Bemiddelaars. Of these 22 there 
are three female Sociaal Bemiddelaars. The number of Mediation Officers has been 
extended considerably since the first two were appointed in 1947. As far as the 
performance of the function is concerned the differences in rank are theoretical.'S 
Financially there is a difference. 
The Mediation Officers are especially assigned to: 
— watch over the prevention of social disputes and to follow the outbreak, the course 
and the termination thereof; 
— fulfil every mediation assignment; 
— keep in permanent contact with the professional organisations of the employers 
and the employees and with the Social Inspectors and Controllers of the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour; 
— draft all reports with respect the social relations within a branch of industry, 
within a sector of industry or within a particular industry. 
The Mediation Officers are recruited from various categories such as organisations of 
employers and workers/employees. Special education is not required. Therefore 
Sociaal Bemiddelaars may be appointed without having a university degree. The trend 
is that for a number of reasons, but particularly because of the increasing complexity of 
labour regulations, persons without a particular degree are seldom appointed. 
The first Mediation Officers learned the profession on the job and this is still the 
practice today. There is no special training course as for example the ACAS in GB has 
developed for the individual and collective conciliators. 
The Mediation Officers may face disciplinary measures in case of malfunctioning. 
Such measures are taken by the Minister on the advice of the Administrateur-Generaal 
who has the responsibility for carrying out. This illustrates again that the Sociaal 
Bemiddelaar is not a regular civil servant. The result of his malfunctioning may be 
that he is assigned with less mediation work. . 
" This norm is only deviated from when other Acts require it. S. 24 of the Act of 1968 requires that for the 
conclusion of collective agreements all members must agree. 
is The rank of Eerste Sociale Bemiddelaar or Super Sociaal Bemiddelaar (Senior Mediation Officer) was 
introduced by the Royal Decree of 8 March 1977. This Decree did not allow persons to become Mediation Officer 
or Administrator General who had not functioned as associate mediation officers first. It was again amended by 
Royal Decree of 13 January 1978. 
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2.4. The Mediation Procedure of the Joint Committees and the Mediation Officers in 
Practice 
The Paritaire Comités and their Verzoeningsbureaus/Bureaux de Conciliation or 
the parties themselves are responsible for the settlement of collective labour disputes. 
According to Rombouts the settlement of collective labour disputes through 
conciliation and/or mediation and collective negotiations are part of een zelfde sociaal 
proces (one and the same social process). 16 The settlement of individual disputes is 
allotted to the Arbeidsrechtbanken since 1970. This division, however, is less • strict 
then it seems. Paritaire Comités may also be involved in individual disputes." Based 
on figures of the years 1962 and 1963 Devisé says that the Paritaire Comités 
sometimes even functioned as the porch to the Werkrechtersraden. At present also 
individual disputes are handled by the Paritaire Comités. 
The normal pattern for the resolution of collective labour disputes in Belgium is 
that first conciliation is tried and, if necessary, mediation is resorted to. The 
institutions involved in this process are the Verzoeningsbureaus of the Paritaire 
Comités and, if necessary, the Sociaal Bemiddelaars. There is no significant role to 
play for the Arbeidsrechtbanken." The tradition of voluntarism expects parties to make 
their own provisions and to resort to their own procedures in case of a dispute. 19 
Conciliation and/or mediation are strongly intertwined in the Belgian system of 
collective bargaining and practised either on a formal or an informal basis, unlike 
„formal" conciliation as practised . by the ACAS conciliators. Informal 
conciliation/mediation is called "preventive" conciliation since it is practised when 
there is yet no open conflict. It takes place during the initial stage of collective 
bargaining when the spokesmen of both sides of industry are still deliberating with 
each other and with their own rank and file. Formal conciliation is sometimes typified 
as „curative". 
2.4.1. The conciliation bureaus 
The assignment to prevent and settle disputes between employers and 
Workers/employees as laid down in s. 38 of the Act of 5 December 1968 is not very 
explicit. How conciliation/mediation should be performed by the Paritaire Comités is 
not clear. The Royal Decree of 6 November 1969 tot Vaststelling van de Algemene 
Regels voor de Werking van de Paritaire Comités en Paritaire Sub joint cornittees (on 
the Determination of the General Rules for the Functioning of the Paritaire Comités 
16 J.L. Rombouts (1993), o.c., p. 4. 
17 H. Devisé (1964), o.c., p. 560. The Treu Report (1984), Luxembourg, p. 9. J.L. Rombouts (1992), o.c., p. 
14. 
18 Scholarly opinion in Belgium is, however, divided on the issue of where to draw the boundary line of the 
competence area of the Arbeidsrechtbanken. After discussing the different points of view, Rigaux concludes that 
the strongest evidence supports of the view that Arbeidsrechtbanken do have jurisdiction in collective disputes 
over rights. M. Rigaux (1986), o.c., p. 17. In practice, collective disputes are not often referred to the 
Arbeidsrechtbanken, but more frequently to the Presidents of the Rechtbanken van eerste aanleg (the regular 
courts of firt instance). 
19 M. Rigaux (1986), o.c., p. 18. 
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and the Paritaire Sub jointcomités) is more clear. Nevertheless, the Royal Decree, as 
the 1968 Act, does not give any indications on the limitations of their competence. 
Stage I: how the Conciliation Bureaus become involved. When the 
representatives of the employers and the workers/employees at the level of the 
enterprise fail to bring about a settlement, the Verzoeningsbureaus of the Paritaire 
Comités become involved. Although the Belgian system of labour dispute settlement is 
voluntary, the parties are nevertheless expected to follow the proceedings of the 
Verzoeningsbureaus as provided for in the private regulations of the Paritaire Comités, 
before they decide to strike or to have a lock-out. Such regulations, however, cannot 
prevent wildcat strikes completely. The proceedings of the Verzoeningsbureaus are 
usually standardised. Sometimes a Verzoeningsvergadering (Conciliation meeting) is 
convened at the level of the enterprise before the regular (formal) bargaining structure 
is resorted to. 20 
General practice is that the Verzoeningsbureaus are asked to intervene by the party 
most concerned on the basis of a bondig dossier (firm file). Our survey confirms that 
most of the time, one or both of the disputing parties take the initiative to involve the 
Verzoeningsbureaus. Less frequently, the members of the Verzoeningsbureaus take the 
initiative to conciliate. Even less frequent are those cases whereby the Chairman of the 
Paritaire Comités or Sociaal Bemiddelaars take the initiative. Occasionally, it is the 
Minister who asks the Verzoeningsbureaus to interfere. According to the respondents 
in our survey, the reasons for parties to involve the Verzoeningsbureaus are: the 
expectation finding the Chairmen-Sociaal Bemiddelaars siding with them and finding 
a way out of a deadlock, preferably without loss of face. Parties who are signatories to a 
collective agreement are on the whole more co-operative and careful of safeguarding 
the balance of power established in the agreement. Non-signatory parties, particularly 
employers, are not very motivated to co-operate. 
Stage II: development of the conciliation process. After the Verzoeningsbureaus 
have been informed of the dispute they arrange a hearing. The function of such hearing 
is to obtain information by learning the points of view of the parties and by asking 
them questions. The party who asked for the intervention of the Verzoeningsbureau is 
given the opportunity to explain his/her view of the dispute first. At this stage the 
Verzoeningsbureaus do not voice their opinion, because after this hearing, which is an 
information round, the chairpersons suspend the hearing to deliberate together with the 
other members of the Paritaire Comités. The suspension of the hearing may have an 
important function. It often happens that during this pause the members of the 
Verzoeningsbureaus, with mutual agreement and in consultation with the chairpersons, 
take the pulse of their organisations of which they are the representatives. They try to 
find out whether some of the proposals of the Verzoeningsbureaus may have any 
chance of success. It gives them an excellent opportunity to learn the difficulties which 
may be considered in the final proposal of the Verzoeningsbureaus. This kind of 
actions, which can be regarded as side meetings, have a rather informal character 
which match the Belgian system. The parties dominate the process and their autonomy 
is left intact as far as possible. During this stage the chairpersons stay aloof. These 
20 J.L. Rombouts (1992), o.c., p. 6. 
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actions belong to what is named collectieve sociale bemiddeling (collective social 
mediation), but consultation may be a better term2l . 
After their return to the Verzoeningsbureaus the members try to formulate a 
unanimous point of view. The Verzoeningsbureaus continue, after the deliberations, 
the hearing to communicate their viewpoint to the parties. The parties are not obliged 
to accept the proposal since the whole procedure of conciliation/mediation is based on 
voluntariness. Nevertheless, the majority of proposals as recommended by the 
Verzoeningsbureaus are accepted. Our survey confirms that 75% to 100% of disputes 
referred to the Verzoeningsbureaus during 1992 were conciliated successfully. The 
100% figure is explained by the respondents from the excellent atmosphere in the 
Verzoeningsbureaus. This depends, however, on the particular branch of industry. 
The proposals for the settlement of the dispute are made by the representatives of 
the parties. A neutral approach by the Sociaal Bemiddelaars at this stage is essential. 
Expressing ideas on the matter openly can imply that one of the parties or both may 
refuse to accept their intervention in the future. They should keep a low profile. The 
whole process through their position is delicate. 
Usually one or two meetings are needed to reach agreement. At average four to six 
hours, including preparation time, are spent on the completion of a 
conciliation/mediation procedure. Some attempts are more difficult such as the 
restructuring and close-down of enterprises and disputes where strikes or work-ins 
have already started. The meetings of the Verzoeningsbureaus usually take place at the 
offices of the Service in Brussels. There are Paritaire Comités which have their own 
facilities: Parties are not often represented by lawyers. The number of instances in 
which they are involved, however, is growing. In some branches up to 60% of the 
disputes submitted may involve lawyers. Lawyers are considered to have a distinct 
negative impact on the conciliation/mediation process. They tend to be legalistic and 
do not have an open eye for the positive impact of consensus on the relationship 
between the parties. Rather, they try to involve the courts in order to have a yes-or-no 
solution. According to one of the respondents judges are not professional conciliators. 
C. Stage III: the Settlement and its legal consequences. If there is agreement, the 
dispute is terminated. The agreement may or may not have a legal status. Frequently, 
the conciliated settlements take the character of an recommendation of the Conciliation 
Bureau. Such recommendations are only morally binding. They are not usually ignored 
as this may jeopardise the sociale vrede (social peace) within a branch of industry. 
Settlements may also result in the conclusion of a new collective agreement or a 
change in an existing agreement. In those situations, the settlement agreement, being a 
collective agreement, becomes legally binding between the parties once it is neergelegd 
(officially registered or deposited) with and approved by the Minister of Employment. 
Approval follows if the agreement conforms with the ss. 13-16 of the 1968 Act on 
Collective Agreements. 22 If the settlement constitutes a collective agreement and the 
parties presented do not have a proxy to sign, further consultations are necessary, for 
instance, with the full Paritaire Comité if the agreement refers to a particular branch 
21  Ibid., p. 28. 
22  The procedure is laid down in s. 18 of the 1968 Act. This ministerial approval is to be distinguished from 
the approval needed to make an agreement binding erga omnes. 
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of industry.' In any case, the respondents hold that parties may not unilaterally change 
their minds once agreement has been reached. The conciliated settlement is laid down 
in a standard form, which is signed by the parties, the members of the 
Verzoeningsbureaus and/or the Chairmen-Sociaal Bemiddelaars. When the 
conciliation/mediation fails a minutes of non-conciliation is drawn up. Both the 
successful and the non-successful attempts at conciliation/mediation by the 
Verzoeningsbureaus are communicated to the Ministry through the Chairman-Sociaal 
Bemiddelaar. 
2.4.2. Chairman or mediator? 
Unanimity within the Verzoeningsbureaus is not always reached due to 
disagreement among the members of the bureau or a just solution cannot be found. If 
that occurs the Chairmen-Sociaal Bemiddelaars may put forward a proposal not 
directly opposed by either party and whereby harmony can be kept. They can also 
suggest to the parties to opt for mediation. This emphasises their role of Sociaal 
Bemiddelaars. They can decide to continue co-operation with the other members of the 
Verzoeningsbureaus and give their opinion clearly and thereby becoming less tied of 
the Verzoeningsbureaus. They can also suspend the hearing to consult the parties 
separately without the members of the Verzoeningsbureaus. At all times the 
chairpersons-Sociaal Bemiddelaars must carefully weigh which options are most 
successful. 
They rely on themselves fully, Finally they can interfere on their own motion or on 
the request of the Minister. They will then assist and advise the parties independently. 
By then their role has changed into that of the Sociaal Bemiddelaar. 
2.4.3. The mediation officer 
The conciliation/mediation practice of the Sociaal Bemiddelaars can now be 
described briefly, as there are few differences from their role as chairpersons of the 
Verzoeningsbureaus. The most important difference, as we saw, was that the Sociaal 
Bemiddelaars assume a more robust role than the role they performed as chairmen. As 
one of the Sociaal Bemiddelaars expressed it to us: ge gaat van pit veranderen (you 
are then shifting to a different gear), 
Through various channels the Sociaal Bemiddelaar is notified of social conflicts. 
They may be familiar with many of the disputes through their chairmanship of 
Paritaire Comités. Contacts with the organisations of employers and 
workers/employees and access to the reports of the Social Inspectors are other 
important sources of information. On their own motion or on the request of a party or 
the Minister of Employment and Labour they commence to mediate. The primary 
purpose is to renew the negotiations, To reach this, they are free in adapting strategies 
which they consider appropriate. 
23 Such further consultations may not be necessary if it concerns an agreement at enterprise level and the 
responsible employer and union delegates are involved. 
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The Sociaal Bemiddelaars and chairpersons of Paritaire Comités we interviewed, 
were all very positive about their continuous involvement in the whole process of 
collective bargaining. This fact, and the relationship of confidence that is thus being 
built up towards a particular branch of industry, is thought to be highly instrumental 
for the success of this Belgian institution. 
Summary 
In Belgium the Vrederechter/Juge de Paix was the first institution primarily 
responsible for the settlement of labour disputes arising from the individual contractual 
relationship through other means than adjudication, that is conciliation. The role and 
importance of this institution, framed on the French Juge de Paix, decreased when the 
Werkrechtersraden/Conseils des Prud'hommes were established. The first 
Werkrechtersraden were established in 1811 and 1813 respectively. The 
Werkrechtersraden originated in the French Conseils des Prud'hommes. Their primary 
function was to conciliate conflicts arising from the individual contract of employment. 
From 1842 onwards the Belgian Government itself regularly promulgated legislation 
Concerning the Werkrechtersraden. The reasons to change the legislation was 
democratisation. 
After World War II the Sociaal Bemiddelaars were introduced as professional 
mediators. They derived their mediation function from the Sociale Inspecteurs and 
Sociale Controleurs who were responsible for inspecting health and safety within the 
factories. The Sociaal Bemiddelaars together with the Paritaire Comités are presently 
involved in the settlement of collective disputes. The Sociaal Bemiddelaars were given 
a statutory footing on 27 July 1964. Their assignments were further elaborated in the 
Wet betreffende de Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomsten en de Paritaire Comités of 5 
December 1968 and the Royal Decree of 23 July 1969. 
The Paritaire Comités and the Sociaal Bemiddelaars are assisted by the Dienst van 
de Collectieve Arbeidsbetrekkingen. This Service was established on 1 November 
1969. The overall manager of the Service is the Administrateur- Generaal. 
The present Belgian settlement machinery is based on voluntariness, although the 
role of the Government has become more interventionist." 
24  This sub-chapter based mainly on the work of Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling Labour Disputes 
in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. 
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Chapter 2 
Settlement of labour disputes in Denmark 
According to our knowledge, Denmark was the first European country to recognise 
trade unions. This happened as early as 1849. Collective bargaining developed during 
the second half of the 19th century at various levels. In 1898 the trade unions and 
organisations of employers associations set up a joint body for the settlement of labour 
disputes as a private initiative. Its main task was to decide whether existing collective 
agreements were respected. 
In September 1899 the first nation-wide agreement was concluded. This agreement, 
the September Forget (September Agreement), became the basic document for the 
industrial relations system in Denmark. It laid down some essential "rules of the 
game".0 Strikes were accepted, but due notice had to be given. 
In 1908 the August Commission was established inquiring into the possibilities to 
set up arbitration courts or labour courts. The Commission was composed of 
representatives of the leading union Landsorganisationen i Danmark (Danish 
Federation of Trade Unions), abbreviated Lo and the leading employers" association 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Danish Employers" Federation), abbreviated DA and an 
independent chairman. This Commission distinguished between disputes over interests 
and disputes over rights. For the first category of disputes, that is disputes arising from 
the negotiation of new collective agreements, the use of legal force was perceived as 
the appropriate means to settle disputes. In order for strikes and lock-outs to be lawful, 
rules about prior notice had to be observed. The services of an independent conciliator 
were considered to be appropriate in finding a way out in situations of deadlock. The 
Forligmandsloven (Public Conciliator) was introduced on a statutory basis through the 
Act on Public Conciliators of 1908. 
For collective disputes over rights, a further distinction was made between disputes 
over the interpretation of existing collective agreements and disputes arising from 
alleged infringements of an existing collective agreement. For the first subcategory of 
disputes, it was held that parties themselves should adopt settlement clauses into the 
collective agreements concluded in their particular branch of industry. Should parties 
have difficulties in drafting such a clause, then they could lean upon a set of model 
rules, drafted under the auspices of the August Commission between the Lo and DA. 
For the subcategory of collective disputes arising from alleged infringements on 
existing collective agreements a Arbejdsretten (Labour Court) was suggested and 
established through the Labour Court Act of 1910. 
A separate Arbitration Court was set up in the same year to deal with disputes 
arising from alleged infringements of the framework agreement of September 1899. 
Thus a multi-track system of dispute settlement evolved in which the distinction 
between disputes over interests versus disputes over rights was predominant. This 
multi-track system still is, although there have been minor changes. The Labour Court 
Act was replaced by a new Act in 1973, retaining the basic principles of the old 
legislation. 
zs  P. Jacobsen (1989), Denmark, in International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
(R. Blanpain ed.), Deventer. 
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The Public Conciliator system of 1910 was modified in 1927, when the number of 
Public Conciliators was extended to three. The amendment of 1927 also explicitly 
provided that the Public Conciliators could intervene in collective disputes, either on 
their own motion or upon the request of either party. 
These procedures were established for disputes of a collective nature. It may be 
questioned whether individual labour disputes, as a distinct category, are at all 
distinguished from collective disputes in Denmark. The answer to this question is: 
hardly. The reason for this may be that the Danish labour relations system is 
characterised by a high degree of unionisation: 80% of all employees is member of a 
trade union. The majority of employees in Denmark is covered by a collective 
agreement. 26  
Typical for the Danish system of collective bargaining machinery is the hierarchy 
of collective agreements, concluded at the national, industry, and enterprise level. In 
the conclusion of collective agreements the central organisations of employers and 
employees, Lo and DA, play a predominant role. At the top of this hierarchy is the 
Economic Advisory Council, a tripartite agency where all major social policy issues are 
discussed. For example, projects of new employment legislation are usually first 
discussed in consultation with the central organisations of employers and unions. 
Therefore, industrial relations in Denmark are regulated by framework agreements 
and detailed collective agreements primarily and only to a small extent by legislation. 
Issues regulated by collective agreement in Denmark are, for example, full pay during 
periods of illness and paid maternity leave. Such issues are in other countries of the 
European Community regulated by law primarily. 
Detailed rules are worked out to regulate the entire bargaining machinery , process. 
All renewals of collective agreements have to take place at the same time. Most 
collective agreements contain a peace obligation during the period of validity. Apart 
from that, the first basic collective agreement, that i is the September Agreement of 
1899 and revised in 1960, still provides that notice must be given prior to a strike. 
As in other European countries, the Danish bargaining underwent a process of 
decentralisation. For example, wages are increasingly negotiated at workplace level. 
The central level, however, still assumes an important role" in devising national 
framework agreements. Both sides of industry are eager to retain control over the 
system of nation-wide bargaining. It gives them an opportunity to influence the 
national economy. Due to the fact that a majority of individual employment contracts is 
covered by collective agreements has effected the settlement of individual labour 
disputes. Such disputes often involve the contents of collective agreements. Therefore, 
it is the Labour Court or one of the conventional conciliation/mediation committees 
that hear the disputes. Yet, in 1987 a special arbitration board, the Board of 
Dismissals, was established to deal with disputes arising from individual dismissals, 
but only after some preliminary steps were taken. These institutions have in common 
that their jurisdiction is exclusive. It implies that disputes under their jurisdiction 
cannot be brought before the regular courts. Neither is it possible to appeal against a 
decision of the Labour Court. The Labour Court has jurisdiction over all disputes 
arising from an alleged infringement of collective agreements. The Court consists of 
26 11e Danish Ministry of Labour (1993), Labour Market Consensus, Copenhagen. 
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twelve lay judges nominated by the two parties, of which six are nominated by the 
employers and six by the trade unions. As the jurisdiction of the Labour Court also 
extends to the public sector, two out of the six representatives for the employers" side 
are high ranked civil servant managers. The lay judges together elect a president, who 
is usually a judge of the Supreme Court. Because of its composition, the Labour Court 
is regarded by both sides of industry as their "own" court, although it is based on 
legislation. 
The Labour Courts may impose penalties on individuals and organisations for 
breach of collective agreements, including the breach of a peace obligation. If 
employees refuse to accept that a strike called out constitutes a breach of the 
agreement, the case is listed for a proper hearing. In the period leading up to the 
hearing the president makes mediation attempts in 90% of all cases. 27 
The other institution of major importance in Danish labour dispute settlement is the 
Public Conciliator. There are at present three Public Conciliators, and thirteen 
assistant Conciliators. 26 They may operate as a Board of Conciliation. In that case, they 
choose a chairman from their midst. 
The Public Conciliators are appointed by the Minister of Labour for a period of 
three years. It is watched that not everyone of them is replaced at the same time. The 
Act on Public Conciliators, dating back to 1910, as amended in 1927, was 
complemented by a Regulation in 1958, which provides more detailed rules for the 
mode of operation of the Public Conciliator. 
According to s. 4 of this Regulation of 1958, the Conciliator may indicate to the 
parties which concessions he would regard instrumental in achieving an amicable 
settlement. The Public Conciliator may also advise the parties to resume bilateral 
negotiations, if he has the impression that the parties have not yet sufficiently 
discussed the subject matter at hand. The Conciliator, therefore, has powers to 
conciliate as well as to mediate. 
The parties appearing before the Conciliator are responsible for providing all the 
materials and documents needed. 
An aspect of the procedure before the Public Conciliator that is regarded as unique, 
is that the Conciliator, upon the submission of a request to conciliate, may decide that 
a strike or lock-out, on which notice has been given, is to be postponed. Such a 
"decision" of the Conciliator cannot be contravened easily by a union, as the balloting 
rules normally require a qualified majority for ignoring the Public Conciliator's 
proposal. 29 
If the Conciliator fails to reach an agreement, then political intervention may take 
place.'° 
In practice, the outcomes of political intervention tend to be similar to the proposals 
made by the Conciliator. This reinforces the credibility and authority of the Public 
Conciliator system. 
27 P. Jacobsen (1989), o.c. 
28 Commission of the European Communities, Mutual Information System on Employment Policies (MISEP) 
(1992), Basic Information Report on Denmark; institutions, procedures and measures, Brussels/Leiden, p. 15. 
29  The Danish Ministry of Labour (1993), o.c., p. 6. 
3° Ibid., p. 7. 
16 — JózsEF HAJDÚ 
The Danish system is regarded as very successful. For years, no major industrial 
dispute has arisen in Denmark in connection with the renewal of a collective 
agreement." 
Compared to the Labour Court and the Public Conciliator, the Board of Dismissals 
is a novel institution. 
A right not to be unfairly dismissed has been entrenched in statute law for 
employees in the public sector only. For the private sector the provisions on unfair 
dismissal are laid down in the Hovedapalen, the Basic Collective Agreements between 
DA and Lo. Section 4.3 of the Basic Agreement of 1973, as amended in 1993, provides 
that, although the employer basically has an unfettered right to manage and a right to 
dismiss, dismissals are held to be unfair if there is no reasonable ground. A reasonable 
ground must lie in either redundancy, or in malfunctioning of the employee. 
The Board of Dismissals can only become involved in the following manner when 
an employee is dismissed, he/she is entitled to be informed of the reason for the 
dismissal. If he/she is not satisfied that the reason is sufficient ground, he/she is 
entitled to have the question taken up by his shop steward. If this does not result in a 
solution, then the union of the employee has a right to have the question taken up with 
the organisation of the employer. If this also does not produce a solution, then the 
union is entitled to have the question decided by the Board of Dismissals. The Board 
can order reinstatement of the dismissed employee. 
The predominant role of the unions is remarkable, in this procedure just as 
elsewhere in the Danish . labour relations system. This system is strongly 
institutionalised and highly collectivised. An interesting question is which changes 
European social policy will bring for Denmark. 12 
31  The Danish Ministry of Labour, the Danish Employers' Confederation and the Danish Confederation of 
Trade Unions (1991), Labour Relations in Denmark, The Self Regulatory System, Copenhagen, p. 15 and p. 24. 
32 Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 321-325. 
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Chapter 3 
Settlement of labour disputes in France 
1. The Development of the Settlement of Labour Disputes 
Just as in Britain, the only category of labour disputes recognised for a long time in 
France was individual labour disputes. During the (first) Napoleonic Empire, a new 
multi layer structure of courts was set up, entrusted with a general civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. 33 
Within this court system, disputes arising between masters and servants were 
brought under the jurisdiction of the Juge de Paix (Justice of the Peace)." The Juge de 
Paix constituted the grassroots level tribunal in the French court hierarchy. Unlike the 
British Justice of the Peace, the French Juge de Paix had jurisdiction in private law 
disputes primarily. 3S As early as 1806, however, a special court was authorised by the 
Emperor to hear particular kinds of individual labour disputes in the city of Lyon. This 
special court was the Conseil de Prud'hommes, which gradually assumed a wider 
jurisdiction and spread all over the country, eventually supplanting the jurisdiction of 
the Juge de Paix in labour disputes. Chronologically, the Conseil de Prud'hommes, 
although essentially a remainder from the preindustrial era, was the first specialised 
institution dealing with labour disputes in industrialised Europe, involving employers 
and workers as individual conciliators and/or judges. This mere fact made the Conseil 
a model, frequently studied or even copied by other European nations, including Great 
Britain. The Conseils have functioned continuously until the present. As an existing 
institution for labour dispute settlement, albeit with a long history, the Conseil is 
discussed separately in the next section. 
Other statutory procedures for the settlement of labour disputes outside the regular 
courts first emerged towards the end of the 19th century, notably in 1892. 
2. Conciliation and arbitration under the Act of 27 - 12 - 1892 
One of the underlying aims of the Waldeck-Rousseau Act of 1884 was to encourage 
friendly negotiations between the unions and employers. It was expected that the 
number of strikes would decrease, now that all barriers preventing . the unions from 
negotiating as an economic interest group were broken down. This expectation was not 
justified. The country soon faced new outbursts of strikes. As a consequence, several 
proposals for legislation were submitted in Parliament, all addressing the issue of how 
33 It would be wrong to say that as the result of the Revolution in 1789, a new court structure was conceived 
and implemented at once. Rather, a number of blueprints and changes to these blueprints were enacted during the 
entire revolutionary era of 1790-1810, under various political regimes. Reference is made to section 4.3.1.1. 
below for a more detailed analysis. 
34 S. 9 and s. 10, ss. 5, of the Goi of 16 August 1790 which was conceived by the Assemblée Nationale 
Constituante and established a nationwide system of courts and tribunals. 
33 C.M.G. ten Raa, Comparaison historique entre la justice de pair sur le Continent et le' justice of the peace' 
en Angleterre, in Conservare Jura. Actes des journées intemationales d'histoire du droit et des institutions 
(P.L. Neve and O. Moorman van Kappen eds.), Deventer 1988, p. 167-174. 
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to stop collective disputes and encourage industrial peace through conciliation or 
arbitration. These proposals, as well as the resulting Act are discussed below. 
2.1. The proposals for an Act on conciliation and arbitration 
The first proposals for legislation were submitted in one public and several private 
member bills. 3ó The proposals made differed from each other on three points: 
whether recourse to conciliation or arbitration should be voluntary or 
compulsory, and arbitral awards should be binding in law or not; 
whether conciliation -and/or arbitration -should- be conducted on an ad hoc 
basis or through a permanent institution; 
- whether an authority from outside the branches of industry concerned should 
be involved, either as a convener or as an umpire, and if so, whether this 
should be the Maire or a judge, particularly a Juge de Paix. 
Nearly all proposals refer to the experiences with conciliation and arbitration in other 
countries, particularly in the United States and in Great Britain. The names of 
Mundella and Kettle frequently recur in the documents concerned. 
Were there any private initiatives taken in France itself? There had been such 
initiatives and some were quite successful. The Conseil syndical mixte de la papeterie, 
set up in 1874 for the paper and stationary trade by a progressive patron, monsieur 
Vavasseur, still prospered in the early 1890s. 37 It consisted of equal numbers of 
representatives of the employers and the workers (eight on each side), who chose their 
own chairman, and met at least four times a year to discuss all important issues 
concerning terms and conditions of employment. 
Similar private initiatives had been taken in 1877 in Rouen by typographers and in 
Paris by employers and workers in the laundries. Yet the legislative proposals made 
did not go in the same direction as the Conciliation Bill which was discussed across 
the Channel two or three years later. All proposals had in common that they regarded 
the involvement of an authority, trusted and respected by both parties essential, 
regardless of whether a habit of working together between employers and workers had 
already developed or not. 
A governmental commission decided on the basis of the proposals made that a 
system of voluntary reference should be opted for, producing results which would be 
binding in law. 3° The governmental commission was uncertain whether to opt for a 
permanent institution or for ad hoc mechanisms. It advised Parliament to do both. 
The matter was now taken over by a committee under the auspices of the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, Monsieur Jules Roche, to prepare a Bill on the basis of the 
outcome of this discussion and on the basis of surveys conducted by the Office du 
Travail, the predecessor of the Department of Employment, targeting the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes and the Chambres de Commerce. The last mentioned surveys had 
36  C. de Fromont de Bouaille ( 1894), La Conciliation et 1 'Arbitrage dans les Conflits entre Patrons et 
Ouvriers; Commentaire de la Goi du 27 Decembre 1892, Paris, identified three initial proposals: those made by 
Raspail, Lockroy and Le Cour, o.c., 150 ff. 
37  C. de Fromont de Bouaille (1894), o.c., p. 137. 
38 Ibid., p. 163 ff. 
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addressed yet another option, namely whether the competence of the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes should be extended so as to include the conciliation and arbitration in 
collective labour disputes. This option was not so far-fetched. The Conseils de 
Prud'hommes, established as early as 1806, had served as an example for other 
countries to set up specialised conciliation and arbitration machinery for collective 
disputes - a fact proudly underscored in the final report by the Office du Travail." This 
option was, however, repudiated both by the Conseils de Prud'hommes themselves as 
well as by the researchers of the Office du Travail. 
The major obstacle identified was that the election system of the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes frequently resulted in the representation of branches within the Conseils 
other than those of the industry in which there were most disputes. This did not cause 
insurmountable problems as long as disputes involved the mere interpretation of 
existing contracts. This was the case with the Conseils de Prud'hommes so far, but it 
would become problematic if the Conseils had to conciliate and arbitrate in disputes 
over future terms and conditions of employment. This obviously required adequate 
expertise on the part of the conciliator or mediator.'° The Chambres de Commerce 
argued that new legislation providing for arbitration was superfluous, since the Code 
Civil already provided the parties with an arbitration regulation. 
The drafting committee working under the auspices of the Minister agreed with the 
Office du Travail to drop the option of extending the competence of the Conseil de 
Prud'hommes. It did bring about some changes and refinements in the 
recommendations of the commission which had synthesised the initial proposals earlier 
on. Thus the drafting committee suggested that the Juge de Paix should be involved 
rather than the Maire (Mayor) as the latter would be too much enmeshed in politics 
and therefore lack an appearance of impartiality. Also, contrary to the commission's 
recommendation, the drafting committee proposed to make the outcome of conciliation 
or arbitration not binding in law, as this would only lead to problems of enforcement, 
particularly on the workers. Another, more effective sanction was suggested, namely to 
make a refusal to comply with a conciliated settlement or arbitral award publicly 
known." Here a role was still envisaged for the Maire. 
The bigger part of the Bill was devoted to ad hoc procedures of conciliation and 
arbitration. Only four summary provisions for permanent conciliation and arbitration 
institutions were incorporated in the Bill. These provisions made no mention of how 
the members of such institutions should be selected. 
While the Bill was on its way to Parliament, a „last minute" dissent was added by 
Monsieur Mesureur, one of the members of the committee. 42 He warned that 
involvement of the Juge de Paix would appear to be a most unlucky choice, as this 
magistrat modeste would not have sufficient authority or inspire sufficient confidence 
in the employers and the workers. It was better, according to Mesureur, to respect the 
desire of both sides of industry to deal with problems themselves. A third party 
39 Office du Travail (1893), De la Conciliation et de l'Arbitrage dans les Conjlits Collectifs entre Patrons 
et Ouvriers, en France et á 1'Étranger, Paris. See the preface by the director of the Office du Travail, Jules Lax. 
4Ó Office du Travail (1893), o.c., p. 9. 
41 The Chambres de Commece had strongly disapproved of this sanction in its reaction to the Government 
survey. De Fromont de Bouaille (1894), o.c., p. 146. 
4  De Fromont de Bouaille (1894), o.c., p. 169. 
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originating from within the branch of industry concerned was preferable. Mesureur 
suggested to follow the Belgian example of the Conseils de 1'industrie et du travail, 
which had been established by law in 1887. For France, Mesureur proposed a system of 
Conseils du Travail, to be installed industry-wise. The primary task of each Conseil du 
Travail was to advise on all issues relating to the terms and conditions of employment 
and to negotiate collective agreements pertaining to its branch of industry, to take 
charge of conciliating and arbitrating disputes arising within its branch and to elect 
members for a similar agency, operating nation-wide, the Conseil Supérieur du 
Travail. According to Mesureur, the role reserved for the Juge de Paix in the Bill 
should be attributed to the president of the section within the Conseil du Travail, 
which organises the particular branch of industry in which the dispute arose. 
In Parliament, the Chambre des Députés did not consider Mesureur's proposal. The 
Bill as suggested by the committee was adopted, except the provisions on permanent 
conciliation and arbitration institutions. The opinion in the Chambre was not hostile 
towards permanent institutions, but it was held wiser to first conduct some in-depth 
studies into the proper way of organising such institutions. The Sénat passed the Bill 
without amendments of any significance. 
2.2. The system of the Act of 27 -12- 1892 
Under the guidance of Mr Jules Roche, Minister of Trade and Industry, the Bill was 
thus enacted in 1892. This Act on Conciliation and Arbitration in collective disputes, 
as it was designated, provided for both a conciliation and an arbitration procedure in 
collective disputes, between employers and wage-earners as well as salaried employees. 
Conciliation was to be performed by conciliation committees, set up with the 
consent of the parties on an ad hoc basis. Such committees consisted of representatives 
of the parties, who met under the chairmanship of a Juge de Paix. The Juge de Paix 
directed the discussions of the conciliation committee, but only in an advisory capacity. 
Yet he/she was more than just a panel chairman, as the law had attributed an 
interesting role to him/her in initiating the procedure. 
The normal course of action envisaged by the Act was that either of the parties 
could set the procedure in motion by submitting a written report to the Juge de Paix in 
the canton (court district) in which the dispute had arisen. In this report, the alleged 
cause and subject matter of the dispute had to be set forth. The applicants had to give 
their own names and occupations, as well as those of their opponents. Finally, 
applicants had to indicate the names and occupations of the representatives they had 
chosen to retain in the dispute. . 
Within twenty four hours after receipt of the report, the Juge de Paix had to notify 
the other party. Within three days, that other party would have to respond whether 
he/she agreed to an attempt at conciliation by the committee. If he/she refused, the 
conciliation would be cancelled. Failure to respond within three days was also regarded 
as a refusal. In this sense, the procedure was entirely voluntary. However, according to 
the Act, a refusal to take part in a conciliation procedure would have to be 
communicated by the Juge de Paix to the Maire of every municipality to which the 
dispute extended. The Maire would have to make the refusal public. As a matter of 
fact, even the original application for conciliation would have to be communicated to, 
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and publicly announced by the Maire. This aspect of the procedure seems to hide an 
element of compulsion, or at least moral pressure. 
Next to the procedure initiated by the parties themselves, another procedure was 
envisaged in the Act in disputes where a strike had been called already. In such cases, 
the Juge de Paix could invite the parties ex officio to submit their differences to a 
conciliation procedure." However, in this situation again parties would be allowed to 
refuse co-operation, but again such a refusal would be publicly announced. 
A great amount of freedom existed as to the appointment of representatives. The 
representatives could be chosen from amongst the parties actually involved in the 
dispute, for instance a delegation of workers in the factory concerned. It was also 
possible for employers and employees to appoint an expert from their respective 
professional associations as their representative. The only two legal restrictions 
concerned the maximum number of representatives, being five for each party, and their 
nationality, which had to be French. 
If both parties agreed to conciliation, the Juge de Paix officially convened the 
members proposed for the committee. Any decision reached by the committee had to be 
adopted unanimously. The Juge de Paix would then draft a report of the meeting, 
including the agreement reached, if any. If an agreement was reached, the report was 
signed by the parties. The legal status of such an agreement was that of a collective 
contract, effective as between the parties involved." Just as the originating application 
and a refusal, a conciliated agreement would be communicated to the . Maire and 
publicly announced by him. 
The Act of 1892 also provided for arbitration, but only as a derivative of the 
conciliation procedure. If agreement could not be reached before the conciliation 
committee, the Juge de Paix had to invite the parties to participate in an arbitration 
procedure. In that case, the parties would have to appoint representatives to function as 
arbitrators in an arbitration committee. A difference between the appointment 
procedure for arbitrators as compared to conciliators was that parties could decide to 
nominate one or several arbitrators each, or one single arbitrator jointly." 
There were further procedural differences between conciliation and arbitration. 
Parties had to define the questions they submitted to an arbitration board in detail and 
the arbitration board was obliged to give an arbitral award. 
In case more than one arbitrator had been nominated, and the arbitrators failed to 
agree on a settlement or arbitral award amongst themselves, an umpire with a casting 
vote could eventually be nominated by the president of the Tribunal civil de premiere 
instance (Court of first instance). 
The arbitral award was signed by the arbitrators and handed over to the Juge de 
Paix, and sent to the Maire for publication. If parties had decided to regard themselves 
bound by the award, then the award had the force of a collective agreement. 
" S. 10 of the Act. Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, 1892, No. 352, p. 6276. 
44 As the first statutory framework for collective agreements was brought about in 1919, one may wonder 
whether between 1892 and 1919 there were parties questioning the precise legal effect of such conciliated 
settlement agnrements. No information is available to the authors on this point. 
°S The 1933 ILO study on conciliation and arbitration erroneously suggests that women were not eligible as 
arbitrators. S. 15 of the 1892 Act explicitly caters for the appointment of female arbitrators. International Labour 
Office (1933), Conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes, studies and reports, Geneva, p. 176. 
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3. The World War I Period: Compulsory arbitration 
By virtue of the Decrees of 17 January and 7 September 1917, permanent 
conciliation and arbitration committees were set up in those branches which formed a 
part of the war industry." Reference of disputes to these committees was compulsory. A 
dispute would first be dealt with by a conciliation committee, to be convened by 
Government officials, the controleurs de la main d'oeuvre. Should conciliation fail, 
then the case was automatically referred to an arbitration committee, also convened by 
the controleurs de la main d'oeuvre. The arbitral award was legally binding, and 
penalties were introduced to guarantee the smooth operation of these committees as 
well as prompt enforcement of their decisions." Just as in Great Britain, the rationale 
underlying this was the necessity to adopt vigorous measures in order to prevent 
stoppages of work in this essential branch of industry. 
4. The Dissatisfaction with the 1892 Act: Alternatives between 1900 and 1936 
Dissatisfaction with the 1892 Act arose once it became clear that the vast majority 
of strikes never reached the conciliation committee's negotiation table. It has been 
calculated that between 1892 and 1936, some 30 bills were introduced, each of them 
trying to solve the perceived deficiencies of the 1892 Act." Already before World War 
I, in the year 1900, a bill had been proposed by Millerand and Waldeck-Rousseau 
seeking the establishment of permanent works councils in industrial enterprises 
employing more than fifty employees. The primary function of these councils, 
consisting of staff representatives, was to act as a conciliation committee. In order to be 
able to prevent labour disputes, the councils were to meet regularly with the board of 
directors. Should the preventive conciliation of the works council . fail, then the 
employer and the workers should each appoint arbitrators. The referral to arbitration 
had a strong compulsory element, since the Bill stipulated that a refusal by the 
employer to co-operate would confer upon the workers the right to call a strike by 
majority vote. By implication, the strikers would be indemnified against claims under 
private law. - 
The Bill was rejected in 1900. Further bills which introduced different versions of 
this system were also rejected in 1902, 1906, 1910 and 1917. One point of criticism 
concerned the confinement of the works council's competence to disputes arising 
within one single enterprise, thus making the system ill suited for disputes 
transcending one enterprise or extending to a whole branch of industry. 
In 1920 another bill was introduced which replaced the permanent works council 
conciliators by ad hoc delegates from the workers, who were to make a first effort at 
conciliation. If a dispute was unavoidable, a conciliation committee would be set up 
through an administrative regulation. A strike could not be called lawfully, until such 
an attempt at conciliation had been made. The Bill was never passed. 
46  J. Edelstein (1922), La Conciliation darts les Con-lits Collectifs, Paris, p. 80 ff. 
47 J. Edelstein (1922), o.c., p. 81. 
48 1. Colton (1951 ), o.c., p. 6. 
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One year later, an amended version of the Bill was proposed. In this version the 
workers' representatives had become permanent . again. In case a dispute could not be 
averted, newly created district trade committees were to conciliate and to arbitrate if 
necessary. Reference was made compulsory and even penalties were provided. This 
Bill was not passed either. 
Yet another bill was introduced in 1929. A compulsory conciliation procedure, to 
be utilised prior to a strike was proposed together with a voluntary conciliation 
procedure for those instances where a strike had already been declared. 
During the first, compulsory, attempt at conciliation the right to strike would be 
suspended. For the second, voluntary procedure, a Superior Conciliation Committee 
attached to the Ministry of Labour was envisaged. Failing a choice of conciliators by 
the parties themselves, the Minister of Labour would be allowed to instruct the parties 
to appear before this Committee, consisting of equal numbers of employers and 
workers recruited by the Minister from members of the Economic Council. This Bill 
was not enacted either. 
Summarising, the conclusion seems justified that French politicians in the era 
described were rather desperately seeking techniques to prevent collective disputes 
from escalating. In this process the draftsmen experimented with various combinations 
of compulsion and voluntariness. Voluntary procedures were perceived as ineffective - 
lacking a genuine willingness on the part of employers and to a lesser extent the 
unions to utilise these - whereas compulsory procedures were consistently turned down 
by the employers and their spokesmen in the political arena.° 9 
S. The compulsory arbitration system of the front populaire: 1936-1939 
The Act of 31-12-1936 and the amending Act of 4-3-1938 provided for a complete 
new system of settlement procedures. The most important features of the new system 
were the more important role reserved for unions - the . Front Populaire united the 
radical political parties and the trade unions - and the compulsory character of the 
conciliation as well as the arbitration procedure. . 
This compulsory arbitration was unique in Europe, in that it was operated in peace 
time. 
The background to the system lay in the high rates of inflation, following the great 
Depression. The unions insisted on the introduction of sliding wage scales to secure 
their members' purchasing power. Strikes and occupations of factories were organised 
to press for this demand. Prime Minister Ikon Blum could not manoeuvre a bill 
introducing such a system, through the Sénat. The Sénat was only willing to agree to a 
compulsory arbitration system, a second option held by the Government, as a means to 
control inflation and wages development and safeguard industrial peace. Rather than 
legislating for compulsory arbitration, Blum preferred the introduction of such a 
system on the basis of an agreement between the two sides of industry. During a second 
meeting at the Hotel Matignon, however, the employers stubbornly resisted the 
19 ILO (1933), o.c., p. 184. 
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introduction of such a scheme." Blum saw no other way but to legislate for a 
compulsory system. In Parliament, the system was described as a means of „reconciling 
the interests of the parties with the higher interests of the nation".s' 
The Act of 31-12-1936 provided for a reference system, which on closer analysis 
could be characterised as quasi-compulsory. Reference of a collective dispute to the 
statutory system of conciliation and arbitration was only prescribed for those situations 
where no conventional conciliation or arbitration procedure was agreed between 
employers and unions. 
It should be observed here, that by 1936 only 7,5% of all wage earners were 
covered by collective agreements.S 2 Reference to the statutory system was to be made 
before a strike had been called. The unions interpreted this clause not as an intrusion 
on their freedom to strike, but rather as a procedural rule, turning strikes to-weapons of 
last resort. 
Several hierarchical layers of conciliation machinery were provided, with every 
higher level becoming involved where the lower level had failed. These committees 
were to be staffed by representatives of the employers and the workers, the first 
category being shortlisted by the Chambres de Commerce, the second category by the 
CGT. If conciliation failed at even the highest level, the responsible committee would 
draw up a list of remaining issues of disagreement. On the basis of this list, the dispute 
had to be referred to the arbitration procedure. The parties were to appoint a number of 
arbitrators each, and an umpire as well. Should they fail to do so, then the Government 
would step in to make the appointments itself. The arbitrators were allowed by the law 
to decide the disputes submitted before them as amiables compositeurs, meaning they 
would not be bound by the strict rules of law in considering the claims before them. 
The arbitral award rendered was not binding in law and no penalties were provided for 
failure to obey. 
The Act was meant to remain operative only temporarily, and as the : social-
economic situation was not going to improve, a further Act had to be introduced to 
extend the system. At this occasion some improvements were introduced. It was felt as 
a shortcoming that the original Act did not discriminate between collective disputes 
involving the interpretation of existing norms and disputes over the negotiation of 
future norms. It was found that many inconsistent and arbitrary decisions had been 
handed down by the arbitrators, who were not bound by the law in any way. Thus in 
the Act of 1938 a distinction was introduced, for the first time in France, between 
collective disputes over interests and collective disputes over rights. Only in the first 
category were arbitrators allowed to decide as amiables compositeurs. 
Another shortcoming of the Act, namely the lack of further specifications of what 
constituted a collective dispute, was not remedied, as it appeared impossible to reach 
agreement on a proper defáition. 
The compulsory arbitration system has been described as an expedient, adopted to 
meet continued labour unrest. It was certainly not a planned experiments' 
so O. Dulias (1938), l'Arbitrage obligatoire dans les Conflits Collectifs du Travail, Paris, p. 25. 
íl  J. Colton (1951), o.c., p. 44. 
52 J. Colton (1951), o.c., p. 9. 
53 Ibid., p. 70. 
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It has been observed that conciliation was practised as a matter of habit, whilst the 
fear of compulsory arbitration encouraged the parties to seek agreement through 
conciliation.S4 
6. The World War 11 Period: Corporatism and compulsion 
World War II brought an interruption in the development just started. All 
legislation concerning collective agreements and collective labour disputes was 
suspended by a Decree of 1-9-1939. 
In Vichy-France a corporatist system was introduced, in which strikes were 
prohibited altogether and disputes had to be referred compulsorily to corporatist 
agencies for an imposed decision. 
7. The Act of 11 -2 -1950: Quasi-voluntary conciliation 
A few years after the war, some elements of the labour dispute settlement system of 
the Front Populaire were reintroduced through the Act of 112-1950, which set up a 
system of national, regional and departmental conciliation committees. 
7.1. The conciliation system of the Act of 11 -2 - 1950 
The same Act of 11-2-1950 laid down a new legal framework for collective 
agreements. Both aspects of this law were unmistakably intertwined. The Act referred 
specifically to direct negotiations as the first method to settle disputes. In order to 
stimulate the use of conventional settlement procedures, the adoption of such a dispute 
settlement clause was made a preliminary requirement for a collective agreement to be 
declared applicable erga omnes " 
Moreover, the statutory conciliation procedure elaborated in the Act was explicitly 
designed as a complement to conventional procedures. The statutory procedure had to 
be used a) if a conventional procedure was not available, or . b) if for any reason an 
existing conventional procedure had not been used." 
Hence recourse to the statutory procedure was made compulsory. The Act stipulated 
that collective disputes had to be submitted to a conciliation committee without delay, 
or at least „within one month. The Act did not indicate how the one month period had 
to be determined, nor did it provide sanctions in case of non-compliance. As a result, it 
is unrealistic to label this statutory conciliation procedure as compulsory." 
An amending Act of 26 July 1957, however, provided an element of compulsion, in 
that parties were obliged to notify the Préfet of the Department concerned that a 
dispute existed. This enabled the Préfet to attempt informal preconciliation. Were this 
S4 X. Blanc-Jouvan (1971), o.c., p. 47. 
ss  This construction is diametrically opposed to Dutch law, where it is provided that settlement clauses can 
never be applicable erga omnes. 
56 S.7 of the Act of 11-2-1950. 
37 The word "unrealistic" is used by X. Blanc-Jouvan (1971), o.c., p. 49. 
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to be unsuccessful, then the Préfet, or the Inspecteur du Travail, could refer the dispute 
to a conciliation committee. The parties also retained the right to submit their dispute 
to the commission. 
The conciliation committees envisaged by the 1950 Act were tri-partite. Employers 
and employees would have to appoint three representatives each, as members of the 
commission. A Government official would chair the commission. The chairman of the 
national commission would be the Minister of Labour or his representative. The 
regional commissions would be chaired by the regional Inspecteur du Travail, the 
labour inspector. Each chairman could be assisted by representatives from other 
Government agencies, as long as their number would not be more than three. 
The size of a dispute would normally be decisive for determining the competence of 
either the national, regional or departmental commissions. Appeal procedures were not 
provided. 
7.2. The Arbitration system of the Act of 11 -2- 1950 
Under the same Act of 1950, a voluntary arbitration procedure was established, 
before a Central Court of Arbitration. Here, disputes could be submitted which had not 
been resolved successfully through either the statutory or the conventional conciliation 
procedure. This procedure has actually had no practical relevances° 
8. The complementary mediation system of the Decree of 5 -5- 1955 
Between 1951 and 1955 several bills were introduced seeking the establishment of 
mediation machinery alongside the conciliation procedure provided by the 1950 Act. 
The drafters of these bills were positively impressed by the American experience with 
federal and state mediation agencies.S 9 The system that was finally adopted contained 
both voluntary and compulsory elements. The hallmark of the system was the early 
intervention of central Government authorities. Should conciliation fail, then either of 
the parties could refer a dispute again to one of the conciliation committees established 
under the 1950 Act, and ask for mediation. Such a committee was allowed to mediate, 
even if only one of the parties had demonstrated a genuine interest. Even without the 
consent of both parties, a mediation procedure could be initiated by the Minister of 
Labour or an official of the labour administration, depending on the level where a 
dispute had arisen. The parties could object to the procedure only if they demonstrated 
that an arbitration clause applied between them, whether these had been agreed before 
or after the dispute arose. 
The mediator was given powers of investigation: he/she could summon the parties 
to appear in person and hear witnesses. Refusal of witnesses to appear was subject to 
fines. A similar sanction awaited the party who did not comply with a request to 
provide particular documentary evidence. Eventually, the mediator would propose a 
solution. If it appeared that the proposals made were not acceptable to the parties, the 
98 T. Treu, (1984), o.c., p. 132. 
59 X. Blanc-Jouvan (1971), o.c., p. 55. 
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mediator should make a final recommendation. The contents of such a 
recommendation varied, depending on whether the dispute related to rights or 
interests. In disputes over interests, the recommendation consisted of the proposed 
solution. In disputes over rights, the mediator should confine himself in his 
recommendation to advising the parties to take their dispute to the court or to an 
arbitrator. 
The mediator's recommendations were not binding upon the parties. The 
underlying idea of the procedure was exactly this, according to Blanc-Jouvan: "merely 
to propose a solution, not to impose one". In this sense mediation was halfway-house 
between conciliation and arbitration. This applied to the method of referring disputes 
to mediation as well. Here, the conciliation system under the 1950 Act comprised more 
elements of coercion than mediation, whereas arbitration comprised less of such 
elements, although the arbitral awards were binding upon the parties. 
The mediation system was reasonably popular during the first few years after its 
establishment. During the second half of 1955, 34 disputes were referred to the 
mediation system, a majority of 20 by the employers, and 3 by the governmental 
authorities on their own initiative. However, figures had begun to decline already in 
1957. During the 1960s and 1970s the mediation system was hardly used and its 
practical significance today is 'virtually nil'. 60 
9. The Act of 13- 11 - 1982 
The failure of both the conciliation system of 1950 and the mediation system of 
1955 induced the Government to enact some amendments to the 1950 and 1955 Acts. 
These amendments, incorporated in the Act of 13-11-1982, mainly concerned the 
scope of conciliation and mediation procedures which was broadened so as to include 
the whole of the private sector as well as state-owned commercial enterprises. 
Reference to both procedures was made entirely voluntary. Despite these amendments, 
the procedures do not seem to have become more popular recently. 
10. The Councils of Prudent Men 
The Conseils di Prud'hommes (Councils of Prudent Men) have lived nearly two 
centuries of changing industrial relations. Many of these changes were reflected in the 
competence and composition of the Conseils and the methods of dispute settlement 
used. The development of this remarkable institution is discussed from its 
establishment in 1806 through to the present. 
10.1. The establishment and historical development of the Councils of Prudent Men 
The origin of the Conseils de Prud'hommes dates back to the era of the Ancien 
Régime. Committees, composed of masters and workmen, were already known to 
6° T. Treu (1984), o.c., p. 129. 
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exercise jurisdiction over labour disputes arising within the silk trade in 18th century 
Lyon.61 
The French Revolution and the subsequent Constitution of 1791 abolished this 
system of dispute settlement, together with all other special agencies, procedures and 
regulations emanating from within the guilds and trades. The administration of justice 
was shifted from these „intermediate structures" to a new, nation-wide machinery of 
elected judges. During the following years, manufacturers and workers lived in a 
legislative vacuum. Abuse and disorder soon became manifest, to the detriment of 
manufacturers and workmen alike, and by the end of the year 1802, legislation was 
passed introducing Chambers of Commerce as well as Chambres consultatives de 
manufactures, fabriques et métiers, chambers set up for the purpose of collecting the 
advice of manufacturers and traders on the issue of how commerce could best be 
promoted. The statutory instruments introducing these Chambers also set up a special 
jurisdiction under which all disciplinary matters relating to workmen were to be 
referred to the prefect of police in Paris or to the Maire in the provinces. 
The inconvenience of this procedure was pointed out to the Emperor Napoleon 
during a visit he made to Lyon in 1806 by the silk weavers of that place. The weavers 
suggested to him the re-establishment of an institution analogous to the one they had 
possessed prior to 1791. Napoleon showed sympathy for this idea and an Act re-
establishing the said institution under the name of Conseil de Prud' hommes, was 
promulgated on 18 March 1806. 
In his explanatory memorandum to the legislature, councillor of state Regnault-de-
St. Jean-d'Angely, who had also introduced the legislation on the Chambers of 
Commerce, stressed the need of vigilance in the area of manufacture and commerce in 
order to prevent disorder and abuse. Such ongoing vigilance required a type of 
knowledge which could only be expected among persons who were themselves engaged 
in the manufacture concerned. Such a manufacture-based system would also be more 
effective than the austere judiciary in securing the willing submission of workmen and 
masters: it would have paternal charisma. 62 
An Imperial Decree of 11-6-1809 supplementing the 1806 Act stipulated that 
similar Conseils could be set up at any time in those parts of the country, where the 
Government would hold this to be desirable because of industrial and commercial 
activity. 
This provision, however, was not used to create a nation-wide system of Conseils at 
once. On the contrary, the creation of additional Conseils took place sporadically 
whenever a particular need arose in a given area, and only gradually their number 
grew.ó3 
61 The history of the Conseils de Prud'hommes, or at least the institution it stands for, goes back further in 
history. _ 
62 Sir Henry Halford, Memorandum on the Conseils de Prud'hommes in France, Appendix No. 9 to the 
Report from the Select Committee on Masters and Operatives, Parliamentary Reports, House of Commons, 1856, 
p. 286 ff. 
63 As indicated supra, the Conseils de Prud'hommes gradually supplanted the Juges de Paix in the area of 
labour disputes. Each Conseil was attributed an area of geographical competence. As the number of Conseils 
only increased gradually, this meant that in (arge parts of the country there was no Conseif to resort to. In those 
areas, the Juge de Paix would normally be competent to hear the case. Also those categories of labour disputes 
which were not explicitly brought under the jurisdiction of the Conseils were handled by the Juge de Paix, or 
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During the 187 years of its existence, the Conseil de Prud'hommes has been 
subjected to a number of changes, as to structure, composition, jurisdiction and 
procedure. The efficacy of the Conseil and its relative part in the overall handling of 
labour disputes has changed accordingly. The major changes are now dealt with 
briefly. 
10.2. The present statutory basis of the Councils of Prudent Men 
The Act of .18-1-1979 constitutes the present statutory basis of the Conseil de 
Prud'hommes; together with an amending Act of 6-5-1982. Both Acts were 
implemented through a number of changes in the Code du Travail. 
The issues addressed by the 1979 Act concerned the jurisdiction of the Conseils, as 
well as the election, training and protection of the conseillers. The Conseils in the 
Alsace - Moselle region were initially left unaffected by this Act, but the 1982 Act 
abolished these tri-partite institutions, and replaced these by Conseils similar to those 
in the rest of France. The 1982 
Act, moreover, re-amended the system of elections, and established a Conseil 
Supérieur de la Prud'homme, a consultative agency with the Garde des Sceaux, 
charged with carrying out surveys amongst the Conseils and making recommendations 
on how to improve their functioning. 
On the issue of jurisdiction, s. L 511-1 of the Code du Travail now provides that 
the Conseils de Prud'hommes decide the disputes which may arise from any individual 
employment contract or contract of apprenticeship. 
As to these disputes, the Conseils decide in the first and final instance if the 
amount in controversy does not exceed 12,000 Francs. For claims exceeding this 
amount, appeal against the decision of the Conseils lies with the Social Chambers 
within the Courts of Appeal and with the Cour de Cassation, provided that the 
requirements for an appeal in cassation are satisfied.` The jurisdiction of the Conseils 
is regarded as concerning public order and public policy. Therefore, employers and 
employees are prohibited from contracting out of the Conseil's jurisdiction, for instance 
by substituting a joint conciliation committee set up under , a collective agreement for 
the Conseil de Prud'hommes: As is demonstrated in the next Chapter, such a public 
policy argument does not exist in Belgium, where individual employment disputes are 
regularly dealt with by such Joint Committees. 
In their jurisprudence the courts of appeal have given a broad interpretation to the 
jurisdiction of the Conseils. It is understood as encompassing all aspects relating to the 
conclusion, interpretation, discharge and termination of all employment contracts, thus 
turning the Conseils into the preeminent Courts of labour law.bs 
occasionally by designated specialised agencies. We decided to leave the Juge de Paix out of our analysis, as this 
instance forms part of the regular court structure. This is despite the conciliation task of the Juge de Paix. See 
C.M.G. ten Raa (1970), o.c. 
64 This requirement is that there must have been a violation of the law, S. 604, Nouveau Code de Procédure 
Civile. In the leading commentaries on French law, violation of the law is distinguished into (:) misapplication of 
substantive law rules, (ii) failure to observe procedural requirements, (iii) lack of jurisdiction, (iv) misuse of 
jurisdiction and (v) inconsistency of judgments in similar cases. 
63 J Villebrun (1987), Traité de fa jurisdiction prud'homale, Paris, p. 465, regards the Conseils as the "juge 
de droit commun en droit du travail". 
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An equally extensive interpretation has been given to the concept of „individual". 
The Cour de Cassation has decided that a dispute is to be regarded as 'individual' if its 
purpose is the enforcement of a right that an individual employee can derive from the 
law, no matter whether that law has a statutory or a collective, conventional basis. 
Neither does it matter whether the action is brought by an individual employee, by a 
group of employees, or by a trade union acting on behalf of the employees." Even an 
action brought for payment of fringe benefits, which actually concerned all personnel 
in an enterprise and necessitated the interpretation of a collective agreement, has fairly 
recently been regarded as having an 'individual' character.ó 7 It should be observed, 
however, that trade unions can be encountered frequently before the Conseils de 
Prúd'hommes in either of two -roles: to assist the individuals who may bring actions, 
but also to act as parties in their own right. Trade unions are granted a locus standi in 
judicio of their own, notably in disputes which are founded on collective agreements, 
in disputes over equal pay, equal treatment and non-discrimination, and on disputes 
arising over temporary work. The individual employee(s) whose rights have been 
allegedly infringed must have agreed to the unions taking over their right to proceed in 
court. 
As to territorial competence, the 1979 Act provides that there should be at least one 
Conseil . in the resort (jurisdictional area) of each Tribunal de grande instance 
throughout the country - thus eliminating the jurisdictional blind spots which there 
were thus far. Detailed rules provide for a further consistent delineation of territorial 
competence. 
10.3. The organisation of the Councils of Prudent Men 
The 1979 Act stipulates that every Conseil is to be divided into five sections, 
notably commerce, industry, agriculture, encadrement (managerial and professional 
staff) and miscellaneous activities. Each section has to be staffed with at least eight 
conseillers, four on behalf of the employers and an equal number on behalf of the 
employees. A section comprising of more than sixteen conseillers may set up chambres 
(panels) as a practical device for distributing caseloads and facilitating Internal 
communication. Each section, or each panel if any, must maintain at least one bureau 
de conciliation and one bureau de jugement. The bureau de conciliation is staffed by 
two conseillers, one for the employers and one for the employees, who alternately act 
as chairperson. The bureau de jugement must be staffed by at least four conseillers, 
with equal numbers from both sides of industry. Should the votes be equally divided on 
any particular case, then a further meeting, presided by a judge from the Tribunal 
d'Instance is required by law. 
The law, moreover, requires a system of rotation, enabling each conseiller to sit in 
a bureau de conciliation at one time, and in a bureau de jugement at another time." 
Within each Conseil, the Assemblée générale, of which all conseillers are 
members, is the most important organ for internal decision-making. 
66 SOC., 10 mars 1965: Bull.civ. IV, No. 214. 
67  Decision of the Social Chamber of 28-11-1984, Cahiers prud'homales, No. 1, 1986, jurispr. p. 1. 
68 For the maximum time set for conseillers to spend working in a Conseil, see below at recruitment and 
training. 
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One of its tasks is to appoint one juge de référé, a single conseiller supervising 
hearings for the exclusive purpose of granting provisional relief. This procedure, 
introduced through the Act of 12-9-1974 as a device for dividing the work within the 
Conseils more efficiently and to make up the increasingly frequent backlogs, is 
obviously in flagrant contradiction to the principle of equitable decision making. The 
law provides that in appointing these juges de référé, care should be taken that 
conseillers from both sides of industry take turns, every other year, in holding this 
office. 
The 1979 Act also replaced the system of local secretariats and introduced a 
sécrétariat -greffe (secretariat-clerk's office or registry); financed by the central 
Government.ó9 This secretariat is integrated in the registries of the regular courts. The 
greers (registrars or clarks) play an important role as technical consultants for the 
conseillers and even for the parties, as was demonstrated by a survey to be discussed 
below. Their task includes the convocation of the parties, the drafting of the minutes 
during sessions held before the bureau de conciliation or the bureau de jugement, 
generally the responsibility to keep the file of every case up to date and to prepare the 
standard forms in which the judgements are incorporated. 
10.4. The conciliation task 
All disputes submitted to the Conseils de Prud'hommes are first referred to the 
bureau de conciliation. The reference to this bureau for an attempt at conciliation is 
compulsory. The Cour de Cassation has confirmed that the conciliation procedure is 
one of public order and thenceforth it cannot be bypassed, except in situations 
explicitly laid down by the law. The Supreme Court also specified that the duty to 
participate in an attempt at conciliation is real and is not a mere formality.'° 
The compulsory character of this conciliation procedure is frequently justified by 
reference to the idea that originally underlied the institution of the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes: to act as a conciliator, rather than a court." This mission is epitomised 
by the official symbol of the Conseils: two shaking hands, and not the Sword of 
Justice. 
The procedural rules applicable to the préliminaire de conciliation reinforce this 
idea, at least to some extent. The parties are under a duty to appear in person, a duty 
referred to as comparition in French. This duty extends to the procedure before the 
bureau de jugement also. Parties can, however, be represented, but under two proviso's. 
First, they must demonstrate a motif légitime for not appearing in person. Second, the 
69 A survey conducted in 1974 by the Commission Exécutive des Conseils de Prud'hommes had indicated 
that 27% of all 250 or so Conseils in France did not have a secretariat at all. In addition, 44% of all Conseils only 
had one conference room available which had to be used for the sessions of the bureau de conciliation as well as 
the bureau de jugement.P. Cam (1981), o.c., p. 11. 
70 Soc., 7 mars 1957, Bull. civ. IV, No. 271. 
71 Although conciliation is given pride of place in the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, conciliation 
having a compulsory character is exceptional in modern French law. Not so, however, in the past: the 
revolutionary Act of 16-24 August 1790, establishing a new court system, provided that all Tribuneaux de district 
were under a duty to attempt at conciliating the parties. Also see C.M.G. ten Raa. 
32 — JÓZSEF HAJDÚ 
person representing the party must belong to one of the categories enumerated in the 
exhaustive list of s. R 516-4 of the Code du travail." 
The law stipulates that conciliation sessions should be held at least oncé a week. 
These sessions are held in camera. During such a session, to which the parties are 
normally summoned through a registered letter, both parties are asked to provide their 
interpretation of the dispute and their proposals for a solution to the conseillers. The 
principe du contradictoire, one of the principles of natural justice in France, dictates 
that the parties are heard in each other's presence. These joint meetings are concluded 
by the conseillers proposing their solution to the dispute, which may but does not 
necessarily have to be based on the proposals advanced by the parties. The parties are 
free to accept or to refuse these proposals for an amicable settlement. In case of refusal, 
the case is down for a hearing before the bureau de jugement. Hence, at this point the 
conciliation procedure takes a voluntary character. 
The legal status of an amicable settlement, concluded before the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes is that of a contract, authenticated through the signatures of both parties 
underneath the minutes drafted of the settlement agreement by the registrar. The 
contract thenceforth is conclusive evidence as between the parties and, if necessary, it 
provides a valid title for enforcement against a defaulting party. The Conseils lack 
jurisdiction in enforcement procedures; a party seeking enforcement of the settlement 
agreement would have to resort to the Tribunal de Grande Instance. 
Minutes are also drafted of unsuccessful conciliations. This procés-verbal de non-
conciliation is added to the file of the case and passed on to the bureau de jugement. 
Having assessed that the conciliation procedure is partly compulsory and partly 
voluntary, it may be interesting to find out to what extent parties are under real 
compulsion to attend the actual conciliation sessions. In other words: are there any 
sanctions, which can be imposed on parties defying the duty to appear in person? The 
law distinguishes between the non-appearance of the plaintiff and that of the defendant 
respectively. If the plaintiff does not appear in person for a valid reason, his 
application is regarded as void. If there is a valid reason, however, for his absence, 
then the hearing is adjourned and postponed, usually for a few weeks. 
If the defendant does not appear personally for a valid reason, the hearing will be 
again postponed. If there is no valid reason in the opinion of the conseillers, then the 
case is passed on to the bureau de jugement for adjudication. This last 'sanction' may, 
however, be quite attractive in a number of instances ... 
The Cour de Cassation has given a fairly liberal interpretation to what constitutes a 
valid reason for not appearing personally. For instance, the aversion of a freshly 
appointed employee to take a day off for attending a conciliation session was held to be 
a valid motive." 
By not appearing, the defendant thus has an opportunity to frustrate the entire 
conciliation procedure effectively. There are other methods of bypassing the 
conciliation phase, notably some exceptions to the compulsory reference which are laid 
down in the law. The most important situations which render conciliation inoperative 
are the submission of a dispute to a juge de référé, the submission of counterclaims 
72  The categories enlisted are colleagues employed at the same plant, trade union officials, avocats and 
spouses. 	 . 
73 Soc., 7 juillet 1965, Bull. civ. IV, No. 566. 
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sufficiently related to the original claim, and salary claims arising from the bankruptcy 
of the employer. 
It should be recalled that the Act of 1974 authorised not only the bureau dé 
jugement but also the bureau de conciliation to take a number of measures necessary 
for the preservation of evidence, such as levying provisional attachment, and 
conducting a number of proof proceedings, including the possibility of appointing a 
conseiller rapporteur. 
It has been observed that these powers, which are more of a judicial character, have 
come to be the major justification for the continued existence for the bureau de 
conciliation today. By using these powers efficiently, the bureau de conciliation can 
prepare the case for swift adjudication by the bureau de jugement. The issues that 
require no further delay and issues which require further evidence are taken out at this 
early stage. The French denote this process as trancher, cutting the dispute in separate 
slices, which are more easy to handle. . 
The bureau de conciliation has thus become regarded as the assistant to the bureau 
de jugement, rather than the most essential agency within the Conseil de 
Prud'hommes. What is the reason for this? Unlike in the past, conciliation today is only 
accepted by parties in a small minority of cases. Supiot has observed a marked decline 
in the role of conciliation in settling disputes, in favour of adjudication. During the 
1830s, 93% of all disputes submitted to the Conseils were conciliated. In the early 
1980s the percentage of conciliated cases had gone down to only 10%. 74 
10.5. The adjudication task 
The proceduré before the bureau de jugement has an adversarial and oral character. 
Orality is the guiding procedural principle for most special jurisdictions in France, but 
not for the proedure before the regular courts. The oral character of the procedure 
before the bure'p de jugement does not exclude the possibility of handing in written 
documents, incorporating pleadings or documentary evidence. This possibility is in fact 
frequently used ‘ here parties are represented by professional lawyers. 
The bureau 
‘r er
 has all the powers of the bureau de conciliation as to the 
conduct of proof proceedings, according the possibility to appoint a conseiller 
rapporteur. Its sessions are open to the public. 
10.6. The recruitment and training of the councillors 
The 1979 Act has retained elections as the mode of recruiting the conseillers. The 
term of service was initially set at six years, but the 1982 amending Act has reduced 
this term to five years. Detailed rules are provided for the professional arrangement of 
these elections. The electorate is classified into segments corresponding to the distinct 
sections within the Conseils. 7 S The rules on eligibility are flexible. Every person of 
French nationality over 21 years is eligible, provided he or she is properly enlisted for 
the elections. . 
74 A. Supiot (1985), Déclin de la conciliation prud'homale, in Droit Social, No. 3, p. 225 ff. 
73 S. L 513-1, ss. 2 and 3 of the Code du Travail. 
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A commission de recensement (a supervisory committee) supervised by a judge, 
distributes the seats on the Conseils, taking account of the distinct sections, 
constituencies and shortlists provided. 
In a critical appraisal, Estoup concluded that the sole requirement of being aged 21 
or over constitutes a danger for the preservation of quality. This danger is particularly 
real as no diploma's or other qualifications are required, whereas the rapid growth of 
adversarial proceedings before the bureau de jugement and the need to state the (legal) 
grounds of the judgement properly call for at least some grounding in law on the part 
of the conseillers. In the era where conciliation played a more important role, this need 
was less obvious. 
Estoup suggests that either of two solutions could be opted for to address this 
immanent problem. The conseillers could be relieved from their duty to state grounds 
for their judgements. This option, however, would be likely to result in arbitrariness, 
and is therefore rejected. 76 The better solution, according to Estoup, would be the 
adoption of a tri-partite system, such as existed until 1982 in the Alsace-Moselle 
region. 
This last option has thus far met strong resistance by the trade unions as well as the 
employers. For the trade unions the bi-partite Conseil still marks a historic victory over 
the univers juridique. The employers particularly distrust a change to the tri-partite 
system. They held that increasing numbers of juges rouges (socialist judges) have 
come to staff the courts. Extension of the Conseil with magistrates of similar 
background would most likely distort the balance of power. 
The underlying problem of lack of adequate qualification on the part of the 
conseillers is not easy to solve either. For the trade unions the requirement of diplomas 
is not open to discussion, as it would make the recruitment of conseillers from the 
ranks of the workers, notably blue-collar workers, considerably more difficult. 
An initiative that met some success, however, is the short training programme that 
has been available since 1981 for unexperienced conseillers. The 1979 Loi Boulin 
made a provision for the first time that the training of conseillers would be the 
financial responsibility of the Governement. In 1980, a working party was established 
within the Ministry of Justice to design a training programme. An early outcome was 
the brochure Vademecum du conseiller prud'homme, which was, however, not widely 
distributed. The programme devised was meant to train neutral conseillers. 
This strategy was strongly opposed by the trade unions. In 1981, when the election 
had brought the socialist party into Government, the responsibility for devising a 
training programme was shifted towards the Ministry of Labour. The unions were 
allowed to arrange a programme, particularly designed for the conseillers representing 
the workers. The 1979 Act does not compel the conseillers of either side to take part in 
this Governement financed training programme. Rather, participation is a right for the 
conseillers, although it is limited to a period of two weeks per year, for a maximum of 
three years. 
The Act of 1979 also introduced statutory protection against dismissal for the 
conseillers. 77 The protection offered is similar to that extended to union representatives 
76 Being President of the Court of Appeal in Versailles, monsieur Estoup has carefully framed some 
guidelines for the conseillers on how to draft their judgments. Estoup (1991), o.c., p. 367 ff. 
77 See s. L. 514-2, Code du Travail. 
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in the enterprise. An employee who has to perform as conseiller may freely be absent 
from his job. 78 
These protective rights form an integral part of the statute, the rights and duties 
connected with the function of conseiller." By virtue of the statut, the conseiller is also 
bound to a statutory code of conduct, which stipulates that the conseiller has a duty to 
render judgement, that he may not accept any mandates from third parties in the 
exercise of his function, that he can be challenged if he has an interest in the dispute 
pending before him, and that he may not act as a legal advisor to any party in 
proceedings elsewhere before the Conseils de Prud'hommes. 80 
10.7. The Funding of the Councils of Prudent Men 
For disputants seizing the Conseils similar costs are involved as in proceedings 
before the regular or administrative courts in France. These costs mainly consist of 
registration fees.B 1 The costs of staffing the Conseils are borne entirely by the 
Government. The greffiers are civil servants and therefore on the Government's 
payroll. The office of conseiller is honorary, but in order to enable conseillers to 
perform their function without financial prejudice, a complicated Government-
financed system of allowances and reimbursements has been devised. For the time an 
employee is off work to perform as a conseiller the employer is fully reimbursed. 
Employers who perform as conseillers are reimbursed on the basis of different methods 
of calculation, depending on whether they are managers or sole proprietor of a small 
business. 
The Presidents and Vice-presidents receive an additional hour-based remuneration 
for their work. This amount is tied to a maximum of 16 hours a month in the smaller 
Conseils to 72 hours a month in Conseils in major cities. 
The conseillers frequently mention the presence of lawyers as a negative factor for 
conciliation. Obviously, lawyers do not always have a proxy to negotiate a settlement 
for their clients. Moreover, according to the survey, their training has made them less 
apt to accept compromises. Frequently lawyers appear only on the hearing before the 
bureau de conciliation asking whether a date has already been fixed for the hearing by 
the bureau de jugement. The impact of professional legal representation on the success 
of conciliation has also been investigated by Supiot. Of those cases, where employees 
appear in person, without any professional assistance, 34% is conciliated successfully. 
By contrast, of the cases where employees are assisted or represented by a professional 
lawyer, only 2% is conciliated.82 
The personal relationship between the conseillers and avocats as the most 
important category of professional advisers was further explored in the survey of the 
Conseil Supérieur. On the whole, the conseillers regard the avocats with mixed 
78 Sees. L. 514-1, Code du Travail. 
79  Y. Desdevises (1987), Quelques remarques sur le statut du conseiller prud'homme, magistrat non 
professionnel, in Droit Social, No. 9/10, septembre-octobre 1987, p. 713 ff. 
80 See s. L. 518-1, L. 514-11 and L. 516-3 of the Code du Travail. 
81 Loi No. 77-1468 of 30 December 1977. The bureau de jugement can award costs against the losing 
party. 
82 A. Supiot (1987), Droit du Travail, tome 9 (Les Juridictions du Travail), Paris, para. 537. 
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feelings. Although the conseillers acknowledge that interventions from lawyers 
contribute positively to the substance of the debate, the frequent requests for 
adjournments by avocats are strongly disapproved of. Moreover, the conseillers are 
annoyed at the disinclination of many avocats to hand in pleadings and other 
documents on time, and generally at their arrogant esprit de corps.°' 
According to the survey, 44 days on average elapse between the actual conciliation 
session and the day the report on the success or failure of conciliation was completed.°' 
83  Conseil Supériur de la Purd'homie (1988), o.co, p. 49. 
e' This chapter based mainly on the work of Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling Labour Disputes in 
Europe, Kluwer, 1994. . 
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Chapter 4 
Settlement of labour disputes in Germany 
In Germany, which became a unitary state in 1871, the Gewerbegerichte (Trade 
and Industry Courts) were the first institutions responsible for settling labour disputes. 
These courts were established by the Gewerbegerichtsgesetz (Trade and Industry Court 
Act), abbreviated GewGG of 29 July 1890. They handled individual as well as 
collective labour disputes. It is interesting that individual and collective disputes over 
rights were to be decided through adjudication, while collective disputes over interests 
were to be decided through conciliation or non-binding arbitration. 
The GewGG defined the task of the Courts as "[...) deciding the disputes arising 
between employers and workers [...]".BS The Act did not define these disputes, but 
enumerated a number of specific disputes, such as the conclusion and termination of an 
employment contract. These disputes obviously constituted disputes over rights. The 
Act also stipulated that the Court could be seized "[...] as a conciliation agency, in 
disputes between employers and workers over the terms and conditions for work to be 
done in the future [...]". 86  This provision referred to disputes over interests, individual 
as well as collective. 87 In practice the distinction between the Gewerbegericht as a court 
or as a conciliation agency was hardly made. It frequently occurred that the Gericht 
was seized as a conciliation agency in rights disputes. 88 As a conciliation agency the 
Gewerbegericht could only become involved upon a joint request by the parties.B9 After 
hearing both parties, the Gericht, still acting as a conciliation agency, had to make an 
attempt at conciliating the parties. Should this attempt fail, then a decision having the 
technical character of a non-binding arbitral award, had to be taken by the Gericht as 
conciliation agency. 90 The Gewerbegerichte were not very successful, particularly not 
in collective disputes." 
During World War I, an institution outside the court system, named the Nilfsdienst 
(Auxiliary Service), was set up to avoid strikes and to direct employment in the 
strategic branches of industry. The Hilfsdienstgesetz (Auxiliary Services Act) of 1916 
stipulated that in every military district of the Empire committees had to be formed to 
settle individual as well as collective disputes through arbitration. Such committees 
were composed of an equal number of representatives from the employers and workers 
and chaired by a military officer. Although the arbitral award issued was not legally 
binding, there was indirect compulsion to accept the award since the same committees 
had the power to grant or refuse an Abkehrschein (Certificate) enabling workers to 
85 S. 1, Gewerbegerichtsgesetz 1890. 
86 S. 62, Gewerbegerichtsgesetz 1890. The word „conciliation agency" is used in this study as a translation 
for the German concept of Einigungsamt which is used in the Act. 
87 The ban on trade unions was lifted in Germany in 1869, when a new Gewerbeordnung (Decree on Trade 
and Industry) was promulgated. For socialist unions, the ban was re-introduced through Bismarck's 
Sozialistengesetz (Anti Socialists Act) in 1878. 
88 G. Königbauer (1971), Freiwillige Schlichtung and tariche Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Stuttgart, p. 21. 
89 S. 63, GewGG. 
99 S. 71, GewGG. The words "decision" and "arbitral award" are used as translations for the German concept 
of Schiedsspruch. 
91 E. Owen-Smith (1989), Third party involvement in industrial disputes, a case study of West-Germany 
and Britain, Aldershot, p. 24. 
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leave their work. This system is very similar to that provided by the Munitions of War 
Acts in Great Britain. 
During the Weimar Republic, which lasted from 1919 until 1934, conciliation and 
arbitration of collective disputes over interests were removed from the 
Gewerbegerichte and entrusted to special conciliation and arbitration committees 
through the Schlichtungsverordnung (Conciliation Act) of 1923. Three years later, 
specialised courts were established to take over the adjudication of individual labour 
disputes from the Gewerbegerichte, that is the Arbeitsgerichte (Labour Courts). From 
then onwards the remaining category of collective disputes had to be submitted for 
arbitration to the Tarifschiedsgerichte (Arbitration Courts for collective labour 
agreements).- It is noticed that this German three-track system closely resembles the 
Danish system for labour dispute settlement. 
Together with this three-track system, a distinction in German legal terminology 
was introduced, that is the distinction between .Sehlichtung and Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
in labour disputes. The former concept is exclusively used for disputes over interests 
and refers to a process whereby equitable or tri-partite bodies try to bridge the different 
views in a dispute. Schlichtung includes the possibility that the third party, if present, 
makes a proposal for a solution or issues an arbitral award, which is binding or non-
binding; depending on what the parties have stipulated. Schtichtung, therefore, 
encompasses the methods of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The concept of 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit is exclusively used for disputes over rights. It refers to the 
process of deciding legal issues, albeit that the parties themselves have appointed the 
third party who issues the award. 92 
From 1934 to 1945, during the Nazi era, labour relations were reorganised 
according to a corporatist model. 
After World War II new Arbeitsgerichte were set up on the basis of the 
Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (Labour Courts Act) of 1953 with a wider competence than the 
Arbeitsgerichte of the 1920s. Through the Act of 1953 a full-fledged system of labour 
courts was established handling individual as well as most of the collective disputes. 
There are three layers of labour courts: Arbeitsgerichte (Local Labour Courts), 
Landesarbeitsgerichte (Appellate Labour Courts) and the Bundesarbeitsgericht 
(Federal Labour Court)." 
The Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz defines the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts precisely 
and exhaustively. The jurisdiction of the Labour Courts extends to: 
collective disputes over rights, that is proceedings between parties concerning 
an existing collective agreement and all disputes over provisions of existing 
collective agreements, including peace obligations; 
disputes relating to the establishment and functioning of works councils; 
disputes relating to the recognition of trade unions; 
individual labour disputes. 
92  For a full discussion of the distinction see G. Königbauer (1971), o.c. 
93 The Federal labour court is regarded as "[...) the real master of German labour law [...1", in the words of 
Th. Ramm (1989), Germany, in International Encyclopedia of Labour Law, (R. Blanpain ed.), Deventer. The 
Court recognised, for instance, the right to strike, but at the same time limited this right through the doctrine of 
social adequacy. Wildcat strikes were never recognised. Strikes are qualified as tortious acts, if a peace obligation 
is violated. 
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The local, appellate and federal Labour Courts have a tri-partite composition. A 
professional judge sits on a panel together with two lay judges, one representing the 
employers and one representing the employees." The lay judges are chosen by the 
Ministries of Labour at federal and Land (County) level from candidates nominated by 
trade unions, independent associations of employees, associations of employers as well 
as Government agencies. In practice, there is a widespread reluctance to accept the 
office of lay judge. This may partly be due to the low financial compensation offered to 
lay judges in exchange for the hours lost from work. 9S 
The local as well as the appellate Labour Courts are under a statutory obligation to 
attempt conciliation throughout the proceedings. According to the Arbeitsgerichts-
gesetz a special conciliation session is always held before the first oral pleadings. Such 
session, called the Güteverhandlung (Friendly Conciliation Procedure), is performed 
within two weeks after the claim is filed. The Güteverhandlung takes place before the 
chairman of the LabourCourt. At this stage he sits alone. It is interesting, that during 
this conciliation sessiontthe lay judges representing the employers and employees are 
not present. 
The chairman investigates into and freely discusses all aspects of the case, 
including the social and ecónomic background. The chairman takes an active approach 
and formulates a proposal for a settlement." 
If conciliation fails the proceedings should be resumed immediately. In practice, 
however, a period of approximately three months elapses before the proceedings enter 
into full for adjudication." The Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz, however, stipulates that the 
Court must continue to conciliate during the adjudicatory stage. Ramm observed that 
30 to 40% of cases filed with the local Labour Courts are conciliated. 98 In practice, 
attempts at conciliation are also made after the Güteverhandlung. It is estimated that 
yet another 25% of cases is settled before judgement and 10% of the appeals lodged 
with the federal Labour Court. 99 A practical reason, encouraging parties to conciliate, 
is the exemption from court fees, which is granted to parties agreeing to a settlement 
by conciliation. 100 
The Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz allows for arbitration clauses in collective agreements, 
excluding the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts. In individual employment contracts 
such clauses are not allowed. 10' The Labour Courts may, however, vacate an arbitral 
award violating a legal norm. The normative terms in an existing collective agreement 
are also regarded as legal norms. 102 
For collective disputes over interests, the post-war landscape of dispute settlement 
is different. On 20 August 1946, the Allied Control Council enacted the 
94 In the Burtdesarbeitsgericht, however, the professional judges are in the majority: three professionals sit 
with two laymen. 
9s B. Aaron (1985), o.c., p. 23. 
96 R. Bender and C. Strecker ( 1978), Federal Republic of Germany, in Access to Justice, (M. Cappelletti 
and B. Garth eds.), Vol. 1, Book 2, Alphen aan den Rijn, p. 548. 
97 B. Aaron (1985), o.c., p. 24. 
98 Ibid., p. 24. 
99 Th. Ramm (1979), o.c., p. 207 and p. 208. 
10o B. Aaron (1985), o.c., p. 25. 
101 Arbitration, however, is allowed in individual disputes relating to firm and stage employment and to 
maritime transport, because there arbitration is customary. 
1°2 This is provided by the Tanfvertragsgesctz (Act on Collective Agreements) of 1949. 
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Kontrollratsgesetz (Control Council Act) No. 35, addressing the settlement of 
collective labour disputes generally. The Act, which has as yet not been repealed, first 
advises trade unions and organisations of employers associations to agree on private 
procedures for the settlement of collective labour disputes. The Act obliges the 
Ministry of Labour of each Land to establish a conciliation commission, which has to 
support the diffusion of private conciliation procedures and to institute a statutory 
conciliation procedure itself if necessary. The procedure envisaged for these 
conciliation commissions is entirely voluntary. A dispute can only - be referred to these 
commissions with the consent of both parties. The settlement proposals or awards of 
the commissions are only binding if both parties agree to accept them. 
- In the early 1950s, the German Government prepared several drafts for a statutory 
conciliation procedure. The federal organisations of employees and employers, the 
Deutscher Gewerkschansbund (German Trade Union Federation), abbreviated DGB 
and the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitsgeberverbande (Confederation of 
German Employers' Associations), abbreviated .BDA did not welcome such statutory 
procedure. It was regarded as interference by the Government. 103 The DGB and the 
BDA themselves drafted a detailed model conciliation clause and urgently asked their 
members to incorporate conciliation clauses similar to this model in their collective 
agreements. The model is known as the Margarethenhof Agreement, concluded on 7 
September 1954. 1 °° The model was used in an increasing number of branches of 
industry. By 1956, already 48% of the employees in the private sector were covered by 
conventional conciliation clauses; by 1978 this percentage was 63%. 105 The influence of 
the Margarethenhof Agreement can be traced in nearly all conventional conciliation 
clauses. 106 This model has led to a far-reaching standardisation of conciliation, 
resulting in an almost uniform system of conventional conciliation clauses today. As a 
consequence of this successful initiative from the part of both sides of industry, 
legislation setting up statutory conciliation machinery never materialised. The old 
Control Council Act of 1946 remained in force; however, without having much 
importance. 107 Governmental conciliators have been installed only in the Lander 
Nordrhein-Westphalen and Baden-Wurttemberg. When collective bargaining becomes 
deadlocked and other settlement procedures, if any, fail the Government conciliators 
usually invite the parties to an informal discussion. Precise data on the working of 
these Governmental instances are not available. 
Next to these conventional and statutory settlement procedures, Governmental 
conciliators intervene occasionally on an informal, ad hoc basis. This intervention 
usually is in a dispute which has been going on for a long time. Depending upon the 
size of the dispute and the skills of the conciliator, Ministers, Prime Ministers of the 
Lander and even the Bundeskanzler (Federal Chancellor) may be called to intervene. 108 
103 G. Plankers (1990), Das System der institutionalisierten Konfliktregelung in den industrieflen 
Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Pfaffenweiler. 
104 For an overview of the major characteristics of the Margarethenhof model reference is made to Th. 
Ramm (1979), o.c., p. 201 ff. 
105 E. Owen-Smith (1989), o.c., p. 39. 
106 Ibid., p. 39. 
107 Th. Ramm (1979), o.c., p. 200. 
108 Ibid., p. 200. 
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Chapter 5 
Alternative dispute resolution system in Great Britain 
1. Historical introduction 
Industrial conciliation in Britain dates back to the time of Pitt the Younger, with a 
series of statutes in the second half of the nineteenth century, the so-called "pretentious 
legislation" of 1867 and 1872. These failed, however, in their aim of preventing 
disputes or industrial action arising from disputes. 
The Acts were repealed in 1896 by the Conciliation Act, which for the following 80 
years provided the legal basis for voluntary conciliation services provided by the state. 
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century there was greater local 
recognition of conciliation. Parliament abandoned attempts to find dispute settlement 
procedures within a quasi-judicial framework, and the voluntary element remained in 
the ascendancy. This voluntary principle stood alongside another principle, namely 
that of respect for autonomous institutions existing within particular industries. 
The fillip required by the legislature in the nineteenth century was provided by the 
success of such autonomous machinery in the north of England. A. J. Mundella, an 
early industrial entrepreneur, established joint boards for the hosiery industry in 
Nottingham, with the proposition that "masters and men should get around the table 
and "talk it out" on a footing of equality".t 09 By equality, he meant that employers and 
employees would participate in equal numbers. His own early casting vote was 
removed as an indication of the spirit of agreement seen as necessary in the continuing 
relationship.' . 
The experience in Nottingham was one of reduced strikes, lock-outs and industrial 
violence, which encouraged the spread of these boards into other areas and other 
industries. Even when the boards were overtaken by developments in industrial 
relations, notably the rise of the national trades unions, the agreements the boards had 
achieved remained. The boards were almost always replaced by a different form of 
autonomous dispute resolution machinery, which enjoyed early TUC support. In its 
1888 Congress, the TUC noted that they "increased understanding and peaceful 
settlement". These early experiences set the agenda and established the basis for future 
industrial dispute resolution. 
Parliament's approbation of a voluntary system of industrial dispute resolution 
reflected the fact that many aspects of employment law were not legally grounded. For 
example, a prominent role was given to custom in defining the employer/ employee 
relationship, including the duties of fidelity and mutual trust and confidence. 
The Industrial Courts Act 1919, which had marked similarities to the 1896 Act, 
also sounded the death knell for the last remnants of state laissez-faire in industrial 
relations and industrial disputes. The new role for the state would be a hands-off 
approach, encouraging without forcing, by supplying the means, funding and if 
necessary the location for conciliation. . 
109 Sharp, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Great Britain (1949) at p. 466. 
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In the twentieth century, despite a substantial level of tripartite co-operation in the 
two World Wars, it was clear that both employers and employees would react with 
indignation to any state involvement in their disputes. State policy is still largely 
unchanged today, notwithstanding the challenges to the voluntary system of industrial 
relations by a series of income policies and enforced wage restraints, by the growth in 
regulation and by the legislature's intervention in certain key industries: that is, to 
encourage autonomous institutions with the option of recourse to a standing, 
independent arbitration and conciliation service funded by the state. Notwithstanding 
the institutional expansion of government regulatory agencies, including Industrial 
Tribunals (established in 1964), the Central Arbitration Committee, and the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS, established in 1974), it remains true to 
say that most disputes are conducted outside state-supplied machinery. Parliament 
remains largely committed to this self-regulation in most sectors of industry. 
Consequently, ACAS officers are statutorily required to have regard to the desirability 
of using and exhausting voluntary procedures before they intervene in collective 
disputes.'") 
The twin considerations of effective dispute resolution and cost effectiveness are 
obviously applicable in the employment context, but are overshadowed by the principle 
of "good industrial relations", that seems the raison d'atre of legislation in this area 
throughout the twentieth century. Conciliation and mediation offer the means to have 
disputes listened to and dealt with by an independent and impartial body. This has 
been shown to prevent, or at least lessen or delay, industrial action. It may be no 
coincidence that ACAS's busiest year for collective dispute resolution (1991) was also 
the year of the lowest number of stoppages or other forms of industrial action recorded 
this century."' 
2. Rationale for ADR in industrial disputes 
The historical introduction to industrial mediation outlines the background to the 
present approach to labour disputes. 
Employers and employees are in a special relationship which will invariably have 
to continue after the dispute has been resolved. Their disputes are not necessarily 
amenable to judicial pronouncement, especially where complex and many-sided 
agreements are concerned and where it may not be appropriate for the solution to 
involve having one party as a winner and the other a loser, as occurs in most 
traditional court litigation. 
It is generally accepted that the best solutions to disagreements between employers 
and employees are those which are arrived at through negotiated agreement, usually 
through an element of mutual give and take. Such agreements can be tailored to the 
needs of the parties, rather than imposed upon them. This creates the optimum 
conditions for a satisfactory continuing working relationship, whereas litigation is 
more likely to lead to a hostile working environment. 
no Employment Protection Consolidation Act 1978, ss.133(5), 134(4); Sex Discrimination Act 1975, 
s.64(3); Race Relations Act 1976, s.55(3). 
"' ACAS Annual Report 1991, with 1,386 references for collective conciliation. 
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Many people are affected by an industrial dispute: the employers, the employees, 
their families and sometimes even the surrounding geographical area or associated 
industries, making an agreed settlement the most desirable outcome. 
Disputes may often be about the very agreements that sought to avoid industrial 
action. Again, it is preferable that these be resolved by agreement. 
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, it was in the field of labour 
disputes that conciliation and mediation were initially used, dating back to the 
nineteenth century. Disputes in this field generally fall into two categories: grievance 
disputes, which arise in relation to the application of collective bargaining agreements 
or complaints by individuals about alleged breaches of employment terms or 
conditions; and collective bargaining, which involves issues regarding the terms of 
proposed new collective agreements. 12 
As will be observed, grievance disputes tend to relate to existing rights, whereas 
disputes concerning collective bargaining agreements relate to prospective and not 
existing rights, and consequently are viewed as interests rather than rights. This 
distinction between rights and interests affects the nature of the dispute resolution 
machinery which may be employed: in relation to rights resolution, the neutral deals 
with the interpretation and application of the terms of an existing agreement, whereas 
in relation to interest resolution, the neutral is required to determine the terms that will 
apply in the future. 13 
While arbitration remains the principal procedure used in collective bargaining 
agreements in the United States, mediation plays an increasing role both in the 
bargaining process leading up to an agreement and in relation to disputes arising from 
alleged breaches of those agreements."' Mediation has commonly been used in 
disputes over interests in the context of negotiating collective bargaining agreements. 
However, its extension into the rights context in the United States has been described 
as one of the most promising innovations in the grievance procedure prior to -
arbitration."S Arbitration, despite its advantages, over litigation, of relative informality 
and specialised knowledge of the context of the dispute, still suffers from its inability to 
provide expeditious, informal and inexpensive dispute resolution. It still involves the 
same limitation as other forms of adjudication including litigation, namely the fact that 
it must provide a winner and a loser, without scope to create a resolution that takes into 
account the varying needs, interests and concerns of the different parties and the 
nuances so often inherent in a complex consensual settlement. The confrontational 
context of arbitration and its win-lose outcome can often have negative consequences 
in terms of parties' satisfaction, perceptions of fairness and compliance with 
decisions. 16 
112 See Murray, Rau & Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution: the Role of Lawyers (1989) at p. 309. 
13 See Murray, Rau & Sherman, ibid. at pp. 404-409, quoting also from Craver, „The Judicial Enforcement 
of Public Sector Interest Arbitration" at 21 B.C.L. Rev. 557, 558 n. 8 (1980) 	 . 
114 See Murray, Rau & Sherman, ibid. at p. 308; also at p. 421 quoting from the U.S. Department of Labor 
"Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements" (1981) that an estimated 96 per cent. of U.S. 
collective bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of grievance disputes. 
115 See Deborah M. Kolb's article "How existing procedures shape alternatives: the case of grievance 
mediation" in the Journal of Dispute Resotution Vol. 1989 at p. 73. 
116 See Kolb, ibid. at p. 72. 
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These considerations have led to the increasing usage of conciliation and mediation 
in the industrial arena in the United States and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, 
including Canada11 and South Africa."" Conciliation is viewed as a preliminary step to 
be undertaken before arbitration is commenced, and used after the ordinary negotiation 
stage has been found to be inadequate but before parties turn to adjudication. A steady 
continuation in the growth of the use of ACAS conciliation could have be seen during 
the last decade. 19 
3. Advisory, conciliation and arbitration services in labour relations 
However, it is well known that there has in Britain been a widespread reluctance 
and even resistance to the extension Of law and the jurisdiction of the courts to the field 
of industrial relations, which was reinforced by the experience of the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971 and the Industrial Relations Court set up by it. Indeed, this 
abstention of the law has been regarded by many as a characteristic of British 
industrial relations. It is at present more marked at the collective level, in the 
relationships between trade unions and companies and employers associations and the 
absence of regulation of collective bargaining and collective agreements than at the 
level of the individual employee. Large amounts of individual employment law have 
quietly and without great fuss been entrusted over the years to the industrial tribunals 
first set up in 1964 which have become accepted as an appendage to the traditional 
court structure. . 
In the collective field the role of Government has been for the most part restricted 
to providing facilities for the resolution of disputes, encouraging the development of 
negotiation, dispute and disciplinary procedures and of collective bargaining. The 
Government has offered facilities for conciliation, mediation and arbitration and has 
had the power to conduct inquiries into industrial disputes since 1896. In 1919 a 
standing arbitration body was set up under the name of the Industrial Court and at the 
same time provision was made for the Government to set up Courts of Inquiry into 
major disputes. There was no compulsion to use the Industrial Court or its successor, 
more appropriately named the Industrial Arbitration Board. 
The Labour Government set up ACAS in 1974 as an independent advisory service 
following the collapse of the Conservative Government's attempt to impose greater 
legal regulation on industrial relations and the abolition of the Industrial Relations 
Court. 120 It consists of a Council of a full-time Chairman and nine part time members, 
three appointed after consultation with organisations representing workers, three after 
consultation with employers associations, and three independent members. Legislation 
117 See Kolb, ibid. at p. 73. 
118 IMSSA, the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa, has been in the forefront of industrial 
mediation activities in that country, and has been instrumental in the resolution of a number of major disputes, 
including those with significant economic, political and social implications such as a potentially crippling rail 
dispute. 
119 See the ACAS annual report for 1989, and the Encyclopaedia of Employment Law and Practice ACAS 
120 Its first terms of reference were set out in a letter from the Secretary of State for Employment which is 
printed as an Appendix to its firts Annual Report for 1975. 
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expressly forbade any interference by Government in the performance of its 
functions.' 2 I 
ACAS took over the collective advisory, conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
functions previously performed by the Government's Department of Employment. It 
was also given a general power to conduct investigations and to draft Codes of Practice 
for the conduct of industrial relations. In addition to these general voluntary functions 
it was also given a specific role to play, in conjunction with the new Central 
Arbitration Committee, which replaced the Industrial Arbitration Board, in disputes 
arising under the Fair Wages legislation and in disputes about claims by trades unions 
to be recognised by employers for the purposes of collective bargaining. Like the 
Commission on Industrial Relations 122 which had had these responsibilities before it, it 
was required in its performance of its functions to have regard to the need to improve 
industrial relations and in particular the extension of collective bargaining. The role of 
the Department of Employment in relation to individual employment disputes was also 
transferred to it. In a number of cases coming before the industrial tribunals, set up in 
1964, notably unfair dismissal cases, and, later, cases involving allegations of 
discrimination on the grounds of sex or race, it was required to offer its conciliation 
services whenever requested and even without a request if it considered that there was 
a reasonable prospect of securing a settlement. 113 In the variety and scope of its 
functions, linked for the most part only by the fact that their performance required an 
expertise and experience in industrial relations ACAS resembles, on the surface at 
least, the OFT. 
So far as collective disputes are concerned ACAS divides its functions up into 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. ACAS may be involved in conciliation as a 
result of the request of one or both parties or it may have taken the initiative of 
reminding the parties that it is available or even have offered its services. It has 
described the role of a conciliation officer as being to provide a calm and informal 
atmosphere, a patient understanding of the difficulties and knowledge and experience 
of industrial relations. He/she probes and identifies areas of agreement and 
disagreement, and acts as an intermediary between parties in dispute, conveying 
proposals without the formal commitment that direct negotiations sometimes require. 
He/she makes suggestions at appropriate times on how to make progress towards a 
settlement. Responsibility for the settlement lies with the parties and the Service does 
not exert pressure on either party in order to achieve a settlement". 124 He/she has no 
power other than those of persuasion. He/she has to win the confidence of the parties 
and part of the experience he brings with him/her is not only a general knowledge of 
121 It asserted its independence in 1975,1976 and 1977 by refusing to instmct arbitrators appointed by it to 
implement the Government's policy on wage increases. 
122 The Commission had been set up on the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Trades Unions and 
Employers Associations, Cmnd. 3623, 1968 (the Donovan Commission). 
' 23 The Donovan Commission had recommended [para. 584] that it should be the duty of the industrial 
tribunals to bring about an amicable settlement and suggested that a round table conference should be held before 
the hearing between the parties and members of the tribunal in an effort to achieve a settlement. It wanted further 
attempts to be made later in the proceedings as well. It noted That experience abroad had shown that labour 
tribunals were able to settle a large proportion of cases and saw no reason why the same result should not be 
achieved in Britain. The task of conciliation was in the event given first to the Department of Employment and 
then transferred to ACAS along with the Departments other conciliation functions. 
124 ACAS Annual Report for 1975, p. 8. 
46 — JózsiF HAJDÚ 
industrial relations but also contacts which he/she has developed over the years with 
both employers and union officials. 
3.1. Terminology 
In the labour field, there is a distinction between the usage of the terms 
"conciliation" and "mediation". 
Notwithstanding that conciliation is extensively used in practice in the industrial 
dispute arena and that its utilisation is referred to in a number of statutes, it is not 
defined in any English statute in this context. The definition of conciliation formulated 
by the International Labour Organisation in 1983 has been followed by ACAS, namely 
that it is: ,,...the practice by which the services of a neutral third party are used in a 
dispute as a means of helping the disputing parties to reduce the extent of their 
differences and to arrive at an amicable settlement or agreed solution. It is a process of 
orderly or rational discussion under the guidance of the conciliator. 123 
Conciliation in the labour field can be individual; for example in relation to claims 
for unfair dismissal or other complaints by individuals that their rights under 
employment protection legislation have been infringed, or collective, in relation to 
trade disputes; for example with regard to pay or working conditions where employers 
and trade unions are in dispute. 
Not only is the conciliation process voluntary, but it is conducted in a non-directive 
way with the minimum of intervention by the neutral conciliator. The conciliator will 
have his or her own preferred method of working in each individual dispute and 
facilitating negotiations between the parties, which may involve joint or separate 
meetings with them but which will invariably leave responsibility for the outcome 
firmly with the parties themselves. 
Mediation, however, in this context, involves a process in which the neutral 
mediator takes a more pro-active role than the conciliator in the conciliation process, 
making his or her own recommendations for the resolution of the dispute, which the 
parties are free to accept or reject. 
ACAS distinguishes between ,  mediation and conciliation as follows: "Mediation 
may be regarded as a half-way house between conciliation and arbitration. The role of 
the conciliator is to assist the parties to reach their own negotiated settlement, and he 
may make suggestions as appropriate. The mediator proceeds by way of conciliation 
but in addition is prepared and expected to make his own formal proposals or 
recommendations, which may be accepted as they stand or provide the basis of further 
negotiations leading to a settlement. Such recommendations may be similar in form to 
an arbitrator's award, but the crucial difference is that the parties do not undertake in 
advance to accept them." 126 
If a dispute is to be referred to mediation, three statutory conditions must be met: 
the consent of all parties is required; any agreed procedures should be fully used; and 
'23 Industrial relations disputes: the ACAS role" by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, in A 
Handbook of Dispute Resolution: ADR in Action (1991) by Karl Mackie (ed.) at p. 104. 
'26 ACAS, The ACAS role in Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation. 1989. 
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parties are expected to have made every effort first to resolve the matter through 
conciliation. 127 
3.2. Conciliation 
As already indicated, there are two kinds of conciliation which may be undertaken 
by a conciliation officer (COT), the one being collective conciliation and the other 
individual conciliation. The conciliation process is likely to be used by parties who may 
be contemplating or who have contemned action including perhaps arbitration, and in 
entering into this process, the parties reserve their right to continue with such action if 
that becomes necessary. . 
Conciliation meetings can be set up quickly as the arrangements to be made are 
informal. The machinery and methods used by the COT are likely to be quite similar 
wherever the conciliation is undertaken, partly due to ACAS's success with those 
methods and partly by reason of a history of shared traditions and training. There will 
obviously, however, be differences of detail depending upon the needs of the individual 
case and the approach of the individual conciliator. 128 
The conciliation process usually begins with a preliminary "briefing" meeting at 
which the conciliator's aim is to get an understanding of the issues and the attitudes of 
the parties. The parties may provide him with documents or he may have to rely on his 
own questioning and other sources such as records on file, press cuttings and the 
knowledge of colleagues. Some of the information may emerge later in joint meetings 
of the parties. He may decide that the differences between the parties are so wide and 
attitudes so rigid that there is no point in arranging a joint meeting under his 
chairmanship. Even where joint meetings are arranged there will often be side 
meetings with the parties individually at which he may be given information in 
confidence, about the limits, for example, to which a party can go in seeking a 
settlement, or a concession which they regard as essential. The general aims of the 
conciliator in a side meeting are to encourage the participants to speak freely, to reduce 
any feelings of tension and above all to adopt a problem-solving approach to the 
resolution of the dispute. The meetings may also give the conciliator an opportunity to 
learn more about the personalities of the parties which may affect the possibilities of a 
settlement, just as joint meetings gives him an opportunity of observing the parties in 
their direct relationship with one another. The sequence and pattern of these meetings 
is mainly determined by the conciliator. The duration of the meetings may vary. The 
actual process may be short, involving one or two visits to a company or a few 
meetings at an ACAS regional office. Other cases may take days or even weeks. Hence 
the need for strong commitment on the part of the conciliator. 
Most of the conciliator's work is done in oral discussions and it is not usual for the 
discussions to be recorded. The parties are encouraged to talk freely. Where, however 
the dispute is complex or there is a matter of principle at stake, a party or the 
conciliator may draft a proposal for a settlement as the basis for further progress. Even 
then the written agreement between the parties settling the dispute may be based on 
127 Encyclopaedia of Employment Law and Practice by Frank Walton, published by Professional Publishing. 
128 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriot: ADR principles and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993 
pp. 208-217. 
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unwritten reservations or understandings that the parties are unwilling to commit to 
Paper. 
3.3. Mediation 
A mediator appointed in relation to an industrial dispute may use all the same 
methods and procedures utilised by a conciliator, but the fundamental difference 
between the two processes is that the mediator can in addition make recommendations 
to the parties for the resolution of those aspects which they cannot themselves settle. 
Mediation moves one step nearer arbitration and adjudication with the mediator 
acting as a conciliator but also making his/her own proposals or recommendations for 
a settlement which may be accepted or used as the basis for further negotiation. It is 
not a common method of dispute settlement but may be used where the parties are 
unwilling to bind themselves beforehand to accept an award.t29 
The parties are under no obligation to accept the mediator's recommendations, and 
this distinguishes the process from arbitration, where the arbitrator's findings are 
binding. 
Parties will generally, but not invariably, provide written statements of their case to 
the mediator and to one another prior to the mediation process being commenced. 
They will also furnish a bundle of relevant documents. If this course is to be followed, 
it should be done reasonably well before the date fixed for the first mediation meeting 
so that the mediator cán obtain supplementary information if required, including 
perhaps meeting separately with the parties or with individual employees, or making 
such other inquiries as he may consider useful and appropriate. 
As with conciliation, the mediator may hold separate, joint or caucus meetings, and 
may use a range of skills and techniques to try to assist the parties in arriving at an 
agreement. He will seek to establish a constructive ambience for negotiation, will 
create an acceptable agenda and try to work to it, will manage the process and chair 
the proceedings, will control any personality conflicts that may occur, and will 
generally try to facilitate a settlement. 
At the conclusion of the mediation, the mediator will prepare a report and submit it 
to ACAS to be sent to the parties. If the issues have been resolved, the report will 
contain the terms of settlement but if they are unresolved, then the report is the vehicle 
in which the settlement recommendations of the mediator are contained. Parties may 
accept the recommendations, or reject them and go to a tribunal or take other 
proceedings, or may revert to conciliation through an ACAS conciliator using the 
recommendations as a basis for further discussion and negotiation. 
Mediation is not generally regarded as suitable for straightforward distributive 
conflicts' 30 such as annual pay claims. It is appropriate, however, for those cases where 
a form of conciliation is required, but it is felt that a higher level of intervention is 
129 Annual Report for 1979, p. 19. 
13° For a distinction between distributive and integrative bargaining see Chap. 5 at p. 89. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems in the sphere of labour law... — 49 
needed than conciliation allows. It can also be more appropriate than arbitration for 
complex and interdependent issues, such as major reorganisation of jobs." 
3.4. Arbitration 
Arbitration is the most formal of the methods of settling collective disputes. It is 
regarded as most suitable where the issue is clear cut or concerns the interpretation of 
an agreement. It depends on the parties being able to agree on terms of reference which 
will sufficiently identify the differences between them and the issues that the arbitrator 
is being asked to decide. It is not regarded as suitable for issues of principle such as a 
recognition dispute or a complex many sided dispute. In some cases collective 
agreements include a provision for ACAN to provide arbitration in case of 
disagreement. In others ACAS is asked to help on an ad hoc basis. In either case it is 
not ACAS officials who arbitrate. They appoint arbitrators either to sit alone or, where 
a major dispute is involved, as a Board, from panels made up of academics, retired 
conciliation officers, lawyers, trade union officials and managers, taking into account 
the arbitrator's status in relation to the importance of the dispute, the location, the need 
for special expertise and availability. 
The procedure is informal though it usually involves the exchange of written 
statements and an oral hearing. The whole process is confidential and conducted in 
private and awards are not published. The parties are not usually represented by a 
lawyer and legal representation needs the consent of the arbitrator. ACAS will only 
arrange arbitration if the parties agree to be bound by the award. 
At the individual employment level 12 provision is made for copies of all relevant 
claims to the industrial tribunals to be sent to the regional offices of ACAS together 
with the respondent's reply and any other communication between the parties and the 
tribunal. 
3.5. The conciliation officer 
The local conciliation officer may then offer his/her services if he/she thinks there 
is a reasonable prospect of a settlement, or at the request of the parties. In performing 
this function the conciliator does not act either as a representative of either party or the 
tribunal. All discussions with him/her are confidential and their content is not revealed 
to the tribunal if the attempt at conciliation fails. In practice, it seems, he/she does not 
attend the hearing. The discussions are also confidential in the sense that a party may 
say things to him/her in confidence which he/she may not then communicate to the 
other party. He/she is also required to tread a delicate line between giving advice on 
the law, the effect of past cases, the rules set out in any relevant Code of Practice such 
as that on Disciplinary Practice and Procedure, procedure and the methods of 
13' See ACAS article in Mackie, Handbook of Dispute Resolution at p. 111. As to the suitability of mediation 
for complex, interdependent issues, see the note on polycentricity in Chap. 12 at p. 234. — Henry J. Brown and 
Arthur L. Marriot: ADR principles and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993. pp. 208-217. 
12 See generally "Conciliation in complaints by individuals to industrial tribunals the ACAS role". ACAS 
1979. 
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calculating compensation on the one hand, 13 and commenting on the merits of the 
parties' cases. ACAS' own rules apparently permit him/her to point out the strengths 
and weaknesses of each party's case as he/she sees them and require him/her to draw 
the attention of a party to the fact that the tribunal can punish frivolous or vexatious 
complaints by an award of costs. He/she may also warn an employer, it seems, who is 
prepared to reach a settlement of an unfounded claim simply to avoid the trouble and 
expense of a hearing of the danger that this may result in other unfounded claims being 
brought against him/her. Apart from this however it is not part of his role to vet, check 
or even comment on the fairness or justice of a proposed settlement. What he/she has 
to do is to check that it really represents what each party wants, which is particularly 
important as any settlement in which the conciliation officer is involved will act as a 
bar to further proceedings before the tribunal. Indeed it is the only effective bar as a 
simple agreement will not suffice. As a result settlements negotiated without the 
involvement of the conciliation officer will be brought to him/her to be registered in 
order that a bar will effectively be created. 
The actual process of conciliation involves a to-ing and fro-ing between the parties 
or their representatives,`° who may be lawyers, in an effort to identify the salient points 
of difference between them in what ACAS describes as essentially "a negotiating and 
bargaining process". 
3.6. The tasks of the ACAS 
ACAS inherited its role under the Fair Wages legislation from the Commission on 
Industrial Relations set up in 1971. Under the Employment Protection Act 1975 (s.l I) 
a trade union could complain to ACAS that an employer of its members was not 
observing the agreed terms and conditions of employment which covered him, or 
where there were no such terms, the general level of terms and conditions of 
employment observed by comparable employers in the district concerned. ACAS was 
under a duty to attempt conciliation. If this failed it would refer the dispute to the 
Central Arbitration Committee which could make an award in favour of the union. The 
award set out the terms and conditions that were to be incorporated into the contracts 
of employment of those concerned, which means they could be enforced in the ordinary 
courts. 
This function under the fair wages legislation was removed in 1980 as was its 
function in relation to recognition questions. Although the recognition jurisdiction is 
now a matter of past history, as a case study of dispute settlement it is probably the 
most complex and illuminative of the functions of ACAS. Only the outlines can be 
sketched out here. The right given to a union to apply to ACAS for a recommendation 
that it should be recognised has been described as "the most contentious and for senior 
ACAS officials the most time consuming of the trade union rights provided by the 
13 In discrimination cases he may draw the attention of the complaint to the possibility of help from the 
Commission for Racial Equality or the Equal Opportunities Commission. 
14 ACAS has said that „the involvement of representatives inevitably makes conciliation more cumbersome 
and time-consuming, since after the meeting with the conciliation officer the representative normally has to 
consult with the party before further progress can be made. It is often difficult to arrange appointments at short 
notice with busy representatives, particularly lawyers and trade union officials", op. cit. n. 27. 
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Employment Protection Act.' 3S The process was criticised by unions as too slow and 
ineffective. 16  ACAS was criticised by employers as being biased in favour of the 
unions and ACAS itself complained both that the particular regulations under which it 
was asked to operate were too restrictive and, more generally, that its functions in 
relation to recognition did not fit well with its other functions where its stance was 
more patently neutral. 137 
The Employment Protection Act 1975 authorised a union to apply to ACAS for 
recognition as a bargaining agent. 138 It then became the duty of ACAS to conduct the 
inquiry into such matters as the amount of support the union had in the company and 
the opinion of the workers, the organisation structure of the company, its industrial 
relations, institutions and procedures, the jobs done by the employees, the general 
practice of the industry and the history of the dispute. The legislation left it largely to 
ACAS itself (as it had to the Commission on Industrial Relations before it) to work out 
the relevant criteria for recognition. 139 At the end of its investigations ACAS was 
authorised to make a recommendation in favour or against recognition. If this was not 
accepted by the employer the union could make a further application to ACAS which 
would then refer the matter to the Central Arbitration Committee. As in the case of the 
Fair Wages legislation the powers of the Central Arbitration Committee were limited 
to making an award the effect of which was to incorporate terms and conditions into 
the contracts of employment of the individual employees. The Committee took the view 
that this did not allow it to include a right to the recognition of the union or any other 
collective rights but only terms and conditions which could themselves have been the 
subject of collective bargaining.'°° The recognition question still remained open. Hence 
the criticism of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the procedure as a means of 
achieving recognition. It was clear that some of this criticism was misplaced. The 
process was deliberately long drawn out since the object throughout was to try and 
achieve not a compulsory decision but an agreed settlement. Efforts at conciliation 
began with the earliest inquiry by ACAS into the facts of the situation. The process of 
fact finding began informally with discussion with the parties. Sometimes this was 
enough to clear away misunderstandings and pave the way to agreement e.g. by 
133 Brian Weekes, "ACAS - An alternative to law?" Industrial Law Journal. 1974, p.141. 
136 It was aptly described in the Report of the Inquiry into the Grunwick Dispute conducted by Lord Scarman 
as strong in principle but slow in implementation (para. 28). It was a process which putting great pressure upon an 
employer to recognize a union, imposes no direct sanction for a failure to do so. (ibid.). 
137 In its Annual Report for 1976 it said (p. 59) that «it was important to distinguish the Service's operational 
activities where it guards its reputation for impartiality, from the broad direction of policy in which the Service is 
steered by the Act's requirement that the extension of collective bargaining is to be encouraged... The Service 
clearly understands it to be the general intention of Parliament that it should be positive in promoting collective 
bargaining, based on trade union recognition, as the best method of conducting industrial relations.» Contrast this 
with its view on the advantages of having a single body which could provide a comprehensive industrial relations 
service to industry and which emphasised the way in which its other functions overlapped and complemented one 
another. (Set out in its Annual Report for 1975, p. 7). Cp. Annual Report for 1975, p. 26. 
138 For the procedure in general see ACAS Annual Report for 1976, pp. 42 ff. 
139 ACAS itself argued for the need for a flexible approach. It said that osince the detailed characteristics of 
each ease vary the conctusions will vary. The Service has no automatic rules to apply, but it is always guided by 
its general statutory duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations and of encouraging the extension of 
collective bargaining... The aims of the Service is to obtain a broad picture of the facts and circumstances of each 
individual case from which to decide whether effective, viabte, collective bargaining machinery could be 
established and sustained in a way which would provide a basis for stable industrial relations.» 
14° See for example its Annual Report for 1978, p. 17. 
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identifying the group of workers which it was appropriate for the union to represent or 
by establishing the extent of support for the union among them. Agreement might at 
this stage be reached for phases recognition, beginning with particular groups or topics 
and extending over a period. Similarly the opportunity was taken at each further stage 
of the proceedings to come to an agreement e.g. after the inquiry into the opinions of 
the workers had been set out in a draft report. If no settlement was reached at this stage 
ACAS would then move on to the more detailed investigation into the position of the 
workers, the organisation of the plant and the general background of the dispute. In 
doing so it would try to consult the parties to discover their views on such matters as 
the identification of the appropriate bargaining unit, the extent of support that would 
be regarded as adequate-to justify recognition. 
Again before a final report was written a draft report would be sent to the parties in 
the hope that it would provide the basis of an agreed settlement and conciliation 
attempts could continue even after the report was published. Conciliation efforts were 
again undertaken if the union came back to ACAS asking for the matter to be referred 
to the Central Arbitration Committee which again provided every opportunity for an 
agreed settlement, with the assistance of ACAS officials. 
In keeping with its general attitude to alternative procedures ACAS was at pains to 
emphasise that its role was secondary to alternative means of settling a dispute. Where 
for example a recognition issue involves a dispute between two unions affiliated to the 
Trades Union Congress the TUC has its own Disputes Committee for dealing with 
such disputes and a set of general principles (the Bridlington Agreement) to govern the 
unions' relations with each other. 1°' The TUC had advised affiliated unions not to use 
the statutory procedures without consulting other unions affected and seeking their 
agreement. ACAS itself adopted a policy of drawing this to the attention of affiliated 
unions who made a reference to them. 
It was perhaps to be expected that in such a controversial area ACAS would find 
itself under attack in the courts. In the litigation in which it was involved the House of 
Lords on the whole showed more sympathy to it than the Court of Appeal under Lord 
Denning who showed clear concern for the way in which recognition of a particular 
union could be seen as an interference with the freedom of choice of individual 
employees. The House of Lords, for example, held that in making a recommendation 
ACAS was entitled to strike its own balance between the general requirement upon it 
to work towards an improvement of industrial relations and the more particular 
obligation to encourage the extension of collective bargaining, whereas the Court of 
Appeal had insisted that the latter goal had priority and had . characterised ACAS 
regard to the possibility of recognition leading to industrial action by other unions in 
the industry as giving way to the threats of the big battalions.'" It was the House of 
Lords too which upheld the practice of ACAS of delaying the conduct of a reference to 
give the UTC's Disputes Committee and opportunity to settle the issue provided this 
did not amount to a refusal to perform its statutory functions.'°' Both the House of 
141 Annual Report for 1976 p. 42. For the work of the TUC Disputes Committee see e.g. P.J. Kalis. The 
effectiveness and utility of the Disputes Committee of the Trades Union Congress. 16 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 1978, p. 41. 
142 ACAS v. OKAPE 11980] IRLR 124. 
143 EMA v ACAS and UKAPE 11980] IRLR 164. 
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Lords and the Court of Appeal however upheld the claim of an employer that he was 
under no obligation to assist ACAS in the conduct of its inquiries by allowing it access 
to his premises or even providing the names and addresses of his workers. 144 It was this 
decision which confirmed ACAS's view that it was unable to operate effectively against 
non-co-operative employers and had led it to ask for the legislation to be amended to 
give it wider powers. 14S Legislation was introduced into Parliament by two individual 
Members of Parliament, without Government `support, with the intention of making 
such changes. In the event it was the criticism not of the weakness of the procedures 
but the procedure overall that prevailed and the Conservative Government abolished it 
in the Employment Protection Act 1980. 
As will be seen from the account of ACAS functions the Central Arbitration 
Committee has a role to play both in relation to the Fair Wages legislation and the 
recognition procedures.i 6 In each case it was authorised to make an award which had 
the effect of incorporating the terms and conditions it recommended in the contract of 
the relevant workers. To this extent it was unusual in the field of labour relations as 
having a compulsory element in its awards. In addition, as successor to the Industrial 
Court and the Industrial Arbitration Committee, it was also available for the voluntary 
arbitration of collective disputes. Its particular interest for this paper however is the 
effort it has made to articulate the philosophy underlying its approach to its work 
which provides a useful contribution to the general debate of the way in which a body 
of its kind should perform its functions. In its Annual Report for 1976 it said, for 
example, that it was „not a court in the traditional sense. Its proceedings and hearings 
are structured so as to achieve complete informality. The aim is to encourage the 
approach by way of problem-solving rather than by emphasising the aspects of conflict 
and verdict. Above all there is a commitment to social and industrial relations and 
workable solutions." 147 This flexible approach, it admitted, 1 g8 was not always possible 
since in some cases legislation had laid down the particular approach to be adopted. 
„The committee operates within a legal framework, but endeavours to appreciate the 
underlying industrial problems. Sometimes unfortunately the requirement to adhere to 
the legal provisions in the framework may seem to indicate a lack of appreciation of 
the industrial relations problems. This is not intentional. The Committee would always 
wish to be aware of the impact of its awards on relationships so that, where discretion 
is properly available, the better result can be achieved". To this end parties were 
encouraged to discuss the background of the cases. „[O]n occasions awards are 
inevitably given which appear to ignore other difficulties or which themselves create 
further problems." If however the parties were prepared to discuss the underlying 
144 Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd. v. ACAS [l978] 1RLR 38. The "Grunwick affair" was also the 
subject of an inquiry chaired by Lord Scarman in 1977. I 
145 Annual Report for 1979 p. 8. For a general review of its experiences see Annual Report for 1980. 
146 It also has statutory responsibilities in relation to th refusal of employers to disclose to unions information 
needed for effective collective bargaining as well as being available as a forum for voluntary arbitration. 
147 Cp the Comment of Paul Davies, "Arbitration'°ánd the Role of Courts", 9th International Congress, 
International Society for Labour Law and Social Security, 1978. "The Committee sees itself as undertaking the 
ambitious task, not of producing merely a solution to the problem as defined in the terms of reference, but of at 
least contributing to the solution of the underlying industrial relations problem of which the issue identified in the 
terms of reference may be only a symptom". 
148 Annual Report for 1977, para. 4.6. 
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issues "every effort will be made to minimise this problem although it cannot always be 
eliminated". 
The approach of the Committee is reflected in its procedure.' 49 The parties are 
encouraged to exchange written statements before the hearing which is used to amplify 
and explain them. Parties are still free to bring new material forward but were 
encouraged to include as much of the factual detail as possible in their written 
statements. Formal cross-examination as a mode of challenging evidence is 
discouraged. "The aim" the committee said "is to keep the challenges which the 
boundaries set by the main objective of clarifying the evidence and issues. The 
Committee hopes to prevent the parties or witnesses from feeling that they are taking 
leading parts in a murder trial. They are encouraged to assist the Committee by 
evidence as to the facts and opinions with, as far as possible, participation in the task 
of problem solving, which in the ultimate, lies with the Committee.'s° 
3.7. The structure of award 
The problem solving approach was also reflected in the structure of its awards. The 
Industrial Court had started out with the ambition of building up a kind of industrial 
case law in its decisions but had eventually taken the view that it was probably wiser 
not to give reasons. It's awards therefore took the form of a statement of the terms of 
reference and the background to the dispute, the main submissions of the parties and a 
very brief award. There have long been two views about the desirability of giving 
reasons in arbitration cases in the field of industrial relations. One of the predominant 
views appear to have been that the giving of reasons is inadvisable. Arbitration cases 
usually come at the end of a long period of dispute and often follow conciliation. The 
parties are well aware of all the issues. What they want above all is settlement. To give 
reasons is to invite yet another reconsideration of the various issues — with a good 
chance of — renewed strife. The nuances of the words chosen to express the reasons 
may rekindle old disputes". But, the CAS said, that there were also strong arguments 
in favour of giving reasons and modern practice was tending to expect all decision 
makers to give reasons. only if reasons are given can a consistent pattern be seen to 
emerge from the various decisions in the same or related areas. Reasons enable other 
disputes to be voluntarily settled or parties to disputes which are submitted to prepare 
their eases more effectively." The CAS therefore adopted the practice of including in 
its awards a passage dealing with "General Considerations". This practice fitted in 
with their problem solving approach as they could include matters not strictly within 
their terms of reference which could not properly be included in their award. They 
were "not intended to be a formal complete set of reasons. They will rarely be drafted 
with legal precision, in the sense that each award can be taken as carefully weighed 
149 Annual Report for 1976, para. 3.5. 
15° In its preference for agreed solutions the CAC adopted a liberal policy toward allowing a ase to be 
interrupted to give the parties an opportunity of working toward a solution or narrowing the area of dispute, often 
with the help of officials from Acas. 
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policy. It is expected that they will be read by the parties as a guide — not as a precise 
legal judgement."' 
The Committee recognised that as it sat in panels of three members and each panel 
was allowed complete autonomy there was a problem of monitoring consistency. While 
placing considerable value therefore on flexibility and the need to deal with particular 
difficulties sympathetically "reasonable consistency" was also a goal.'SZ 
4. Conclusion 
One of the criticisms of the use of conciliation or mediation in the industrial 
context (which mirrors some similar criticism in other fields of activity) is that it may 
not necessarily be appropriate to the dispute which is referred to it, and that the time, 
energy and cost spent in the process may be wasted. For example, in a recognition 
dispute, there may be no common ground, nor any agreement on the facts as to the 
extent of trades union membership. What might be required, initially in any event, 
would be a thorough investigation prior to negotiations, rather than a conciliation or 
mediation role. Parties might nevertheless select conciliation in the hope that it will 
provide answers where all else has failed; but the conciliation may prove to be fruitless. 
While some risk must exist that parties may see conciliation as a panacea which 
will produce results for them in circumstances where that would be unrealistic, in 
practice it is unlikely that trained conciliation officers would allow this to occur. It is 
more probable that they would identify those kinds of disputes which would not be 
amenable to conciliation, and would make this clear to the parties, rather than taking 
them through a fruitless exercise. 
Another question that may need to be addressed is whether mediators are more 
interested in securing 'agreements than with the contents of such agreements. This is 
rejected by ACAS, whose work relies on their reputation and the efficacy and 
endurance of the agreements which they help parties to reach. The long-term survival 
of the settlement is of primary importance, as ACAS takes to heart the "good industrial 
relations" obligation in the Employment Protection Act. 
isi In the same report the Committee noted in relation to its jurisdiction under the Fair Wages legislation that 
thete were those especially in legal and academic circles, who were looking to the Committee to give an early 
reties of decisions providing more precise definitions,» of words used in the legislation. This is not the 
Committee's intention; indeed it appears essential not to limit the necessary flexibility left by the Act's draftsmen». 
The flexibile approach was not entirely without its problems. In reg. v. CAC ex parte Deltaflow Ltd. (1977) 1 
RLR 486 the High Court adopted a view which the CAC had rejected as "formalistic legalism". Words used in a 
statute, the court said, were to be given their strict legal meaning». 
152 'Geoffrey Wilson: Alternatives to Litigation: Recent British Experience, in Les Conciliateurs la 
Conciliation ed. André Tune, Economica, Paris 1983. pp. 75-87. 
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Chapter 6 
Settlement of labour disputes in Greece 
Since 1830, when Greece became an independent state, many years went by before 
the country started to industrialise. Industry started to expand in the 1920s and only 
after World War II economic growth became considerable. Yet, still today, the bigger 
part of the population is self employed and works in artisan production or agriculture. 
A considerable percentage of the wage-earners is employed in the public sector. 1 S3 This 
structure of employment is important in order to understand the relative weakness of 
trade unions and employers" associations and the slow development of collective 
bargaining: 
The rather hostile relationships between both sides of industry is only gradually 
being converted into a more constructive working relationship. During the past, Greek 
Governments often took an interventionistic and authoritarian approach towards 
industrial relations. The most recent period of authoritarianism was that of the regime 
following the military coup in 1967, which stayed into power until 1974. 
The first institution responsible for the settlement of collective labour disputes was 
established by Decree-Act of 21 April 1926. Through this Act separate conciliation and 
arbitration committees were established connected S through a two-stage procedure. 
First a conciliation committee made an attempt to conciliate the disputing parties, 
either on the request of the parties or on the initiative of the chairperson, usually a 
labour inspector. If the attempt at conciliation failed, then an arbitration committee 
became involved automatically.'" 
After World War II, a semi-compulsory system of labour arbitration was established 
through the Act 3239/1955 and the Decree 186/1969. The 1955 Act not only addressed 
the issue of dispute settlement. It also laid the main basis for post-war Greek industrial 
relations, restricting the agenda of collective bargaining and the right to strike and 
enabling the Government to implement its income policy without much formalities. 
The Act provided that where a collective difference arose, either of the disputing 
parties was allowed to refer the case to an Administrative Arbitration Court.'" The 
agencies involved were the Administrative Arbitration Courts, encompassing six 
Courts of First Instance and a Court of Appeal. These Arbitration Courts had a quadri-
partite composition. The President / was a judge from a regular court, sitting with a 
representative from the Ministry of Employment, a representative from the trade 
unions and a representative from the employers. The Court of Appeal was of quinto-
partite composition. Next to the representatives from the Ministry, top-ranked civil 
servants, the employers and employees, there was a fifth member, who was to be 
appointed by the parties.'s6 
153 N.D. Kritsantonis (1992), Greece: From State Authoritarianism to Modernization, in Industrial 
Relations in the New Europe (A. Femer and R. Hyman eds.), Oxford, p. 601 ff. 
'" ILO (1933), o.c., p. 533. 
Iss S. 10 ff., Act 3239I1955. The procedure could not only be started by one of the disputing parties, but also 
by the Minister of Employment in exceptional cases. 
156 T.B. Koniaris (1990), Greece, in International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
(R. Blanpain ed.), Deventer, p. 184. 
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The Ministry of Employment, however, was also involved. Within five days after 
the application for arbitration, a civil servant of the Ministry would "introduce" the 
dispute and ask the parties to give evidence for their position. The civil servant then 
made an attempt at conciliation. If this attempt was successful, the report of the 
"introducer-conciliator" became a guideline for, or even an intrinsic part of the 
collective agreement between the disputing parties. In the greater Athens area, a 
second conciliation effort could take place after eight days from the notification of the 
Erst report. 
If conciliation was not successful, the file was sent to the Arbitration Court of First 
Instance. From that moment, the parties became litigants and bound by the procedural 
rules governing the arbitration procedure. Decisions of the Arbitration Courts were 
legally binding and considered as a collective agreement. 
Because of the compulsory elements, the system was held to be in violation of the 
Greek Constitution of 1952 by some authors. 1 S7 Under the auspices of the three party 
coalition Government of Conservatives, Socialists and Communists, an Act was passed 
in 1990 constituting "[...] a radical step towards industrial relations modernisation 
[ 	]., 158 
This Act No. 1876/1990 explicitly lays down the right for unions and employers to 
engáge in collective bargaining. It replaces the compulsory arbitration system of 1955 
by a new voluntary system of mediation and arbitration by an agency independent from 
the Government. The overall aim of the Act is to reduce authoritarian Government 
intervention and to promote the social dialogue between both sides of industry at all 
levels. 
The newly created institution is the Organisation of Mediation and Arbitration, 
which is referred to hereinafter with its Greek initials as OMED. 
OMED consists of 50 full-time or part-time mediators, of whom 20 may act as 
arbitrators.These mediators and arbitrators are recruited by the Board of Directors of 
OMED. Vacant posts are publicly advertised and filled through a selection procedure. 
In order to qualify, candidates may not have leading positions with trade unions or 
employers" associations. Candidates must have a university degree in law or 
economics and have experience in the area of industrial relations, particularly with 
collective bargaining and solving collective labour disputes. 1 S 9 Mediators and 
arbitrators are appointed on a three year basis. Their contract may be renewed. A fee is 
paid to the mediator/arbitrator by OMED for each case dealt with. Fees are higher if 
the dispute is solved due to the intervention of the mediator/arbitrator. 160 
Mediators/arbitrators exercise a public function, although technically they are not 
civil servants. They enjoy complete independence in the exercise of their duty. The 
mediators/arbitrators are subject to a code of conduct. 16' Violation of this code of 
conduct or the by-laws on OMED constitutes a disciplinary offence. 
1" T.B. Koniaris (1990), o.c., p. 184. 	. 	 . 
158 N.D. Kritsantonis (1992), o.c., p. 620. 
1" S. 4, Regulations governing the status of mediators and arbitrators of the Organisation of Mediation and 
Arbitration (1991). 
160 S. 9, Regulations governing the status of mediators and arbitrators of the Organisation of Mediation and 
Arbitration (1991). 
161 The rules of the code of conduct are incorporated under s. 5 of the Regulations governing the status of 
mediators and arbitrators of the Organisation of Mediation and Arbitration (1991). 
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The procedure before OMED starts upon th - őint request of the parties. The parties 
first select a mediator from the list provided by OMED. If they do not agree, a 
mediator is selected through the drawing of lots. It is for the mediator to decide 
holding joint or separate meetings and to ask for expert opinions. An interesting 
combination of conciliation and mediation becomes manifest in the provision, that the 
mediator has the right to submit his own proposal to the parties, but only if the parties 
cannot reach agreement within 20 calendar days after the procedure has started. If the 
proposal of the mediator is accepted by the parties, it has a status tantamount to a 
collective agreement. It is, therefore, necessary that the disputing parties who come to 
OMED have the capacity to sign such agreements. If mediation fails, the dispute can 
be referred to arbitration. The parties decide on the terms of reference.' 62  The arbitral 
decision is taken within ten days and has a status equivalent to a collective agreement. 
The cautiously framed demarcation between conciliation and mediation, the 
requirements for intending mediators/arbitrators and the code of conduct all indicate 
that OMED is aware of its vulnerability as well as its potential in the emerging modern 
industrial relations system of Greece.' 63 
The Greek settlement of individual labour disputes goes back to the Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1834 entrusting the settlement of disputes between masters and servants 
to the Justice of the Peace, an institution modelled after the French Juge de Paix. An 
Act promulgated in 1912 aimed to make the procedure before the Justice of the Peace 
speedier and more accessible. 1 ó' In 1944, the jurisdiction in individual employment 
disputes was shifted to the specialised labour judges, sitting alone within the regular 
court of first instance.' 65 
On 16 September 1968, a new Code of Civil Procedure entered into force. This 
code treats disputes over individual employment rights as a special procedure. The 
competence to deal with these disputes is divided between the Justice of the Peace and 
the court of first instance, depending on the amount in controversy. A plan for a system 
of compulsory conciliation preceding a court procedure was withdrawn.' 66  
The law of Civil Procedure stipulates that individual disputes are handled in an 
informal, expedient manner, allowing for consolidation with other individual claims 
arising from the same legal cause, and allowing the judge freedom in evaluating 
evidence. The length of the trial may not exceed eight days. As a first step, the court 
should try to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute. 167 
162 M: Daskalakis (1993), An institutional innovation in Greece: the new model of mediation and 
arbitration in the collective labour disputes, Athens. 
163 D. Daskalakis (1993), o.c., p. 4. 
16' Act No. 3974/1912. 
163 Act No. 1968/1944. 
'66 M.T. Mitsou (1978), Le role des tribunaux dans !'administration de la justice en droit du travail, 19th 
International Conference of Labour Law and Social Security, München. 
167 T.B. Koniaris (1990), o.c., p. 119. - Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in 
Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 341-344. 
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Conclusion 
It is impossible to conclude this brief survey with a detailed comparative analysis. 
Only some striking differences and similarities are touched upon. 
It is noteworthy that the political and economic development of many of the 
countries studied in this Chapter lacked continuity and stability, unlike in Great 
Britain, and Belgium. In Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal national corporatist 
associations dominated industrial relations in the late 1920s, following the rise of 
political dictatorship. As a result, voluntary conciliation and arbitration procedures 
were reformed into compulsory procedures, supervised by the state authorities. In 
Spain and Portugal this situation continued to exist for a number of decades. 
Denmark and Sweden stands out as a noteworthy exception to this pattern of 
discontinuity. Industrial relations in this country have been firmly settled long ago. 
Today, the high degree of self-regulation and voluntariness, combined with a high 
degree of institutionalised procedures is the major characteristic of the Danish and 
Swedish system. The German system, despite its different historical antecedents, bears 
resemblance with the Danish system. Here self-regulation has also become 
predominant and the dispute resolution procedures are highly institutionalised. 
Another similarity between Germany and Denmark is the systematic distinction 
between collective disputes over interests and collective disputes over rights. They are 
handled through different procedures. In this respect, Italy seems to join its northern 
neighbours. Yet, there are more similarities between France and Italy. Both France and 
Italy have a strongly individual approach towards labour relations. As in France, the 
settlement procedures for such individual disputes have received much attention from 
the legislator. Collective disputes, in Italy as in France, are mainly settled through 
informal, ad hoc procedures involving politicians increasingly. The relations between 
employers' associations and trade unions are usually antagonistic and distrustful and 
self regulation is not much developed. 
Spain, Portugal and Greece have in common that new approaches to industrial 
relations are being explored in the wake of the recent past political changes. 
In Spain and Portugal, institutions were developed under the aegis of the 
corporatist system, whereas in Greece the degree of institutionalisation was low thus 
far. Attempts to set up new settlement institutions independent from the Government 
have been common to these countries. It is too premature to assess these new 
developments. 
Luxembourg resembles Belgium with its long lasting distinction between white 
collar and blue collar workers in individual employment relations, although in 
Belgium no separate institutions were set up. The conciliation procedure for collective 
disputes in Luxembourg has encompassed a number of compulsory elements, which 
are not contested by employers and unions. Finally, Ireland has settlement machinery 
which resembles the British system. This comes as no surprise considering the long 
lasting connections between this jurisdiction and Great Britain. 168 
168 This chapter based mainly on the work of Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in 
Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 334-345. 
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Chapter 7 
Settlement of labour disputes in Italy 
The first institution in Italy responsible for settling labour disputes were the Collegi 
dei Probiviri (Councils of Prudent Men), established by the Act on the Councils of 
Prudent Men of 15 June 1893. The Collegi were introduced as the result of a 
recommendation by a Royal Commission investigating the phenomenon of strikes in 
Italy. The Collegi bore a strong resemblance to the French Conseils de Prud'hommes. 
They were similarly organised having a bureau de conciliation and a bureau de 
jugement. Their jurisdiction primarily concerned individual labour disputes. There 
was, however, one striking difference between the Collegi and the Conseils. Section 
eight of the Act of 1893 stipulated that the conciliation bureau could be seized 
handling disputes over wages paid or to be paid in the future and disputes concerning 
the conclusion of a new collective agreement. 169 Hence the Collegi dei Probiviri 
conciliated individual as well as most collective disputes. The Decree No. 1098 of 31 
July 1921 brought about some modifications in the organisation of the Collegi dei 
Probiviri and reconfirmed and extended the competence of the Collegi in collective 
disputes to controversi (disputes over the interpretation of existing agreements) and 
conflitti•(disputes over the terms to be negotiated for future agreements) generally. 
In both categories of disputes, the Collegi were given additional competence to give 
a giudizio (a decision or award, indicating a desirable solution), in case conciliation 
was not successful. Section 20 of the 1921 Decree declared that the parties were legally 
bound by this giudizio. 
During the Fascist era, lasting from the early 193Os to 1944, a corporatist system of 
labour relations was introduced. 
After World War II, individual labour disputes over rights were entrusted to the 
regular civil courts. This was a legacy of the Fascist era, which forbad special courts. 
The Constitution of 1948 allowed for special sections within the regular courts, but 
these were not introduced until 1973. Within the regular court system, the Pretori 
(Cantorial Judges with jurisdiction over small claims and petty offences) are 
responsible to deal with individual labour disputes. For the purpose of civil litigation, 
collective disputes over rights are not recognised in Italy. These disputes are split into 
a number of individual claims in order to bring them before the Pretori. The reasons 
for this are various. Collective agreements have no special legal status in Italy. They 
are regarded as mere gentlemen's agreements. A deeper reason is perhaps the "[...] 
Italian tradition, which has always been very sensitive to the individual's rights, and 
opposed to subjecting them to discretionary evaluation by a union representative or any 
third party". 170 The Pretori render judgements alone. Appeal against their decisions can 
be lodged with the Tribunale (Court of First Instance) and subsequently to the Corte 
d'Appello (Court of Appeal). 17 ' 
169 ILO (1933), o.c., p. 470. 
17° T. Treu (1987), Italy, in Comparative Labor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No.1, p. 122. 
171 Eventually the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) may be seized. Provisions in a collective 
agreement are not perceived as legal norms, but rather as the terms of a private contract. Hence these cannot be 
reviewed in a cassation procedure. However, the Corte di Cassazione could be seized in a different manner by 
claiming that a norm has been wrongly applied by a lower court in the interpretation of a private contract. 
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The procedure before the Pretori was revised in 1973 by the Act No. L 533, which 
at the same time provided a statutory basis for extra judicial conciliation practices. 
Until 1973, the procedure was governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. On average 
individual labour procedures took three years to be completed. The Act provided for a 
speedier, more informal, and accessible procedure. Consequently, the procedure in 
labour disputes differs significantly from ordinary proceedings. An individual labour 
dispute may be completed within 60 days. The Act exempted labour disputes from all 
court fees. The Act also provided for a special section in the Corte di Cassazione 
(Court of Cassation) to hear labour disputes. Apart from these improvements within 
the court procedure, the Act of 1973 provided a statutory basis for an already existing 
conciliation procedure, administered by the Labour Offices. Labour Offices are 
Governmental agencies, staffed with civil servants. They are established in all 
provinces and are hierarchically subordinate to the national Ministry of Labour. Their 
tasks include the promotion of employment at provincial and local levels. 
Since the 1950s a practice developed for officials of the provincial Labour Offices, 
including the directors thereof, to conciliate labour disputes. To justify this practice, 
reference was often made to Act No. D. 520 of 1955 that conferred upon the Labour 
Offices in vague terms the general task to conciliate in industrial disputes. 172 
The Act of 1973 not only gave a statutory basis to the intervention of the Labour 
Office in two categories of disputes, that is disputes over rights and individual disputes. 
It also stipulated that the individual Labour Officers should function as conciliators in 
a collegiate body on a permanent basis. The Labour Officer presides a commission, 
consisting of eight members, recruited equally from employers" associations and trade 
unions. The commissions may be invoked by the individual worker himself or by his 
union. Consequently, the unions do have a locus startdi in conciliation procedures. 
Conciliation agreements are registered by the commissions. If one of the parties fails or 
refuses to comply with the terms of the conciliated settlement, the non-defaulting party 
is entitled to obtain an enforcement order from the Pretori straightaway upon 
production of the official document embodying the settlement. 
A major innovation introduced by the Act L. 533 was the explicit provision that 
any waiver or compromise reached before a commission of conciliation cannot be 
attacked later in a court of law under section 2113 of the Civil Code. This section 2113 
states that a worker may not waive his rights. Through the Act of 1973, settlements 
below the legal norm are now explicitly allowed in Italy. A number of labour law 
specialists, including Treu, have mixed feelings about this innovation. 13 
The regime for settlement of collective disputes over interests has not changed 
since World War II. This implies, that individual Labour: Officers still conciliate such 
disputes on an informal basis. Next to this type of conciliation; there is an equally 
informal conciliation practice, whereby politicians intervene in labour disputes. Treu 
has compared and contrasted these two informal practices. 14 Treu observes that the two 
informal systems are used interchangeably and simultaneously. Empirical research 
revealed that in 50% of disputes, which were in the process of being conciliated by 
172 T. Treu (1989), The role of neutrals in the resolution of interest disputes in Italy, in Comparative Labor 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 378. 
13 T. Teu (1987), o.c., p. 121. 
14 T. Treu (1989), o.c., p. 374 ff. 
62 — JÓZSEF HAJDÚ 
Labour Officers in Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia, regional politicians also intervened. 
The intervention of the regional politicians was more appreciated by the parties than 
the Labour Officers. According to Treu, the regional politicians are becoming more 
important as mediators, as they are increasingly involved in disputes arising from 
industrial restructuring and employment reductions. In such matters, the regional 
Governments obviously take a direct political interest. Often trade unions find it 
difficult to convey the bad news to their members. They consider it more convenient to 
involve the regional Government, which may press management to mitigate the 
implementation of its plans. Subsidies may be provided by the regional Governments to 
reduce the effects of the restructuring process. Management may find it convenient to 
accept such reductions in its financial burdens, which may accompany the settlement. 
Opposition to such settlements under the auspices of regional politicians has come 
from groups of individual employees who were negatively affected by them. With 
varying degrees of success, such individual employees have applied to the Pretori, 
trying to transform the collective interest dispute into an individual rights dispute. 17 S 
Treu also observes that no distinction is drawn between conciliation and mediation. 
Labour officers, particularly the less experienced ones, however adopt a more passive, 
"go-between" like approach, whereas politicians tend to be more active, making 
proposals for a settlement or participating in the dispute as a full-fledged third party. 16 
175 T. Treu (1989), o.c., p. 381. 
176 Ibid., p. 387. — Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 
332.335. 
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Chapter 8 
Settlement of labour disputes in Ireland 
In Ireland, independent from Great Britain since 1921, the development of 
voluntary, statutory machinery for settling labour disputes started by the British 
Conciliation Act of 1896 and the Industrial Courts Act of 1919. Consequently, the 
settlement of labour disputes was restricted to collective labour disputes.'" As in Great 
Britain, individual labour disputes were submitted for adjudication to the regular courts 
of law. 
The British Conciliation Act 1896 was replaced by the Irish Industrial Relations 
Act 1946. This Act established the Labour Court inquiring into trade disputes, 
registering and changing certain agreements and assisting in the establishment of joint 
labour committees. Apart from these functions the Labour Court was allowed to 
practise voluntary conciliation in trade disputes. 
The composition of the Labour Court is tri-partite. There is a chairman, three 
deputy chairmen and six ordinary members. These functionaries are appointed by the 
Minister for Enterprise and Employment. The six ordinary representative members are 
recruited from the workers" and employers" organisations. Legal qualifications for 
performing the task are not required. By amendments of the Industrial Relations Acts 
of 1969, 1970 and 1990 the functions of the Labour Court changed. One of the changes 
was the transfer of its conciliation function. 18 Although the conciliation function has 
been removed, the Labour Court still has a role to play in trade disputes by undertaking 
investigations resulting in recommendations and by arbitration. 
After investigation into a trade dispute, the Labour Court makes a recommendation 
summarising the arguments of each party and containing the opinion and the terms on 
which the dispute may be settled. The parties are not bound by it, although they are 
expected to consider the terms carefully. 19 
Under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 the Labour Court is empowered referring a 
dispute to arbitration. Arbitration is performed by the Labour Court itself or it may 
refer the dispute to one or more arbitrators. In many collective agreements clauses are 
incorporated stating that if there is no agreement on the nomination of the arbitrator, 
the Labour Court "(...] shall be invited to nominate one [...]". 180 Such an arbitrator must 
be an expert in industrial relations. 
Under the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 and the Employment Equality Act 
1977, the Labour Court performs an adjudicatory role. 181 The status of the Labour 
177 ILO (1933), Conciliation and Arbitration in Industrial Disputes, Geneva, p. 202. 
18 Another change was the transfer of the Equality Officer Service from the Labour Court to the Labour 
Relations Commission. In 1977 the Employment Equality Act was promulgated. 
179 Irish Labour Court (1992), The Labour Court, Dublin, p. 5. 
180 The Labour Relations Commission (1993), Institutions in Ireland with responsibility for Labour 
Dispute Resolution, Dublin. 
191 Another institution established in 1967 to deal with disputes arising from statutory rights is the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal. It performs its adjudicatory role under the Redundancy Payment Act 1967, the 
Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, the Maternity Protection 
of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Act 1984, the Worker Protection Regular Part-time Employees Act 1991 
and the Payment of Wages Act 1991. 
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Court, which is assumed to perform a key role in the Irish labour relations, is 
characterised as follows: 
[...] the Labour Court is not a „court" at all, but rather a body which uses its good 
offices to persuade and cajole parties in dispute in order to achieve a peaceful 
settlement. In this function it has been largely successful, in that a large proportion of 
disputes taken to the Court in any year are resolved either at the conciliation stage or 
through mediation (called "investigation" in the Court's terminology). 182 
The conciliatory function of the Labour Court has been attributed to the Labour 
Relations Commission (LRC), which was established under s. 24 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1990. 189 The transfer of the conciliatory assignment of the Labour Court 
to the -LRC was the resúlt of the desire to promote conciliation and to make parties 
aware of their own responsibility for settling their disputes. 184 The removal of the 
conciliatory task was not received with enthusiasm by the Labour Court since it had 
always considered it as its main function. 
As the ACAS, the LRC is independent from Government. The LRC is composed of 
a chairperson, a chief executive and six ordinary members. As the members of the 
Labour Court, they are appointed by the Minister of Enterprise and Employment. 
The LRC has the general responsibility for the promotion of good industrial 
relations strove for by providing a comprehensive range of industrial relations services. 
This is expressed in its organisation. The Commission encompasses the Industrial 
Relations Conciliation Service, the Equality Service and the Rights Commissioners 
Service. Apart from that it assists and advises joint labour committees and joint 
industrial councils. 
Within the Commission the Industrial Relations Conciliation Service is responsible 
for the performance of the conciliation task. The Commission defines conciliation as 
follows: 
Conciliation is continuation of the negotiation process with the active assistance of 
an experienced Industrial Relations Officer as a chairman and independent 
facilitator.'"  
Although the Commission has interventionist powers, it promotes the parties to 
exhaust local procedures first. While offering its services in settling disputes the parties 
should refrain from any form of industrial action.' 86 
The intervention of the LRC in collective labour disputes starts when any party 
requests to assign an Industrial Relations Officer for assistance in the settlement of a 
dispute or on its own motion. The Industrial Relations Officer invites the disputants to 
attend a conciliation conference or to meet officers of the LRC to discuss the dispute. 
The request for assistance in the settlement of the dispute must be accompanied by 
information concerning the details of the dispute, the number and category of workers 
involved, a summary of what happened during the earlier settlement procedures and 
the mention of contact persons. The employers" organisations and trade unions are 
182 F. von Prondzynski (1992), Ireland: Between Centralism and the Market, in Industrial Relations in the 
New Europe, (A. Femer and R. Hyman eds.), Oxford, p. 76 and 77. 
183 S. 25, Industrial Relations Act 1990. 
184 Department of Labour, A guide to the Industrial Relations Act 1990, Dublin. 
183 Brochure of the Labour Relations Commission, Dublin, p. 5. 
186 Ibid., p. 3. 
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notified of the referral to the Commission. After receiving a request the LRC contacts 
the other party to ask whether they are prepared to attend a conciliation conference, if 
so, an Industrial Relations Officer is appointed. After dates are agreed, the parties 
jointly meet under the chairmanship of the Industrial Relations Officer. Separate 
meetings may be arranged thereafter. The settlements reached with the assistance of 
the Industrial Relations Officer have no legal effect. If the parties agree, the dispute 
may be referred to the Labour Court accompanied by a report containing the course of 
actions taken to solve the dispute. 
The Public Sector in Ireland has its own settlement machinery in which 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration are practised. The bodies responsible are the 
General Council and the Departmental Council. 187 
In the Irish industrial relations system methods to settle disputes other than 
adjudication play an important role, which is emphasised by the newly established 
Labour Relations Commission.' 88 
187 The Labour Relations Commission (1993), o.c., p. 12. 
188 Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 319-320. 
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Chapter 9 
Settlement of labour disputes in Luxembourg 
The present Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has a complicated constitutional status 
and history. The most important facts for the purpose of this study are that the territory 
was occupied by France under Napoleon at the beginning of the century, that the 
territory became semi-independent from the Netherlands in 1839, and fully 
independent in 1890. 89 
The first institutions with a responsibility to settle disputes were the Conseils de 
Prud'hommes (Councils of Prudent Men), introduced in 1810, and the Tribunal 
Arbitral (Arbitral Tribunal), introduced - by the Act of 31 -October 1919 on the contract 
of service of salaried employees. The working area of both institutions was individual 
labour disputes. The Conseils de Prud'hommes dealt with blue collar workers 
exclusively and the Tribunal Arbitral with white collar workers. This distinction 
between individual labour disputes involving blue collar and white collar workers has 
continued to exist in Luxembourg for a longer time than anywhere else in Europe, that 
is until 1989. The Act of 6 December 1989 on labour jurisdiction finally merged the 
two jurisdictions and established a single Labour Tribunal competent to hear all cases 
arising from any employment contract. If the claim exceeds 15,000 Francs, appeal 
against the decision of the Labour Tribunal may be brought before the Court of 
Appeal. 190 The Labour Tribunals are composed of one magistrate acting as a chairman 
and one representative from the employers and employees respectively. The employee-
assessor is chosen by the magistrate chairing the Tribunal. 191 The Labour Tribunals 
adjudicate disputes through a largely written procedure. It is possible for parties to opt 
for a summary procedure, if certain conditions are satisfied. 
In the area of collective labour dispute settlement, the year 1936 marks the 
establishment of the Conseil National du Travail (National Labour Council), a 
Government committee responsible for arbitrating disputes arising from deadlocked 
negotiations over collective agreements. in 1945, this institution was replaced by the 
Office National de Conciliation (National Conciliation Office), abbreviated ONC. The 
Decree of 6 October 1945 establishing the ONC describes the task of the Office as "[...] 
to prevent or to settle collective labour conflicts, which are not settled through 
conciliation otherwise".' 92 The ONC has to perform its task in close co-operation with 
the Labour Inspection. 193 Although the ONC is often referred to as an equitable 
institution, its composition is essentially tri-partite. Three representatives from the 
unions and employer's associations respectively are presided over by the Minister of 
Labour or his deputy. These are the seven permanent members of the. In each dispute, 
however, ad hoc conciliators from the plant or profession concerned are appointed in 
addition. 
189 P. Weber (1961), Histoire du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Luxembourg. 
19° R, Schintgen (1991), Luxembourg, in International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations (R. Blanpain ed.), Deventer. 
"' R. Schintgen (1991), o.c., p.149. 
192 S. 6, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945 ayant pour objet !'institution, tes attributions et to 
fonetionnemeru d'un Once National de Conciliation. 
193 S. 7, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
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All collective labour disputes must be referred to the ONC. Strikes called without 
prior submission of the dispute to the are unlawful.'" The may step into a dispute on its 
own motion, if the parties fail to take the initiave. The representatives from both sides 
of industry discuss the dispute separately and jointly, and may ask the president of the 
Office to assist the meetings. Settlement proposals are based on an absolute majority. 
Voting is at the close of a conciliation session or in the course of a session when 
interim measures are decided. The president has a casting vote. 19S No distinction is 
made between conciliation and mediation.' 96 
Not attending the conciliation session or hindering the parties" representatives is 
also regarded as unlawful. 197 The conciliated settlement binds the parties to a collective 
agreement and can be declared erga omnes. Failure to comply with a conciliatory 
settlement constitutes a penal offence.' 98 
The Decree of 1945 stipulates that parties may have recourse to arbitration, if 
conciliation is not successful. The Decree lays down that such arbitration is to be 
conducted by an arbitration tribunal composed of a president, appointed by the 
Government and two arbitrators, each of which represents one side of industry. These 
representatives are to be appointed by the parties. The Decree further provides that the 
sends a report of non-conciliation, providing the arbitration tribunal with background 
materials concerning the dispute.' 99 
Instead of using this arbitration procedure of the 1945 Decree, parties to a 
collective agreement may decide to nominate one or more arbitrators of their own 
choice in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. This possibility is laid down 
explicitly in the Act of 12 June 1965 on Collective Agreements. 200 In Luxembourg a 
substantial role, at least on paper, is reserved for arbitration, unlike for example in 
Belgium. 
Finally, mention is made of the role of the Labour Inspectors. Labour Inspectors are 
placed under the authority of the ministry of Labour. The inspectors ensure application 
of all regulations on working conditions and protection of the workers. To this end 
they may supply information and advice to employers and employees, and they may 
freely enter relevant places and investigate books and personnel. Apart from this task, 
the Inspection has a general task to prevent and smoothen labour conflicts before 
referring them to a Labour Tribunal or to the ONC. 201 
194 S. 9 and s. 25, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
195 S, 15, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
196 G. Tunsch (1992), Luxembourg, in Industrial Relations in the New Europe, (A. Ferrer and R. Hyman 
eds.), Oxford, p. 397. 
197 S. 25, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
198 S. 26, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
199 S. 18, Arrété grand-ducal du 6 octobre 1945. 
200 S. 7, Loi du 12 juin 1965 concernant les Conventions Collectives de Travail. 
201 The structure and functions of the Labour Inspection are laid down in the Act on the Labour Inspection of 
4 April 1974. — Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 330-
332. 
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Chapter 10 
Settlement of labour disputes in Portugal 
Recently a new institution was established outside the Direc'áo Geral das 
Gondi'öes de Trabalho (Directorate General for Working Conditions), which is called 
Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Inspecpüo, Direc9ao de Servi9os das Dela9öes 
Professionais (Institute for the Settlement and Inspection of Labour Conditions). 
In Portugal, by Act of 14 August 1889, arbitration courts were set up to deal with 
individual labour disputes. It is said that the arbitration courts resembled the French 
Conseils de Prud'hommes. 202 
Following the effective recognition of trade unions in 1910, an Order was issued on 
17 August 1912 allowing trade unions, employers, municipal councils and the 
arbitration courts to request the installation of Juntas de Conciliacdo (Conciliation 
Boards) in the most important industrial areas. These boards intervened by conciliation 
on a voluntary basis in collective as well as individual labour disputes. 
The Juntas de Conciliavtio were composed of an equal representation of the 
organisations of employers and employees on the basis of elections. The functions of 
chairperson and secretary were alternately performed by a representative of the workers 
and by a representative of the employers. The Juntas had to meet at least once a year. 
The decisions of the Juntas were taken by majority vote, made known to the public 
and were only morally binding. It is observed that the Juntas were not very 
successful.203 
Through the Period of Authoritarian Rule, which lasted from 1926 until 1974, the 
Portuguese labour relations experienced an interventionist Government embracing 
corporatism. Strikes were prohibited in 1927. Independent trade unions were forbidden 
since they were considered to be threats to economic stability. Wages and labour 
conditions were determined by the Government predominantly. 204 Nevertheless, 
conciliation and mediation services were established. 
At present individual labour . disputes, which are mostly disputes over rights, are 
settled by labour courts and are untied from the collective industrial relations.'" 
Until 1985 an individual labour dispute could not be referred to a labour court 
before an attempt at conciliation was made. Such conciliation in individual labour 
disputes was performed by the Conciliation and Judgement Committees, which were 
set up in the framework of collective agreements in the branches of industry covered by 
it. Their ancestors were the Corporate Committees, which were established under the 
Decree-Act of 23 September 1943 of which it is said that they again were founded on 
the Juntas de Concilia Ao of 1889. 
The Conciliation and Judgement Committees were composed of three members. 
The chairperson was appointed by the Minister of Labour, the two other members were 
2°2 This is suggested by M.J. Leitáo (1993), Prevention and Settlement of Labour Disputes in Portugal, 
Division of Collective Labour Regulation of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Lisbon, p. 22. 
According to the do study of 1933 these arbitration occasionally intervened in „special" collective labour 
disputes. . 
zo3 ILO (1933), o.c., p. 525 ff. 
204 J. Barreto (1992), Portugal: Industrial Relations Under Democracy, in Industrial Relations in the New 
Europe, (A. Ferrer and R. Hyman eds.), Oxford. 
zo3 The labour courts were established by Act 82 of 6 December 1977. 
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appointed by the signatories of the collective agreement. The settlements reached by 
conciliation had the same status as a-judgement rendered by a court. 
Other institutions with a conciliation power in individual labour disputes were the 
Services of Conciliation of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security. They 
functioned between 1978 and 1991. Their intervention was voluntary and informal. 
At the collective level disputes over interests, as the result of the conclusion or 
renewal of collective ' agreements, are mostly . settled by the negotiating parties 
themselves. If no settlement is.reached, the parties may request the intervention of a 
third party, for example a conciliator. The conciliators are regional based and are 
embodied in the Direction General of Labour Relations of the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security. They may be assisted, whenever necessary, by other Ministries 
responsible for a particular industry. . 
Conciliation in disputes related to the negotiation of collective agreements was first 
introduced by the corporatist Decree-Act of 28 August 1969. Conciliation is regarded 
as an aid to the actual negotiation process. The conciliator is regarded as the helping 
hand in reaching the collective agreement. . 
The conciliator may intervene with the consent of both parties or on the request of 
one of the parties. In the latter case the other party must be informed within eight days 
and in writing. 206 The conciliator usually calls for joint meetings. If necessary, separate 
meetings are. convoked.  . 
In Portugal mediation was first established by Decree-Act of 28 February 1976. As 
conciliation it is regarded as an aid to the negotiation process. A difference, however, 
is that the mediator makes proposals to be freely accepted by the parties. This 
definition is similar to the British definition of mediation. It is clearly distinguished 
from conciliation. The outcome of mediation is just as conciliation embodied in the 
collective agreement. 
The Decree-Act of 1976 may be regarded as supplementary. If the collective 
agreement does not contain mediation terms, the provisions in the law is applicable. 
Mediation is hardly opted for. 207 
By Decree-Act of 1979 arbitration is provided under sections 34 and 35. Arbitration 
is performed by three arbitrators. Two are selected by the respective parties. The latter 
appoint the third arbitrator. When opting for arbitration the parties oblige themselves 
to accept the award. Compulsory arbitration is accepted since 1976 and was practised 
in public or state-owned enterprises only until 1992. Since 1992 compulsory arbitration 
is extended to the private sector in disputes where conciliation and mediation have 
failed. 
From the early days of the Portuguese labour relations the methods other than 
adjudication are practised in individual as well as in collective labour disputes. 20' 
206 S. 31, par. 1, Decree-Act of 1979. 
207 M.J. Leitáo (1993), o.c., p. 9. 
208 Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 335-338. 
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Chapter 11 
Settlement of labour disputes in Spain 
Spanish machinery for settling disputes ,was first introduced by Act of 19 May 
1908. 209 The institutions established were the Consejos de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
Industrial (Industrial Councils of Conciliation and Arbitration). The Act prescribed 
that strikes and lock-outs had to be preceded by an attempt at conciliation. Individual 
employers and employees, contemplating strikes or lock-outs were under the duty to 
indicate to each other by formal notice whether they were interested to make an 
attempt at settling the dispute amicably. If the parties agreed to attempt conciliation, 
the local Government-called a meeting of these Consejos de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
Industrial, composed of three members of the employers and three from the workers. 
The Consejos de Conciliación y Arbitraje Industrial, while conciliating, tried to keep 
the parties from striking or locking out. If a settlement was reached, it was signed by 
the parties or their representatives and by the Consejo. The fact that trade unions were 
not represented in the Consejos was considered as a week point. 210 Trade unions were 
given legal personality and were only recognised by Decrees of 10 august 1916 and 25 
August 1923. As a result of these Decrees permanent or ad hoc joint committees were 
set up for the prevention and resolution of labour disputes."' 
Also the Decree of 25 August 1923, recognising trade unions, provided for the 
establishment of joint labour committees on an ad hoc basis. 
After 1923, during the regime of Primo de Rivera, the involvement of the 
Government in labour relations strongly increased. The Government started 
controlling based on "[...] paternalist supervision for employees" welfare." 212 Spain 
experienced regimes of an authoritarian, corporatist nature until 1975. 2 ' 3 
By Act of 27 November 1931 three types of corporative committees were 
established, of which the committees for labour in industrial and rural employment 
were particularly charged with labour matters. 2 ' These committees, established by the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, were composed of an equal number of 
employers and workers and assigned with a conciliation and arbitration function. 
Apart from the members there were a chairperson and a secretary. 
The parties or one of the parties could ask for the intervention of these committees, 
which could intervene themselves in case of disputes of major importance. Usually the 
dispute was first handled by a subcommittee. If not successful, the full committee could 
make a fresh attempt at conciliation. Another failure could imply that the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare asked the parties to refer their dispute to the Labour 
Council within five days or that the committees advised the parties to opt for 
arbitration. If the parties accepted arbitration, the parties were obliged to accept the 
award. Compulsory arbitration was frequently practised. If arbitration was refused, the 
209 ILO (1933), o.c., p. 460 ff. 
210 ILO (1933), o.c., p. 463. 
21 By Royal Decree of 5 October 1922 such committees could be established. 
212 M. Martinez Lucio (1992), Spain: Constructing Institutions and Actors in a Context of Change, in 
Industrial Relations in the New Europe, (A. Ferner and R. Hyman eds.), Oxford, p. 482 ff. 
213 The regime of Primo de Rivera encompassed the years 1923 until 1930. A climax of the authoritarian 
regime was reached during the era of Franco, lasting from 1939 until 1975. 
2'd The other two were the committees for rural property and agricultural production and industries. 
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committees would draw up a report which had to be sent to the Minister, containing 
the essence of the dispute and the proposals for settlement. He could decide to publish 
it. After the era of Franco the labour relations were gradually relieved of corporatism. 
At present the individual and collective labour relations are increasingly shaped by 
terms in collective agreements. The settlement of labour disputes is characterised by 
separate procedures for individual and collective disputes over rights and collective 
disputes over interests. . 
The settlement of individual disputes over rights, disputes arising from the contract 
of employment, is mainly entrusted to a highly developed and popular system of labour 
courts, which has been characterised as "[...] one of the fastest and most efficient, 
reliable, and economical methods of dispute resolution in Spain". 215 Next to the labour 
courts there are administrative procedures and procedures as laid down in collective 
agreements. 
The Spanish labour court system encompasses a court of first instance Magistratura 
de Trabajo (Labour Court), a court of appeal Tribunal Central v de Trabajo (Central 
Labour Court) and the Sala de lo Social del Tribunal Supremo (Social Chamber of the 
Supreme Court). They are governed by the Act of 1 July 1985. 
Before submitting a dispute .to a labour court, a pre-trial mandatory conciliation 
procedure is required. This conciliation procedure relieves the workload of the labour 
courts considerably. 2tó If conciliation fails the same labour court judge hears the labour 
suit. 
Conciliation in individual disputes is also practised by the Ministry of Labour. This 
conciliation function was taken over from a special Institute for Mediation, Arbitration 
and Conciliation (IMAC), which was established in 1979. This Institute disappeared, 
since the private sector had no confidence in Government based procedures. 217 This 
Institute also encompassed an Arbitration Court, comprised of a President from the 
civil servant and one representative from the employers and the employees dealing 
with individual as well as collective labour disputes. This Arbitration Court began to 
operate by 1988. 
The settlement of collective disputes over rights may take place by the labour 
courts, informal channels of the parties concerned, works committees, regional 
administrative bodies, the labour inspectors and the Directors General of Labour of the 
Ministry of Labour. Most collective disputes over rights are settled through the labour 
inspectors or the labour courts. 
During the hearing, the Director General of Labour tries to conciliate and mediate 
the dispute. If no agreement is reached, the proceedings may be continued. The 
Director General of Labour may send the report of the dispute to the labour court. The 
labour court arranges a new hearing and decides the case quickly. Frequently a series 
of individual disputes amount into a collective dispute although they tend to be treated 
as individual ones in law. 
215 C. De Miguel Y Alonso (1978), Special Courts, in Access to Justice, (M. Cappelletti and B. Garth eds.), 
Alphen aan den Rijn, p. 860 ff. 
216 C. De Miguel Y Alonso (1978), o.c., p. 865 ff. 
217 R. G. McElrath (1989), Trade Unions and the Industrial Relations Climate in Spain, Philadelphia, p. 
178. 
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Conciliation, mediation and arbitration may be practised in the resolution of 
collective labour disputes over interests, if solutions cannot be reached through 
bilateral negotiations. Such negotiations are taking place, directly or indirectly through 
the - works centre councils or the Comisión del Convenio (Committee of the 
Agreement). Such an institution is usually established by a collective agreement and is 
responsible for the settlement of disputes arising from the application of the agreement. 
In Spain conciliation and mediation are distinguished. Unlike the British ACAS 
officers, however, a Spanish conciliator may also mediate and vice versa. . 
Conciliation or mediation in collective labour disputes over interests is. formally 
performed by the labour inspector, and by the Director General of Labour. Conciliation 
or mediation may be required for at any time during -the; negotiations. The conciliator 
or mediator is designated by the negotiating parties. 
Private arbitration, agreed upon by the parties themselves in an arbitration clause is 
hardly practised in Spain. Public arbitration, that is arbitration provided by an 
institution designated by the Labour Law Code, does exist but to a limited extent: The 
existing procedure before the Director General of Labour which used to have a 
compulsory character was declared unconstitutional in 1981 by the Constitutional 
Court. This procedure, however, may still be used . on a voluntary basis. The Labour 
Law Code states that employees cannot strike, if they have initiated the procedure. If 
the employer initiates the procedure, - the employees may go on strike. Then the 
procedure is suspended. The Labour Law Code gives detailed rules of procedure for 
this public arbitration procedure. • 
In Spain machinery for settling labour disputes through other means than 
adjudication has been there since the dawning of the development of its labour 
relations system. Even during the authoritarian regimes there was some settlement 
machinery such as compulsory arbitration. At present the mandatory conciliation 
procedure of the labour courts seems to be very successful because of their speedy 
character. 218 
218 Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 338-341. 
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Chapter 12 
Settlement of disputes out of court in Sweden 
1. Negotiations . 
In general there are very few rules concerning negotiations between private parties 
as a means of solving disputes in .Swedish legislation. However, it is obvious that the 
risks involved in litigation, particularly with regard to costs for litigation, will serve as 
a strong incentive to settle out of court. 
Negotiations are conducted by lawyers as a normal part of the preparations for 
litigation. The preparations for litigation may indeed be seen as continuing 
negotiations, possibly ending in the judge's trying to reconcile the parties. 
In areas where organisations bargain collectively, negotiations as a method of 
settling disputes has, however, been made subject to statutory regulation. Negotiations 
with a view to solving disputes between individuals should be regarded as an integral 
part of collective bargaining systems. . 
In Sweden there are mainly two areas where there is regular collective bargaining, 
namely in labour relations and in landlord and tenant relations. This chapter shall deal 
with labour law negotiations, which is the most advanced system. 
The negotiation procedures in labour relations are intended primarily for disputes 
concerning the collective agreement. 219 Here the interests of the collective parties 
dominate, although there may also be individual interests present concerning the rights 
of an individual employee under the agreement. I shall not elaborate on the rules as to 
who „owns" the grievance220 — the individual employer or employee or the 
organisations, which may be present on either side. We shall only point to the fact that 
there are two main rules which are of interest. When a dispute concerns a right under a 
collective agreement, the parties to the agreement may of course always solve the 
dispute by amending the agreement. Such an amendment is, however, not binding on 
the individual member to the extent that the concerns rights already acquired under the 
agreement, e.g. payment already earned. The collective parties may also between 
themselves agree on the construction of the agreement. This does not involve 
amending the agreement. Such an agreement is only binding on the individual member 
insofar as it is in accordance with the original and common intent of the parties. The 
individual is not bound by agreements on the interpretation of the agreement made 
later on by the parties diverging from the original intent and meaning of the 
agreement. 
When a dispute concerns a right under an individual contract of employment, 
naturally the individual himself „owns" the grievance and the organisations may in no 
way settle the dispute without the consent of the individual. The collective parties may 
however settle the dispute with regard to the future by making a collective agreement. 
It is possible according to the Swedish Act on Joint Regulation of Working Life to 
219 See, in general, Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, 1977, pp.101 ff. 
229 Cf. Schmidt in Aaron (ed.), Labour Courts and Grievance Settlements in Western Europe, 1971, pp.188 
ff. Cf. also Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, pp. 55 ff. 
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make collective agreements also concerning individuals, but this possibility is seldom 
used. 
Negotiations in grievances over a collective agreement may to some extent be 
regarded as a way of preparing the dispute before bringing it to the Labour Court. 
Since the Swedish Labour Court is a court of last instance. it is necessary that the suits 
are well prepared. In consequence the Act of Labour Disputes requires the collective 
parties to negotiate over the matter before bringing the dispute to the Labour Court. In 
effect a very minor part of all grievances are brought before the Labour Court, most of 
them being solved in local or central negotiations. 
Naturally the organisations look upon the risks of bringing a dispute before the 
Labour Court in much the -same way as-do individuals. The risks involved in losing the 
case as well as the costs for litigation are taken into consideration. However, these 
matters partly take on new dimensions on the collective level. Probably the financial 
aspect of.losing the case and having to pay the costs of litigation for the other side as 
well play a lesser role. More important is the impact of the judgement in the future 
relationship of the parties. A favourable judgement is regarded as a valuable asset, 
whereas an unfavourable judgement may be very difficult to compensate for, e.g. by 
amending the collective agreement. The Labour Court bases its activity to a great 
extent on precedents. 221 A judgement may therefore have repercussions on a great 
number of similar or connected cases. Therefore the parties often prefer ad hoc 
settlements rather than going to court. The parties often make this entirely clear by 
stating in the settlement that the settlement is ad hoc and may not be referred to in 
future disputes between the parties. 222 
The long-term relationship between the parties also plays a significant role in 
grievance processing. Good relations is an asset for both parties which is not 
jeopardised in grievances of minor importance. In some instances, particularly in local 
negotiations, grievances are subject to barter. Concessions are made in one grievance 
in exchange for favourable terms in another grievance, or even in collective 
bargaining. 
One may therefore say that in collective relationships grievances are subject to a 
more complicated game than elsewhere. 227 The interests of the parties are not confined 
to the particular grievance in question. The parties often have common interests that 
go beyond that, which also contributes in making settlements in most cases possible. 
The complexity of interests of the parties also applies in negotiations over individual 
disputes, although perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree. In particular when the dispute 
concerns statutory rights of individuals, e.g. employment protection, the disposition of 
the labour side to settle on a compromise is certainly less than in disputes concerning 
the own collective agreement. Apart from the fact that the trade union in many cases 
cannot dispose of the rights of the individual, there are psychological reasons involved. 
One may say that the parties adopt a more legalistic way of looking upon the matter 
221 Sigeman, „Ascertainment of Law and Doctrine of Precedent in the Swedish Labour Court", 22 Sc.St.L 
(1978), pp. 179 ff. Cf. Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, pp. 231 ff. 
222 Cf. Edlund, „Settlement through Negotiation of Disputes on the Application of Collective Agreements", 
12 Sc.St.L. (1968), p. 37. 
223 Edlund, op. cit., pp. 41 f. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems in the sphere of labour law... — 75 
when the dispute concerns legislation which has not been bargained by the parties like 
a collective agreement. 
According to Swedish law the union has a right to negotiate over any grievance 
arising out of a collective agreement or any individual contract of employment as long 
as the matter concerns a member of the organisation.'" According to sec. 10 of the Act 
on Joint Regulation of Working Life, an organisation of employees shall have a right to 
negotiate with an employer on any matter relating to the relationship between the 
employer and any member of the organisation who is or has been employed by the 
employer. An employer shall have a corresponding right to negotiate with an 
organisation of employees. 
The individual employee, however, has no right whatsoever to negotiate. He/she 
must rely on the organisation to take on his/her grievance. The individual does not 
even have a right to be present in such negotiations. However, as noted earlier, any 
settlement must be agreed on by him. According to most collective agreements 
negotiations are conducted first locally, i.e. on the enterprise level, and secondly, if 
either party so requests, centrally, i.e. between the central union and the employer and 
the employer's association. In some cases procedural agreements establish a more 
complex system with several different steps of negotiations at the enterprise level and 
also with possibilities for the parties to refer the matter to some body for joint 
recommendations. If either side decides to bring the grievance to the Labour Court, the 
negotiation procedure must be completed according to the collective procedural 
agreement unless the parties jointly decide to end the negotiations on a lower level. 
There is no way an individual can prevent the union from negotiating over his/her 
grievance — the union may have vested interests of its own in the matter — although 
he/she cannot be forced to settle on the result of the negotiations. Instead the individual 
may decide to bring the matter to court. It is presumed in the Act on Labour Disputes 
that the union will represent its member. 225 We shall not go into the matter what 
happens if the union decides not to, or if the individual does not want to be represented 
by the union. 
Grievances concerning individual employment contracts are to be brought before 
the Labour Court in the first instance if the individual is a member of the union and if 
there is a collective agreement in force at his/her place of work. If this is not the case, 
the grievance has to be brought before a district court. Appeal is to be made to the 
Labour Court. 
A crucial point is of course to what extent the union is under an obligation to 
negotiate with regard to an individual grievance. The matter to what extent the union 
is obliged to help its members is not entirely clear. However, as a rule of the thumb one 
may say that the individual is entitled to the support of the union in local negotiations. 
Any further commitment from the side of the union depends on how the union looks 
upon the prospects for success. The union will of course also give legal aid to its 
members, e.g. in court, if it finds litigation justified. 
It is an open question to what extent legislative intervention may facilitate settling 
out of court in collective negotiations. There is indeed under Swedish law in 
224 Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, pp.103 f. 
225 Cf. Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, pp. 55 ff. 
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negotiations over rights as in all kinds of collective bargaining a duty to bargain in 
good faith. The duty to bargain does not, however, include any duty to make 
concessions or to make any agreement. The duty to bargain can rather be seen as a 
duty to discuss the matter with the other side openly and fairly. 226  This means that the 
party who is under a duty to negotiate has to answer the demands of the other side, to 
state his/her reasons for his/her position and to give the information requested by the 
other side. It would, however, in my view be very difficult to introduce a duty to make 
concessions, not to hold unreasonable positions, etc., in disputes over rights, however 
feasible this may be in bargaining over a new collective agreement. 
To some extent promotion of out of court settlement in disputes over individual 
rights might be the result of encouraging the union to take on such disputes. One may 
also suspect that if the bargaining position of the union is improved it will be easier for 
the parties to work out settlement. From a formal point of view the position of the 
union in such disputes is not stronger than that of the individual member that it 
represents, although in effect the union is of course stronger. The strength of the union 
to some extent depends on good relations with the employer. Where the relations are 
not as good as they should be, a strengthening of the negotiating position of the union 
may seem appropriate. 
However, one should also remember that as legislative intervention becomes more 
sophisticated it also becomes more difficult for the parties to understand and to use, 
particularly on the local level. The present author submits that rules in order to be 
effective should also be simple, easy to understand and to use. 
In some respects the Swedish legislation does encourage trade unions to take on 
disputes concerning the rights of individuals. The primary concern of legislation here 
is not, however, to promote a settlement out of court, but to promote a speedy 
settlement of disputes and at the same time strengthen the position of the union in 
negotiations. The Act on Joint Regulation in Working Life contains rules as to the 
prerogative of interpretation in two important respects that both concern rights of 
individuals. 
According to sec. 34 of the Act, where' a dispute arises between a union and an 
employer over a member's duty under in agreement to perform work, the union's view 
of the interpretation of the agreement shall apply until the dispute has been finally 
tried. This also applies if the dispute concerns the duty to perform work according to 
an individual contract of employment. The view of the employer shall, however, apply 
if there, according to his/her opinion, exist urgent reasons against a postponement of 
the disputed work. Urgent reasons may be the risk of a great economic loss or danger 
of physical damage to goods and, of course, physical harm. . 
According to sec. 35 of the Act, the employer must immediately call for 
negotiations if a dispute arises with the union concerning wages or other remuneration 
for a member of the organisation. This also applies to an individual contract of 
employment. If the negotiations do not lead to settlement of the dispute at the local 
level the employer has to call for negotiations on the central level and, eventually, 
bring an action before the Labour Court. If he fails to do this within the time limits 
stipulated in the statute, he/she is obliged, as far as relates to the disputed amount, to 
226 Cf. Schmidt, Law and Industrial Relations in Sweden, p. 120. 
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pay remuneration which accords with the interpretation of the union, so long as the 
demand is not unreasonable. — Here it is obvious that the legislation uses another 
technique than in sec. 34. In disputes concerning the duty to perform work according 
to most systems of labour law, the opinion of the employer will prevail pending trial. 
This may be regarded as a corollary to the right of the employer to give reasonable 
orders — one of the employer prerogatives. By reversing the prerogative of 
interpretation the position of the union seems to be strengthened considerably. As soon 
as the union declares that it has another opinion than the employer concerning the 
interpretation of the agreement, the employer may no longer order the employee to 
perform the disputed. work. However, the union is Liable for damages if it uses its 
prerogative of interpretation in bad faith, i.e. when the union understands or should 
understand that its interpretation is wrong. In order to reach a solution of the dispute 
the employer has to call for negotiations and eventually bring an action before the 
Labour Court. 
In disputes over pay the procedure is different. Here the employer does not have to 
comply with the opinion of the union. However, he/she has to carry the burden of 
litigation as opposed to claims in general where the claimant has to bring an action 
against the debtor. 
It may seem obvious that these rules are highly efficient in promoting a speedy 
settlement of disputes. It may also seem likely that the rules are efficient in bringing 
individual disputes into the negotiation procedure and that thereby settlement out of 
court is promoted. The fact that the employer will carry the procedural burden does not 
in itself alter the character of collective negotiations, although it has been argued that 
the legislative intervention giving the union the prerogative of interpretation will bring 
in an element of prestige into the negotiations, thus making settlements more difficult 
to reach. 
As a matter of fact very little is known about how these rules actually are used. It 
seems, however, that these rules are not used to the extent that was expected when the 
Act came into force. Contrary to expectations there are only a handful of cases 
concerning these rules from the Labour Court. In a study conducted at the Swedish 
Centre for Working Life (Arbetslivscentrum) involving close on 1,000 cases of 
negotiations only two cases on these rules have been reported. One case concerned a 
situation which clearly revealed that both parties had grossly misunderstood the rules. 
In the other case one of the researchers had told the union representative that the rules 
of priority of interpretation applied. The union representative had failed to see that, 
during discussions concerning pay for one particular employee, a dispute had arisen in 
the sense of the Act. The employer had failed to realise as well that he/she then had to 
call for negotiations. 
Therefore it may tentatively be concluded that the rules on the prerogative of 
interpretation are inefficient because the parties on the local level do not understand 
them. The main difficulty seems to be to identify the situation where the rules come 
into operation. 
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2. Recommendations and quasi judicial proceedings 
In some instances a matter may or has to be referred to an impartial body that will 
issue a recommendation. 
Disputes in connection with inventions made by employees may on the request of 
the employer or the employee be referred to the Council of Employee Inventions, a 
government funded body consisting of two employer and two employee representatives, 
an impartial chairman and two other members one of whom is an expert in matters of 
patents. The council will issue a statement concerning the dispute. If either party has 
brought an action in the matter to court, the court may also request a statement from 
the council. 
3. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have tried to make a short survey of some of the systems used in 
Sweden to promote employment related settlement of disputes out of court. 
The conclusions that can be made are not very encouraging with regard to 
settlement out of court in general. The problem may in general terms be described as 
one of the relationships between the quality and the costs of justice, but these 
parameters vary in various sectors of society, depending on the parties, the issue and 
the kind of conflict. 
A settlement in a dispute involves a number of complex factors. Eventually, if the 
parties fail to reach an agreement, the „right" solution has to be established and it will 
be forced on one of the parties, or both. The essence of court procedures is that the 
solution is binding on the parties and that it can, and will, be enforced. However, one 
may safely say that in a great many cases the element of force or judicial sanctions is 
unnecessary. The parties are willing to accept a solution proposed by a body in which 
they have confidence. In effect they need a referee, not a judge. At least in some 
disputes this is probably the case in labour relations in Sweden and it is probably also 
the case in relationships involving business enterprises of some size. The continuing 
relationship between such parties involves social sanctions against anyone who breaks 
the rules of the game, sanctions which probably are more serious than the sanctions 
applied by a court. 
Therefore, under such circumstances, out of court settlement is rather easy to reach 
by means of recommendations issued by impartial bodies. 
Again, it may be said that under such circumstances the body making the 
recommendation might often as well be a court. The advantage of a system of out of 
court settlement based on recommendations over a system of litigation depends on 
whether the procedure for settlement is superior to court procedures. The decisive 
factors are probably speed and costs as well as the prestige of the body making the 
recommendation compared with the prestige of a court. 
There are reasons to believe that the Swedish Labour Court, where the procedure is 
reasonably quick, somewhat more informal than before a regular district court and 
where in many instances the parties carry their own costs, in combination with the- fact 
that the court enjoys a high prestige, explains why the parties in the labour market 
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have not chosen a system of recommendations on top of their own negotiations 
procedure. True, there are a number of bodies jointly set up by the parties in order to 
make recommendations concerning the making of collective agreements, but the 
Swedish Labour Court does not have jurisdiction in such cases. It may also be noted 
that arbitration plays a rather insignificant role in Swedish labour market relations. It 
seems that a court system which fulfils the requirements may even compete with a 
system of negotiations, at least as far as disputes over rights are concerned. In most 
cases, even where the parties in effect do not need a court, negotiations between the 
parties are highly efficient in bringing about a settlement. 
Negotiations, particularly in the labour market, however, include a strong element 
of persuasion. The union often tries to persuade the employer not to stand on his/her 
rights in a dispute with an individual. The arguments used may vary. The union may 
call for equity, or even mercy, the union may threaten to impose informal sanctions, 
etc. The long-term relationship of the collective parties often play a decisive role. One 
may not, however, take for granted that the argument of good long-term relations is 
always used by the union alone. It may work both ways. If the employer takes a firm 
stand in an issue, the union may choose to drop the case for the sake of good relations 
in the hope that there is still a chance of making advantageous settlements in the 
future. 
A system of negotiations between lawyers representing their clients works very well 
in most cases. Since this is the most widespread system for the promotion of 
settlements out of court, I submit that any general proposals for increasing the will of 
the parties to settle their disputes amicably have to start from this system. An 
improvement of this system could be achieved if legal aid was extended so as to 
embrace a still larger section of the population. As noted before, legal aid is also given 
as a home insurance benefit, which in part gives the same result. Information as a part 
of legal aid would also have to be subsidised. As a part of the legal aid system, or even 
as a generally applicable rule, a further promotion of settlements could be achieved if a 
statutory rule of compulsory negotiations were to be introduced. Negotiations between 
the parties with a view toward settlement would be a precondition for bringing an 
action before a court. In this way there would be a reasonable guarantee that the 
parties, preferably represented by counsel, actually have met. The duty to negotiate 
would force the parties seriously to discuss the matter.'" 
227 Hein Kötz and Reynald Ottenhof: Les Conciliateurs la Conciliation, Une etude comparative, Economica, 
Paris, 1983 pp. 140-155. 
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PART TWO 
Alternative Dispute Resolution System in Hungary 
I. Historical development of Dispute Resolution schemes in Hungary 
There are some alternative methods for settling disputes in the Hungarian history. 
They mainly are not special Hungarian legal institutions, but during the last centuries 
they well settled_into the Hungarian dispute resolution system. Some of them can be 
seen as an early forerunner of the Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes. The most 
common entities were as follows: a) arbitration (arbitrium); b) conciliatory boards 
(békéltető bizottságok); c) justice of the peace (békebírák) and d) conciliation in court 
(egyességi kísérlet). 
1. Arbitration (arbitrium) 
The decision of a "quasi" court elected by the parties by general agreement for the 
settlement of a certain matter in dispute. 
These judges of arbitration were called arbiters in Roman legal sources. This term 
was encountered in several senses, the arbiter could be a judge elected by the parties by 
a special agreement (compromissum) to whom their case was referred [arbiter 
receptus] or a referee appointed officially by the magistrate [arbitrium/judex]. These 
were used among others in cases which did not involve the judicial decision on a 
certain legal dispute but rather giving opinion about a certain situation, or when 
mediation was necessary in order to avoid legal disputes. 
They had a similar role in Hungary, too, and were highly respected as early as from 
the beginning of the age of the Árpáds. Arbiters were already encountered during the 
reign of Saint Stephen (Book II, Chapter 16), their task was to carry out a role of 
mediation and conciliation in cases of murder. 
It is known from the "Váradi Regestrum" as well as from several later documents 
that in disputed matters the Hungarian juridical procedure allowed each party to 
choose two honest persons from among their relatives and neighbours, who were 
always the advocates of a peaceful solution. The parties subjected their disputed matter 
to their decision. Their award appeared later as "Arbitrium Boni viri or probi viri", and 
in most of the cases it put an end to the dispute. 
These men — who were also called "caught judges" (fogott bírák) — were frequently 
asked to act as justices of the peace, the parties usually turned directly to them with 
their disputed matters. There were village and county arbiters, too, who were entitled 
to proceed in more significant, legal matters as well, and who, through their greater 
experience, could also appear in the palatine's court of justice. If the arbiters could not 
reach an agreement, the parties were referred to the court of competent jurisdiction. 
The possibility also existed for the parties to name arbiters in any stage of the 
lawsuit. In this case the court granted a delay and set the date before which the parties 
were obliged to appear before their arbiters. However, the "award" passed in this way 
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became binding only if the parties accepted it as a settlement in ordinary court. If, 
however, one of the parties did not accept the decision, the lawsuit was continued in an 
ordinary way. 
If the parties took their mutually chosen arbiters with themselves as early as in the 
first stage of the commencement of the lawsuit, the court — accepting the agreement 
reached — discontinued the lawsuit. In such cases the lawsuit could not be reopened, 
and the person who violated the agreement was punished as a quarrelsome, litigious 
person. . 
Thus in the Middle Ages judges of arbitration (elected judges, caught judges, 
arbiters, probi viri) were important participants in legal proceedings both in Hungary 
and abroad, who always strove to find a peaceful solution for the given matter. They 
offered great help to the judges by acting out their conciliatory role, and they also 
played a major part in the juridical procedure. 
They could act as mediators both in criminal cases and in decisive tilts. They aimed 
at terminating them by their proposals for agreement. In other disputed matters or 
lawsuits the judge also referred the parties to them in the first place. 
The arbiter's task was primarily to give sensible opinion, but if the parties turned to 
him voluntarily with their dispute and subjected themselves to his decision, his opinion 
was considered as a final judgement and whoever failed to adhere to it was punished, 
in addition to its execution. If the parties refused to accept his award by common 
agreement, his role was restricted only to helping to reach the agreement, and the 
parties were referred to the competent judge. 
Thus in this sense arbiters were lay judges, who were not legally qualified and did 
not belong to an official body. Arbitration was not necessarily based on the strict 
application of law, as on the fixed day, after hearing the parties and examining the 
documents, the arbiters could decide at their discretion — with an eye to God and 
justice — before a provost or a chapter. 
Despite these the fact remains that in the rules of court of the Middle Ages arbiters 
discontinued several lawsuits through their role of conciliation, thus contributing to the 
undisturbed operation of ordinary courts in the whole county. 
Arbiters were similarly common in Transylvania, too. It is characteristic that there 
was no possibility for the reopening of the case against their award. However, such 
procedures had a special feature, namely that the arbiter could also proceed as an 
advocate (procurator) in cases referred to arbitration. 
Arbitration is the settlement of a dispute between parties in an organisation set up 
in agreement with the parties' common will and according to the rules determined by 
the parties, and as such ,it. serves to supplement ordinary court procedures. The arbiter 
is authorised by the parties to work as a real judge, so he gains his judicial power by 
means of the parties' commission. However, he does not represent the parties, so he 
cannot accept instructions from either party in the course of his proceedings. 
Thus the roots of the Hungarian regulations concerning the peaceful settlement of 
disputes date back to the early Middle Ages. Its first comprehensive regulation, 
however, is found only in the civil judicial regulation of 1868 (Act LIV of 1868). The 
peak of the development of this legal institution was reached in Title 17 of the Civil 
Procedure of 1911 (§ 767-788), which regulated the procedure of arbitration on a 
European level. 
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After the Second World War this legal institution started to decay partly because of 
nationalisation and the solidification of planned economy, and partly because of the 
establishment of boards of arbitration set up for the resolution of public disputes, and it 
was looked upon by the literature of law as a legal institution on the verge of 
extinction. Although the opinion about arbitration changed by the end of the sixties 
due to the new economic mechanism, the new regulations of the Amendment of Civil 
Procedure III did not bring any changes of content, either. 
The breakthrough came at the end of the 80s. Then the Company Act gave the 
possibility to domestic natural persons to settle their legal disputes through arbitration. 
As regards the establishment of courts of arbitration a distinction has to be made 
between ad hoc and permanent (organised, -institutional) courts of arbitration. The ad 
hoc court of arbitration is set up for the settlement of a single legal dispute, where the 
rules of the procedure are also determined by the parties. The institutional court of 
arbitration is usually associated with a certain organisation (chamber) and has a panel 
of arbiters and a permanent administrating organ. Its rules of procedure are also set by 
itself. The number of the arbiters can be agreed upon by the parties as they wish as 
long as it is an odd number, and if this question is not regulated, the number of the 
arbiters is three. 
2. Conciliatory boards 
The settlement of disputes by arbiters was actually a one-man arbitration, which 
was an excellent way for settling simple disputes in the Middle Ages, and thus it 
relieved the otherwise cumbersome medieval adjudication from the burden of a great 
number of trivial cases. • 
It is true to say that the smaller the sum involved is and the sooner the problem can 
be solved, the simpler the method for dispute settlement can be. On the other hand, the 
more complicated a dispute is and the more people are involved in it (e.g. disputes 
concerning employment relations), the more difficult it is to find a suitable person — 
preferably trusted by both parties — who is willing to undertake to make a decision. For 
this very reason usually several persons were involved in conciliation already in the 
guilds. 
So certain institutions resembling conciliatory boards were encountered during the 
Middle Ages in cases of disagreements between guild-masters and journeymen. These 
boards, however, set up in the framework of the guild, can in no way be considered as 
equivalent to the subsequently regulated conciliatory boards as there was neither a 
legal background nor a definite organisation behind these conciliators, who were 
constituted by laymen, that is by the members of the guild. However, the practical 
results, the rapid and permanent settlement of the disputes all acted towards further 
development and thinking. 
It was actually the period of industrialisation, which saw the intensification of 
social conflicts, during which the rapid, cheap and just settlement of disputes 
concerning labour contracts became really important. The activity of conciliatory 
boards in today's sense was legally recognised in Hungary only as from 1872. Act VIII 
of 1872 made it first possible to establish industrial boards (iparbizottságok) for the 
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peaceful settlement of conflicts between the employer and the workers. This possibility, 
however, was legally taken only by the city of Miskolcz, while the other industrial 
associations (ipartársulat) set up only private conciliatory boards, which became 
common practice, their < decisions were accepted by the parties involved, but the 
institution lacked legal background. . 
The task of the boards was on the one hand to set the conditions of the labour 
contract to be concluded, and on the other hand to create an agreement compulsory for 
the future in the case of work stoppages. At the same time this was the best means for 
settling the disputes arising between employers and employees, thus also for preventing . 
work stoppages (strikes). 
The board was generally set up from an equal number of representatives by both 
parties for the purpose of conciliation, and it was presided by a chairman, outside the 
sphere of interest of both parties, who was either permanent or elected from case to 
case. 
The essence of the board's activity was that its decision, whatever it was, should be 
recognised by both parties as binding on themselves. It was indispensable to its 
effective operation that its members should be familiar with the conditions of the 
employers and the employees and also to be trusted by both parties. 
In Hungary it was Act XVII of 1884, that is the industrial act (ipartörvény), which 
first ordered "to set up a separate conciliatory board consisting of craftsmen and 
journeymen for the purpose of settling disagreements and disputed matters between 
craftsmen and apprentices or journeymen in each guild". . 
Two conciliatory boards are recognised by law: a) permanent conciliatory boards 
and b) temporary conciliatory boards. §141 orders the establishment of .permanent 
conciliatory boards. This concerns only small-scale industry. Its craftsman members 
are the members of the corporate magistracy (testületi elöljáróság), its journeyman 
members are journeymen chosen by the journeymen of the craftsmen belonging to this 
guild, elected at a meeting convened for this purpose by the industrial commissioner 
(iparhatósági biztos). This kind'of conciliatory board is in fact an industrial court as it 
serves to settle individual disputes arising from labour contracts in force: Such boards 
usually worked as boards of conciliation and arbitration (Einigungsfimter) in other 
European countries with more developed industry and were organised for a district or 
for several branches of industry. The settlement of disputed matters arising between 
employers and workers by means of conciliation originated from England at the time 
of the industrial revolution and spread to other European countries, including Hungary. 
In England this task was carried out by the board of arbitration in the framework of 
the Ruppert Keettle and Mundella systems. The former (Ruppert Keettle's) board was 
constituted by 6 representatives of each party and by the chairman elécted by them, 
while in the other (Mundella's) system it consisted of 20 members elected by the parties 
and of the chairman. As the beneficial activity of the boards could be experienced on 
many occasions, the government promoted the establishment of such boards by passing 
laws, what is more, a permanent court of arbitration was also set up in 1908 as a 
supplement to the institution of the justice of the peace. This served as a model for the 
subsequent organisation of industrial courts across Europe. 
In Hungary the task of permanent conciliatory boards was first of all to reconcile 
the parties. If they failed to do so, the members decided by a majority of votes, and in 
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the case of a tie vote the chairman's vote was decisive. The decisions, if necessary, 
were executed by the industrial authority (iparhatóság). The party dissatisfied with the 
decision could enforce his claim in court within 8 days, but this did not hinder 
execution. 
The operation of the boards generally fulfilled the hopes attached to them, only 
exceptionally did the interested parties request the enforcement of their claim in court. 
Even if this happened, the justified decisions made by the boards consisting of experts 
were usually confirmed by the ordinary court, apart from a few exceptions. 
The other board is the temporary conciliatory board set up by § 163 of the Act. Its 
task was to intervene in the case of strikes both in small-scale industry and 
manufacturing industry (to reconcile effectively) and to prevent or to terminate 
collective disputes aimed at changing the labour contract. The craftsmen and 
journeymen were represented in equal numbers (6 persons for each party) in the 
conciliatory board, which was presided by the industrial commissioner. The chairman 
of the board was the president of the industrial authority of first instance. 
In practice, the text of the law could not be realised to a full extent, as there were 
hardly any examples for such boards in the case of strikes in the field of small-scale 
industry, while it was almost impossible to set them up in manufacturing industry as 
manufacturing industry was not organised according to individual branches of industry 
and thus neither the workers, nor the industrialists could choose their representatives. 
That is why § 35 of the Act on industrial inspectors226 (iparfelügyelőkről szóló törvény) 
set forth later that "in case the procedure defined in § 163 of the quoted act fails to be 
successful, the Minister of Commerce may commission the industrial inspector to set 
up a conciliatory board and to resolve the arising disagreements peacefully". 
However, at this time conciliation in manufacturing industry was not settled in a 
reassuring way, it was resolved differently from case to case, through either the 
industrial authorities of first instance or the district industrial inspector. The draft of 
the new industrial act (1909) hallmarked by the name of József Szterényi, Under-
Secretary of Commercial Affairs, intended to regulate the whole matter of conciliation 
in manufacturing industry in a progressive manner, with the consideration of foreign 
experiences; this act advocated the establishment of separate industrial and commercial 
courts for the purpose of conciliation as well as the organisation of a court of 
arbitration proceeding in disputes encountered in public utility companies. According 
to the draft the attempt to arbitrate was made compulsory and failing to do so would 
entail certain legal consequences for the employer. 
3. Justices of the peace 
The institution of the justice of the peace (German: Friedensrichter, French: juge de 
paix, Hungarian: békebíró) was made part of the Hungarian judicial system by Act 
XXII of 1877 on Procedures in minor civil actions. This Act stated that a justice of the 
peace could proceed in those minor civil actions which were beyond the scope of 
municipal judging. As regards the person of the justice of the peace, it was prescribed 
228 Act XXVIII of 1893. 
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by the legal rule that "in towns and villages vested with the power of municipal 
authority one or more unimpeachable and suitable persons, who have graduated in law 
or have taken a theoretical judicial or jurisprudence state examination or have held the 
position of a judge, can be appointed justice of the peace by the Minister of Justice in 
the name of the King, after the hearing of the committee of public administration". 229 
If a justice of the peace was entrusted with the task of municipal judging, no other 
municipal judging was permissible in the area of his competence and during his time 
of operation. Justices of the peace could also proceed — among others — in actions for 
performing work provided that the value of the object of the action did not exceed the 
amount defined by law. 
This form of the institution of the justice of the peace was unknown everywhere 
else, but it existed as an administrative authority in England and in France, too. In 
these countries they proceeded as authorities of conciliation and arbitration, and 
exercised judicial authority in minor civil actions, in addition to which they were also 
vested with police and administrative power. The English system of the justice of the 
peace served as the basis for the French system. 
According to the law, a French justice of the peace could only be a person who, 
through his personal abilities and authority, was capable of settling disputes between 
local residents. However, the institution could not take root in this form. Instead, 
French justices of the peace became officials appointed by the government, who - in 
addition to compulsory conciliation in civil actions - administered justice in minor civil 
cases, carried out tasks of policeman and criminal judge and participated in 
extrajudicial cases."' 
4. Conciliation in court 
This is the attempt at the peaceful settlement of a legal dispute in court without a 
lawsuit. This method is connected to ordinary court but makes it possible for the 
parties to put an end to their dispute in an alternative way, which is still in use today. 
Its essence is that if an agreement is reached by the parties before the bringing of the 
action, it has the force of a judicial agreement, but if they fail to agree, the court — 
provided both parties have appeared and the case belongs to its competence — places 
the action on record on the plaintiffs request and the case is heard. The old summary 
procedure also contained agreement but only for district court cases on the basis of § 
21 of Act XVIII of 1893. However, no summons for agreement could be requested as 
regards tribunal matters. 
The usefulness and practicability of this alternative method for settling disputes is 
confirmed by the fact that the regulations of the Civil Procedure in force still make it 
229 Act XXII of 1877 on Procedures in minor civil actions, § 3. 
20 This is important because Boldizsár Horvát, Minister of Justice, intended to introduce the institution of the 
justice of the peace in Hungary with a similar power. He submitted his bill to the Parliament on 6th January, 
1870, but his proposal was not even debated. According to his bill, justices of the peace could have proceeded as 
authorities of conciliation in all civil and administrative cases in which there was hope for the parties to reach an 
agreement. Besides, their sphere of authority would have included minor, personal claims up to 30 Ft, tresspass 
and in criminal cases the tasks of policeman and interrogator. 
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possible for the judge to attempt to settle a legal dispute or a certain question by 
agreement not only before the lawsuit but also at any time during it. 
1111. Development of Labour Court 
Labour courts (Munkaügyi Bíróság) had to be first regulated after the First World 
War. The reason for this was that the crisis phenomena accompanying the transition 
from war to peace led to such radical mass movements (general strikes, seizure of 
factories, etc.) which had to be solved without delay. Due to the wave of strikes all over 
the country, the membership in -trade unions -in -this period rose to a level twice as high 
as in 1914. 
The 9180/1920 Decree of the Prime Minister referred lawsuits arising from 
employment relation between craftsmen and tradesmen and their workers in 
employment relation based on a civil law contract under the authority of labour courts. 
Labour suits usually belonged to the authority of district courts, a rule of competence 
was determined only for the area of Budapest. The rules of the district court had to be 
applied in labour suits with the consideration of the differences set forth in the decree. 
As a result of the powerful action of trade unions, lay assessors representing the 
employers and the employees (1 person for each side) could also take part in labour 
courts in addition to the chairman, but the parties could .also forbear from their 
employment. They were employed mainly when the district court was at the same time 
a social security court, or where it was ordered by the Minister of Justice. However, 
appeals against the judgements were invariably judged by the tribunal without the 
participation of lay assessors. 
This regulation remained practically unchanged for two decades although the fate 
of the country took a great turn in the meantime. In spite of this it was suitable, even if 
not the most effectively, for handling the arising disputes. So in this period disputes 
arising from employment relations were settled in court instead of using alternative 
methods. The regulations tried to ensure the "transparency" of social relations in this 
way. 
1. Decaying of labour courts 
By the end of the 40s the so-called Soviet-type organisation of the state emerged, 
accompanied by all the state organs of a "different state". The regulations of labour 
jurisdiction underwent significant changes according to Act 1951:7, that is the Labour 
Code of that time. According to the new rules of law the board of arbitration, court and 
the subordination rule were set as possible methods for settling labour disputes. This 
meant that labour disputes were first discussed in a board of arbitration and then, if 
necessary, in court. The lawsuit could also be commenced by the employee — 
irrespective of the total value — in the district court competent for the place of work, 
and in lawsuits arising from employment relation the district court proceeded in 
accordance with the general rules of the Civil Procedure. 
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The Labour Code modifications of 1964 meant that the general competence of 
settling labour disputes was transferred to labour boards of referees and the court 
procedure was allowed only in exceptional cases. This decision was influenced by 
ideology, too, as this solution makes it seem as if a simple worker could actually take 
part in settling disputes. In practice, however, this active participation was well-
controlled, in harmony with the total mentality of the period. 
The narrow scope of movement was also well reflected by the limited possibility of 
appeal. The parties could appeal against the decision of the board of referees to the 
regional labour board of referees and a bill of review could be submitted to the district 
court only in four cases. 
2. Establishment of Labour Courts 
The comprehensive reform of the administration of justice carried out at the 
beginning of the 70s brought essential changes in the judgement of labour disputes, 
too. The changes effected in the law of civil procedure (Amendment of the Civil 
Procedure III) stated with general force that in labour disputes the entitled party could 
bring an action in the labour court against the decision of the labour (co-operative) 
board of referees, service superior or general assembly. 
In 1972 the previous regional labour boards of referees were re-organised into 
labour courts and they have been operating as separate courts ever since. 
The special rules applying to procedures in labour courts remained essentially 
unchanged for the following two decades. The minor modifications failed to remedy 
the greatest deficiency of the regulation of the actions ensuing from employment 
relation, that is the lack of the possibility to appeal. The Amendment of Civil 
Procedure III permitted the possibility to appeal only in two cases: against the 
resolution made with respect to the company's or the worker's financial responsibility. 
Act XXII of 1992, the Labour Code in force and the related modification of the 
Civil Procedure brought fundamental changes in the rules of settling labour disputes. 
According to the new regulations the labour court could proceed only in lawsuits 
arising from employment relation or from employment relation-like legal relationships 
based on co-operative membership. 
At present the compulsory procedure of the board of referees is ceased in 
labour disputes and according to Section (3) of § 199 of the Labour Code the 
court proceeds in cases of labour dispute. 
A distinction is made by the Labour Code between collective labour disputes 
and legal disputes in employment relations. 
The restriction imposed on the possibility to appeal was ceased, and thereby 
the rules of labour lawsuits became more similar to the general rules. 
3. Labour board of referees (Munkaügyi Döntőbizottságok) 
The Labour Code modifications of 1964 referred the settlement of labour disputes 
to the labour board of referees with general competence and allowed turning to court 
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only in exceptional cases. In this respect the former Labour Code (Act II of 1967) did 
not bring essential changes, either. 
The tasks and organisation of boards of referees are regulated by Act 29 of 1964 
and Act II of 1967 on the regulation of certain questions concerning employment 
relation and by the decrees on their execution: "A labour board of referees has to be set 
up in each company and in its units in some other locality where a trade union organ 
operates. If the company employs a greater number of workforce, more than one labour 
board of referees may be set up, if necessary. As regards public service, the railway, the 
post, the armed forces, the armed bodies and organs of security forces as well as 
agricultural plants and companies or company units where a labour board of referees 
cannot be set up, the establishment of a labour board of referees can be regulated by the 
Minister of Labour in a different way." 
In disputes arising in connection with the rights and obligations ensuing from the 
employment relation between the worker and the company — unless considered as an 
exception by law or by the Labour Code — the company and the regional labour board 
of referees or the court proceeded. The company board of referees proceeded on first 
instance and the regional board of referees on the second instance, while in cases 
determined by the Labour Code the district court proceeded. 
The chairman and deputy-chairman of the company labour board of referees was 
appointed by the chairman of the regional labour board of referees, based on the 
common proposal of the company organ of the trade union and the company. The other 
members and alternate members were nominated in equal proportion by the company 
organ of the trade union in a number which ensured its smooth operation. The board of 
referees proceeded in each case in a board consisting of 3 members. The company was 
obliged to provide the material and personal conditions necessary for the undisturbed 
operation of the company labour board of referees. 
The regional labour boards of referees were organised by counties and their 
operation was supervised by the Minister of Labour together with the National Trades 
Union Council. The material conditions required for the smooth operation according to 
the rules of procedure were provided by the executive committee of the county council, 
while in the case of a regional labour board of referees covering a larger regional unit 
these conditions were provided by the organ appointed by the Minister of Labour. 
The chairman of the regional labour board of referees and the labour referees were 
appointed by the Minister of Labour in agreement with the National Trades Union 
Council, after consultation with the county council and the county council of the trade 
union. Its other members were elected by the county council of trade unions in the 
required numbers according to branches of industry. 
The procedure of labour boards of referees was started by a complaint, which had to 
be judged by the board within 8 days of its submission. The boards decided about the 
complaint in a resolution in a board of 3, against which an appeal could be lodged to 
the regional board of referees within 15 days. In certain cases defined by law - on the 
basis of a bill . of review - the district court proceeded on second instance. These cases 
included primarily labour disputes arising in connection with injuries to the worker's 
life, health and bodily integrity or concerning the compensation for damage done by 
the worker through criminal damage, etc. Moreover, separate rules applied to the 
formation and termination of the employment relation of judges, state attorneys and 
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detectives of the state attorney's office, as well as to disputes arising in connection with 
social security. 
Decree 2/1969 (II.2.) of the Ministry of Labour prescribed the obligation of taking 
an oath for the chairmen and for the members of labour boards of referees . 
The system of labour boards of referees was dissolved by the new Labour Code in 
1992. 
III. The alternative dispute resolution system under the labour law in force 
The labour disputes, among them alternative dispute resolution methods, are 
regulated in the Hungarian Labour Code in force. The solutions of labour disputes can 
be divided into two groups: a) interest disputes (or in other words collective labour 
disputes) and b) legal disputes (or other words individual labour disputes). Some of the 
internationally known alternative dispute resolution methods were incorporated into 
the newly enacted Labour Code in 1992. The types of the alternative (or appropriate) 
dispute resolutions are as follows: a) mediation b) conciliation and c) arbitration. 
1. Type of ADR technics for collective labour disputes 
1.1. Conciliation 
In a dispute arising in connection with employment between the employer and the 
factory council or between the employer (the organisation representing the employer's 
interests) and the trade union that does not qualify as a legal dispute (collective labour 
dispute), there shall be conciliatory negotiations between the parties concerned. 
Conciliation commences upon the submission of the initiating party's written position 
to the other party. During the period of conciliation, which can be a maximum of seven 
days, the action serving as the basis of the dispute shall not be executed, and 
furthermore, the parties shall refrain from all acts that may endanger agreement. 23 ' 
1.2. Mediation 
With a view to settling the conflict, the parties may avail themselves of the 
mediation of a person independent of them and not involved in the conflict. The 
participation of the mediator is jointly requested by the parties. For the duration of 
conciliation the mediator may request information or data from the parties to the extent 
he/she thinks necessary. In this event, the deadline of seven days will be replaced by a 
deadline prescribed for the provision of information or data, but the extension cannot 
exceed five days. 
Upon completion of conciliation, the mediator will put the parties' positions and the 
results of the conciliation in writing and deliver them to the parties. 232 
23' Articles 194 of the Act XXII of 1992 on Labour Code. 
232 Articles 195 of the Act XXII of 1992 on Labour Code. 
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1.3. Arbitration 
The parties may, on the basis of an agreement, avail themselves of an arbitrator to 
settle a labour dispute. The decision of the arbitrator is binding if the parties have in 
advanced subordinated themselves in a written statement. 
The arbitrator may set up a conciliation committee, to which the parties delegate an 
equal number of representatives. 	 . . 	 . 
The arbitrator's procedure is obligatory in regard to disputes arising in connection 
with a) trade unions' . right to publicity; 233 b) the cost of the operation of woks council,a 4 
and c) the . works council's right to joint decision 235 in the event of an absence of 
understanding. 
- An agreement - that has come into being in the course of conciliation or the 
arbitrator's decision is qualified as a collective agreement. 
In the course of conciliation and arbitration, in agreement with the parties, experts 
or 	may be Consulted. 
Justified and necessary expenses arising in connection with the conciliation and the 
arbitration process are borne by the employer in the absence of agreement departing 
therefrom.36 
2. The legal labour dispute 
With the intention of asserting claims that . arise from employment, the employee, 
the_trade union and the factory council may initiate a - legal . dispute under the provisions 
of the Hungarian Labour Code against an action (omission) of the employer in 
violation of the regulations pertaining to employment. 
Unless the Code stipulates otherwise, the employer . may initiate a legal labour 
dispute towards the assertion of his/her claim related to employment. 
A court of law (labour court) decides legal disputes in employment relations. 
A legal dispute in labour relations may be initiated against a decision adopted by 
the employer within his/her right of deliberation in the event that the employer has 
violated standard regulations in the course of making his/her decision. 
The parties may seek conciliation prior to going to court (preliminary conciliation), 
if they . agreed in advance about the conciliation in collective agreement or in 
employment. agreement. Besides the preliminary conciliation during the court process 
negotiation Co take. place between the parties at any time. In the course of conciliation 
233 Article 24, "The employer ensures opportunity for the trade union to make public information and appeals 
that it regards as necessary as well as the data related to its activities in a manner customary with the employer or 
in another appropriate way. By agreement with employer, the trade union is entitled to use the employer's 
premises after or during working hours for the purpose of activities that represent its interests." 
234 Article 63, "The employer ensure the justified and necessary costs. for the election and operation of the 
factory council. The extent of this is jointly determined by the employer and the factory council. In the event of 
dispute, there is conciliation." 
235 Paras (1) of Article 65, "The works council has right of joint decision in regard to the utilization of 
welfare money specified in the collective agreement and in regard to the utilization of institutions and property of 
this nature." 
236 Articles 196-198 of the Act XXII of 1992 on Labour Code. 
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or negotiation, any accord reached by the parties qualifies as an agreement, which has 
to be put in writing. 
If conciliation has not yielded results, it is then, with the exception of those 
provisions contained in Article 202 of Labour Code, possible to turn to a court of law. 
With certain exceptions237 a law suit does not have the force to delay the 
implementation of a measure. 
A law suit may be initiated within the term of limitation of the establishment of the 
failure of conciliation, or within 30 days of the below mentioned actions: 
a work contract modification implemented with the employer's one-sided 
action; 
the cessation of employment, including termination based on mutual consent; 
extraordinary notice and legal consequences 238 applied on account of the 
employee's breach of obligation; 
payment notice239 and a ruling prescribing compensation. 240 
If the employee files his/her suit against termination of employment or against legal 
consequences applied by the employee on account of a violation of obligation after the 
lapse of six months, he/she will not demand the restoration of his/her employment or 
his/her employment in the original position or work place. Furthermore, he/she can put 
in a claim only for wages for the six months preceding the filing of the suit. 24 ' 
As we could see within the Hungarian labour legislation the so called alternative 
dispute resolution method is not yet widely accepted. We believe that in the future this 
situation will change in favour of these methods, which help to settle the labour dispute 
more appropriately. 242 
237 See Article 23, Article 67, and points c) and d) of para (1) of Article 202 of Labour Code. 
238 Article 109, "In the event of a grievous viloation by the employee of obligations arising from employment, 
the collective contract may, in addition to specifying the rules of procedure, also establish legal consequences in 
addition to those contained in Labour Code (para (1) Article 96). The collective contract only establishes, as a 
detrimental legal consequence, those disadvantages attached to employment that do not violate the employee's 
personal rights and human dignity. A pecuniary fine shall not be prescribed as a detrimental legal consequence. 
There is no measure containing detrimental legal consequences in relation to an employee if one year has already 
elapsed since the reprehensible breach of obligation. A measure entailing detrimental legal consequences is only 
carried out in a ruling justified in writing, which shall also contain information about the opportunity for legal 
redress. In a procedure aimed at the implementation of detrimental legal consequences, it is ensured that the 
employee be able to present his/her defence and to avail him/herself of a legal representative." 
239 Article 162, "In the event of the payment of wages without a legal basis, this may be reclaimed from the 
employee in writing within sixty days. Wages paid without a legal basis may be reclaimed within the general time 
for prescription, if the employee has recognized the lack of basis for the payment or if he/she him/herself caused it. 
The employer may assert its claim, by written notice, that the employee should repay the debts connected with 
his/her employment." 
240 Para (2) of Article 173, "A collective agreement may determine the value to the extent of which the 
employer can directly oblige the employee to pay compensation. In this case the standard procedure for making 
compensation is also established." 
241 Articles 199-202 of the Act XXII of 1992 on Labour Code. 
242 József Hajdú: The Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the Sphere of Labour Law, Acta 
Juridica et Politica Tomus LIV., Fasciculus 8., Szeged, 1998 pp. 72-74. 
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IV. The Hungarian Mediation and Arbitration Service 
1. Creating the Service's operating conditions 
The Hungarian Mediation and Arbitration Service (hereinafter: HMS) was not 
created by a law, but rather by an agreement on the NCC's Feb. 16, 1996 meeting, 
therefore the HMS' legal status is still unsettled. The HMS is currently under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, however, the NCC agreement allows it to 
operate as a fully independent institution. In the past one year, the NCC members did 
not interfere with the-Service's -operation -and did not violate the their agreement. 
The financial conditions for operation are provided by the Government through the 
state budget which appropriated the NCC Secretariat HUF 10.100.000 for 1997 in the 
Ministry of Labour chapter. These funds are used to pay mediator/arbitrator fees, 
salaries of the three staff members, office rent and the costs of continuous operation 
(electricity, telephone, car, office supplies, post etc.). The Service's Secretariat 
currently has good technical and tangible equipment, but this primarily due to PHARE 
aid and other conditions ensured by the Ministry of Labour. In addition to the above 
mentioned compulsory expenses, its budget was mainly used to pay for 
mediator/arbitrator training related costs. 
In the past year HMS also completed the administrative tasks — extremely 
important from an operation aspect — stipulated by its Operation and Procedure 
Regulation. Thus, it prepared a service file for each colleague, registration forms for 
recording cases and training records etc. 
The Service Secretariat — following establishment — rather quickly developed the 
fast and effective internal reporting and liaison system. One of the system's important 
elements is the "Békéltető" (The Reconciliatior), a publication in which HMS not only 
publishes information on events, programs and training possibilities, but in the 
supplement it publishes reports/studies. 
2. Training the Service members 
Base training for mediators/arbitrators is prescribed by the Service's operation and 
procedure regulation. Furthermore, all colleagues admitted to the list assumed the 
obligation of attending base training organised by the Service. 
The training course had two objectives: 
Provide know-how, offer methods and procedures to the participants and 
practising these. 
Establishing friendly and professional relationships within the Service, as well as 
creating work teams which operate as professional workshops even after the training. 
Since the mediator, arbitrator "profession" was unknown in Hungary, the HMS had 
to entrust foreign institutions which have both mediator and training experience. It was 
a great assistance, that the American FMCS provided base training for all mediators 
stated on the list, which was well supplemented by the British ACAS and Belgian 
Ministry of Labour's base level but not totally "beginner" mediator training. 
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The HMS feels that aside from its own internal training, it would have been 
necessary to inform, prepare and train potential clients on the Service's mission, goals, 
procedure, who the mediators/arbitrators are. However, neither the unions nor the 
employer organisations were very interested. 
3. The operation of the Hungarian Mediation and Arbitration Service 
In the past years, the Service concentrated its work on the following four areas: 
Offering assistance in known conflicts (interest disputes, collective disputes) or 
providing mediation/arbitration services upon request. 
Establishing the HMS organisation, creating conditions for operation. 
Making the Service known, popular. 
Organising base training for the mediators/arbitrators contained in the list. 
3.1. Settling labour disputes: mediation, arbitration 
Since its founding (1996), the Hungarian Mediation and Arbitration Service 
handled 30 cases. (Statistics prepared on the cases are contained in Appendix 1.) , Of 
this, in 14 cases either of the disputing parties turned to HMS for assistance and in 6 
cases they jointly requested its help. In the other cases (10) the Service Director and 
Secretary contacted the participants of the labour disputes based on reports published 
in newspapers and electronic media. Of the 30 cases, 18 cases fell under the HMS' 
jurisdiction based on the disputes. Of these in six cases, the participants of four 
disputes jointly requested the Services' assistance on location (Szekszárdi Meat 
Processing Rt., Szolnoki Bakery Co., Szolnoki Furniture Manufacturing Limited, and 
the Karacs Teréz High School Girl's Dormitory). 
In 12 cases of the remaining 18, the HMS would have had the right to take action, 
but either its services were not requested or due to a strike threat and the internal 
conflict management mechanism (in most cases this was regulated in the collective 
agreement) within the work place this was not possible. 
In two cases, the owners turned to the HMS requesting assistance in settling 
disputes. In the other 9 cases, the Service's assistance was requested in resolving 
individual disputes and in 1 case the Service helped properly execute a works council 
election. The HMS succeeded in asserting its principle, that whoever turns to it for 
help, be that either industrial disputes or individual legal dispute, it shall always listen 
and provide advice on who to turn to or what to do. 243 
3.2. Why wasn't the Service's assistance requested more frequently? 
a) Primarily because the Service is not well known. It is almost certain, that the 
majority of those who turned to it were not informed of HMS' founding through the 
Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Gazette), but rather from some other source e.g. TV, 
243 Report to the National Conciliation Council on the period of Julyl, 1996-July 1, 1997; by The Labour 
Mediation and Arbitration Service, Hungary, Budapest, 1997 pp. 3-5. 
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radio, newspaper, various lectures, briefings, trade journals etc. Its successful work at 
the Szekszárd Meat Processing Co. in 1996 summer briefly put the HMS in the 
limelight. 
In the past year, few collective disputes were made public. The HMS collected 
articles from national newspapers and magazines, which reported on strike threats, 
strikes and other disputes between employers and employees in the period following 
July 1, 1996. Based on the articles, most of the conflicts - due to the effects of strike 
threats (in the initial phase of placing pressure) and publicity - never got as far as 
demonstration or walk out. To the bést of HMS' knowledge, during the reporting 
period there were 9 strike threats in the country and 5 warning and general strikes, of 
these one was-only-a two hour warning strike. In the remaining four cases, there were 
3 walk outs in Szekszárd and one in Szolnok. The Service was asked to mediate in 
both Szekszárd and Szolnok. 
There are only a few workplace or sector level collective agreements. In 
Hungary, industrial relations in the workplace have low standards, there is practically 
no employee interest representation at small and medium sized companies, the unions 
in certain fields/professions have almost completely ceased. Naturally there are no 
collective agreements at these places of employment and cannot be, because as per the 
regulations in effect only the union can conclude such contracts with the employer. 
Interest disputes are difficult to manifest at these places of employment, because the 
employer does not have a partner with whom it can develop and operate collective 
industrial relations. 
The employer does not always appreciate the participation of a third -party in 
the dispute with the employee, because it fears that the mediator may obtain 
information which, if leaked, might violate the company's business interests and 
undermine its position during negotiations. If a conflict does occur within the 
workplace, naturally they first try to resolve the problem "internally". If this is not 
successful, then the trade or sector unions are brought in on the employee side. It is 
important for the unions to be involved and successfully resolve the conflicts, because 
their prestige increases among the members. In the HMS' opinion, this type of union 
behaviour is only natural. If even they are incapable of resolving the interest dispute, 
only then can an external independent party brought in, who e.g.- if they know that the 
Service exists - may also be one of HMS' members. 
Based on the above four reasons, we can state that the economic and social 
transformation causes much tension in the Hungarian labour market. The majority of 
labour interest disputes do not reach the strike phase, but are resolved earlier in some 
manner. Perhaps this would explain that in the first year of the HMS' operation it 
registered 30 cases. These are not a big deal. However, the leadership of HMS knows, 
that only with great patience, persistent, steadfast work, greater openness and 
assistance from social welfare partners, can HMS' services accepted by the workplace 
unions and employers. 
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4. Future tasks 
A. Based on the experiences of the past year, it would be necessary to make a few 
modifications to the Service's goal and task system. In addition to providing mediation 
or arbitration services — upon request — in evolved labour disputes, to also emphasise 
preventive mediation 
on -site open or public consulting to established civilised industrial relations, 
assisting workplace problems (labour, economic etc.) through team work, etc. 
B. The government — in agreement with the social partners — shall sort out the 
Service's legal status. Create a law which determines the HMS legal situation, its 
relationship with the NCC, financing and personnel and material conditions of 
operation. So far, the Rules of Operation and Procedures of HMS was accepted by NCC 
in March 31, 2000. There is a basic problem relating to the Procedures. Namely, it was 
not enacted as a legal rule. 
In addition to preparations for traditional mediation and arbitration tasks, 
preventive mediation, consulting and team work should also be given priority. 
The Service should improve its PR work. Continue developing its briefing 
strategy started with the help of the US Department of Labour, make preparations for 
publishing brochures facilitating workplace partner relationships. 
The Service should continue to maintain its international relations established in 
the first year, make use of the received know-how and incorporate what it can into its 
own work. At the same time take advantage of its position, that it can play a 
determinant role in Eastern Europe in passing on the Hungarian model. 
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Summary 
Finally, we would like to touch upon four seemingly different issues, which are 
somehow rolling around one common topic: the ADR system. 
Trust in judge (court), but wish to solve the problem informally. One of the main 
difficulties of ADR is that majority of the persons trust only in court decision and 
process, but at the same time they want to solve their disputes as close, cheap and fast 
as possible for their own circles. This discrepancy leads. them to think about ADR, but 
at the same time they do not trust in it really. We have to solve this problem and let 
them think-about using on theú trust the different ADR systems. 
Vindicating only rights, instead of solving the problem. There are, no doubt, a 
plethora of reasons contributing to a particularly litigious society. A significant factor 
is that contemporary morality often values the vindication of rights over the balance of 
compromise. For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has, with its 
guarantees of individual rights, encouraged the citizen to believe that one really can 
fight City Hall and win. 
Plural system. In consideration of the previous chapters, our view is that, 
wherever court-based adjudication is designated, an attempt should be made to make 
other methods also available. This implies that other methods are not advocated to 
supplant adjudication, but rather that these methods are available next to adjudication. 
Our recommendation for a co-existing plurality of dispute settlement institutions 
stems from an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of both court-based 
adjudication and other methods of dispute settlement. The acclaimed advantages of 
adjudication as well as the other methods can easily turn into the reverse, depending on 
the personae and circumstances of the parties, and the characteristics of the dispute at 
hand. Where autonomy is sought, for example, the authority of a judge may be needed 
instead. Proceeding in public accompanied by publicity may be desirable for particular 
litigants, but it can be extremely burdensome for others. In some cases there may be a 
need to establish a precedent in law, whereas in others mere application of pre-existing 
norms would only hinder a pragmatic solution desired by both parties. 
Therefore, the central question should be which method of dispute resolution is 
most suitable considering the parties and the dispute at hand. 
In our view it is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules as much depends on the 
parties and their problems. Nevertheless, conscientious attempts at drawing up some 
"do's and don'ts" have been made by other specialised institutions. 
We do not subscribe to the widely accepted theory, that disputes over rights are to 
be settled through adjudication only, and disputes over interests through any of the 
other methods such as conciliation. One argument to support this is that the law itself 
does explicitly allow for disputes over rights to be taken out of the judicial process. 
Provisions thereto can be found in the domestic laws of the legal systems under review, 
as well as in international_ legal standards, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights.The law itself does not give the courts the monopoly of the legal dispute 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems in the sphere of labour law... — 97 
market. In addition to this somewhat formal argument, we submit that it may be 
practically difficult to separate interests' out of rights. 244 
D. Problem of legal education. Another important and perhaps more significant 
factor, because it is within societal control, is the system of modern legal education 
which is unrelenting in its inculcation of the adversarial approach to dispute 
resolution. The result is that modern legal education often produces lawyers trained in 
a confrontational spirit which undermines and ultimately ignores innovations aimed at 
the early settlement of disputes. The primary goal of winning the case often blinds 
lawyers to the financial and emotional cost to the client. 
Law schools, therefore, must foster an atmosphere of conciliation by emphasising 
such methods as mediation, negotiation, and arbitration as means of resolving legal 
disputes. The curricula should give weight to the values of balance and compromise to 
complement the vindication of rights as the sole principle of dispute resolution. Instead 
of placing all the emphasis on trial practice, some of the student's time should • be 
devoted to settlement techniques. More of the budding litigant's time in practice will be 
spent in settling than in trying cases. The governing bodies of the law profession can 
help with this task by establishing continuing legal education programs. 
In this paper we intended to introduce the basic elements of ADR systems, and also 
demonstrate briefly how it works in countries, with different legal and cultural 
background. Some type of ADR technics are not unknown in Hungary, therefore, we 
hardly believe that it could widespread in Hungary as well. 
244 Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg: Settling labour disputes in Europe, Kluwer, 1994. pp. 35-36. 
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HAJDÚ JÓZSEF 
AZ „ALTERNATÍV VITAMEGOLDÁS" ALKALMAZÁSA A 
MUNKAJOGBAN NÉHÁNY EURÓPAI UNIÓS ORSZÁGBAN ÉS 
MAGYARORSZÁGON 
(Összefoglalás) 
Külföldön és hazánkban egyre nagyobb problémát jelent a bíróságok telítettsége és 
ebből adódóan a-peres ügyek -elhúzódása. Az-ítélethirdetésig évek telhetnek el, jelentős 
költségtöbbletet okozva ezzel a feleknek, a vita pedig hosszú ideig megoldatlan marad. 
Több vonatkozásban felmerülhet a kérdés, hogy miként lehetne ezt a problémát 
orvosolni. 
Az egyik lehetséges megoldásként az ún. ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution 
vagy „alternatív vitamegoldás", továbbiakban: AVM) kínálkozik. Az AVM önkéntesen 
választott vitamegoldási technikák rendszere, melyeknek közös célja, hogy a 
konfliktust a lehető leggyorsabban, a felek kölcsönös megelégedésére rendezzék, 
lehetőleg a hosszú és költséges bírói út elkerülésével. Az így alkalmazott legtöbb 
módszer egyáltalán nem újkeletű. Az elmúlt időszakban ezt a technikát több országban 
újra „felfedezték". Az AVM a legtöbb esetben csak apró részletekben különbözik egy 
már meglévő konfliktusmegoldó módszertől. Az AVM lényege, hogy a felek mindig az 
adott konfliktushelyzetnek legmegfelelőbb technikát választhatják ki. Ez pedig 
rendszerint gyorsabb és olcsóbb vitamegoldást eredményez. Ez a „mozgalom" számos 
látható és kedvező eredményt hozo tt, főként a gazdasági és kereskedelmi jog, az 
egészségügyi jog és nem utolsósorban a munkajog területén. 
Az AVM Magyarországon sem ismeretlen, sőt néhány technika alkalmazása a 
gazdasági, illetve a kereskedelmi jogban kifejezetten — történeti távlatokban is — 
gyakorinak mondható. A nálunk isme rt és alkalmazott módszerek azonban az AVM-
nek csak nagyon kis szeletét jelentik. 
Több ország eddigi gyakorlata bebizonyította, hogy az AVM nagyon jól 
alkalmazható munkaügyi konfliktusok megoldására. Magyarországon az AVM alkal-
mazása nem hagyományok nélküli, ugyanakkor a munkaügyi konfliktusok megoldásá-
nál napjainkban még viszonylag ritkán alkalmazott módszer. 
Jelen munkánk első részében az Európai Unió néhány — e tárgy vonatkozásában 
meghatározó — tagállamában működő AVM-ek bemutatására kerül sor. Külön-külön 
tárgyaljuk Belgium, Dánia, Franciaország, Németország, Nagy-B ritannia, Görög-
ország, Olaszország, Írország, Luxemburg, Portugália, Spanyolország, Svédország 
fontosabb AVM-rendszereinek a kialakulását, jogi szabályozását és működési 
mechanizmusait. 
Munkánk második részében a magyar AVM-rendszerrel foglalkozunk. Az első 
fejezetben a magyar rendszer történeti kialakulását tekintjük át. A második fejezetben a 
munkaügyi bíráskodás kialakulását és fejlődését mutatjuk be röviden. A harmadik 
fejezetben a hatályos munkajogi szabályozás keretében működő alternatív 
vitamegoldási rendszereket tárgyaljuk. A negyedik fejezetben a Munkaügyi Döntőbírói 
és Közvetítői Szolgálat szerepét vizsgáljuk meg. 
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